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ABSTRACT 
CORPORATE SOCIAL INVOLVEMENT: 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE 
SOCIAL DECISION PROCESS 
September, 1978 
Michael J. Merenda, B.S.B.A., 
Northeastern University, M.B.A. Northeastern University 
Ph.D. University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Arthur Elkins 
Although many authors have been prolifically writing about corpo¬ 
rate social involvement, much of that being offered is presented in a 
normative, prescriptive approach. As a result, the bulk of the effort 
in this field is usually value laden and often provokes a "so-what" 
attitude. As such, a need still exists for investigating corporate 
social involvement as a positive managerial concern devoid of subjec¬ 
tively biased opinions and prescriptions. 
The primary purpose of this exploratory study is to add empirical 
credence to our understanding of corporate social involvement by in¬ 
vestigating, tracing, describing and reporting the actions and/or 
steps leading to a social program’s initiation and institutionalization. 
Corporate social involvement was defined in terms of corporate 
programs that were: (1) considered to be socially desirable by the 
company, community and literature, and (2) voluntary (e.g., having 
no legal obligation to commit time or finances to the program). 
Specifically, we looked at five different voluntary social pro- 
viii 
grams in five different companies, including: (1) corporate contribu¬ 
tion activities at the Cabot Corporation; (2) social audit at Eastern 
Gas and Fuel Associates; (3) minority educational assistance at General 
Electric; (4) civic involvement at John Hancock; and (5) minority vendor 
program at the Raytheon Company. All five companies were Fortune 500 
concerns or its equivalent and represented four different industries. 
Data was collected in over thirty-five hours of interviews with 
twenty individuals in the five companies used for the case profiles 
and one company used for a pre-test of an interview guide. Data ob¬ 
tained in the field investigation was supplemented by corporate docu¬ 
ments and a library search for information pertinent to the social 
program and company investigated. 
Analysis centered on comparing, discussing and interpreting the 
descriptive data contained in the case studies with focuses relating to 
(1) the companies under study mapped in five substantive propositions, 
and (2) the verification of other studies on: (a) social response pro¬ 
cesses in organizations and (b) the use of several open systems refer¬ 
ence points as a possible way of explaining and viewing corporate social 
involvement mapped in one theoretical/methodological proposition. 
Relative to the five substantive propositions it was shown that: 
(1) the chief executive officer is the pivotal figure when it comes to 
the initiation of voluntary social programs; (2) while social challenges, 
threats or opportunities may enter the organization at any level of the 
organization, they are most likely to enter at or above the middle 
management level; (3) social programs are eventually institutionalized 
ix 
into routines with top management participation a key aspect of a pro¬ 
gram’s institutionalization; (4) while social program activity may be 
decentralized in the organization, social program responsibility re¬ 
mains at or relatively close to the top of the organization; and (5) 
corporate social involvement is a positive and explicit top management 
activity and as such may be recognized in the policy formulation process. 
Relative to our theoretical/methodological proposition, it was 
shown that several theoretical reference points employing open systems 
phenomenon provide a consistent way for viewing and explaining organiza¬ 
tion actions and processes associated with the initiation and institu¬ 
tionalization of voluntary social programs. 
Finally, it was concluded that there is strong evidence that the 
social response process as reported by R. Ackerman and E. Murray was in 
many ways replicated for voluntary social programs. This was especially 
true when the organization under study required mandatory participation 
from lower level employees and this participation was viewred as a threat 
to their present job position. 
In the final analysis, it was advanced that the crossover of 
observations made in several disciplines and areas (e.g., organizational 
theory, innovation) can be used to increase our understanding of corpo¬ 
rate social involvement and help mitigate the rhetoric and misunder¬ 
standing that so often accompanies discussion of corporate social 
involvement. 
X 
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Although many authors have been prolifically writing about corpo¬ 
rate social involvement,"^ much of that being offered is presented in 
a normative, prescriptive (what should be) approach. As a result, the 
bulk of the effort in this field is usually value laden and subjective¬ 
ly biased. This often provokes a "so-what" attitude. 
Corporate social involvement, however, is real and does demon¬ 
strate particular corporate processes and behaviors. However, the em¬ 
pirical positive approach in the literature is still limited. Before 
any normative and/or conceptual model can be legitimately offered for 
corporate social involvement, these models should be grounded in posi¬ 
tive, descriptive (what is) approaches. As Paine and Naumes state, 
"Prescribing what we should do is meaningful only when it is grounded 
2 
in valid description." 
Purpose of Study 
With the above in mind, the primary objective of this study is 
to add empirical credence to our understanding of corporate process 
and behavior—more specifically in corporate social activity—by in¬ 
vestigating, describing, and reporting in detail specific social pro¬ 
grams in their entirety. A corporate social program will be defined 
as a specific program of an organization that meets the following cri 
terion: it is recognized as a social activity by the community in 
2 
which the organization functions, by the social involvement literature 
and by the company. To distinguish voluntary social programs (e.g,, 
corporate contributions) from mandatory '’social" programs (e.g., pollu¬ 
tion abatement programs) an additional criterion must be met. For our 
purposes an activity is a voluntary social program if the participating 
organization can withdraw support or dollars from the activity and still 
be in compliance with the law. 
Specifically, we will direct our effort to the following objec¬ 
tives in this study: 
1. Trace and describe in detail for the firms under study all the 
initiating actions and/or steps (e.g., how did the program get 
into the organization) which eventually lead to one actual social 
program 
2. Trace and describe in detail for the firms under study all the 
actions and/or steps employed by the firms to institutionalize the 
social program arrived at in one above, into routines: policies, 
procedures, methods (e.g., steps to make it an ongoing program for 
the organization) 
Relative to the objectives of this study only those programs that 
are institutionalized will be considered. Hence, this study will not 
concern itself with contemplated programs. 
In addition, this study will hopefully develop and establish a 
blueprint or foundation from which a positive model of corporate social 
involvement can be built by comparing and contrasting findings and data 
advanced in five voluntary social program profiles (see Chapters IV - 
VIII) to: 
1. Five substantive propositions advanced by this investigator (see 
Chapters III and IX) 
2. One methodological/theoretical proposition relative to alternative 
theories of the firm (see Chapter III and IX) 
3 
3. Propositions and findings advanced in the literature relative to 
the "corporate social response process" (see Chapter X) 
The five substantive propositions were advanced and developed by 
this investigator based on a thorough library review on corporate social 
involvement (see Chapter II). 
Finally, since it is felt that corporate social involvement is a 
positive and important corporate activity, it is hoped that this inves¬ 
tigation will lay the groundwork and initiate and inspire interest for 
future research in the field of policy, especially as it is related to 
corporate social policy. 
Methodology 
In order to construct the voluntary social program profiles from 
which analysis, discussion and interpretations of propositions advanced 
by this investigator and others on corporate social activity can occur 
(see Chapters IX and X), indepth case studies of voluntary social pro¬ 
grams in five large corporations (see Chapter III - Table 16 ) were 
undertaken. Data obtained in over thirty-five hours of interviews 
with 20 individuals were supplemented with data contained in corporate 
documents (i.e., policy statements, minutes of meetings, communications, 
executive reports, annual reports, other) and an indepth library review 
and investigation of documents pertaining to programs and companies 
under study. 
In all, six corporations were contacted and visited. One company 
was used as a pretest of an open-ended questionnaire used as a guide 
in the collection of profile data (see Appendix A). 
4 
Case study was selected over other methodologies for this study 
since this investigative technique: (1) allowed greater freedom to 
investigate, describe and report in detail the initiation and institu¬ 
tionalization of voluntary social programs, (2) overcame the operation¬ 
al problems associated with defining the significant variables under 
study (e.g., social involvement), and (3) because of the dearth of 
prior in-depth investigation in this area (voluntary social programs), 
the case method of study seemed to offer the greatest potential for 
advancing our knowledge in this positive, little understood, and in¬ 
creasingly important area of corporate involvement. 
Significance of Study 
The significance of this exploratory study on corporate social 
involvement presents itself in the following ways: 
1. While former studies investigated one particular type of social 
activity (i.e., contributions) in one industry (i.e., banking), 
this study, for the first time, investigated different voluntary 
social programs in five different companies in four different 
industries 
2. While much rhetoric and misunderstanding surrounds corporate social 
involvement, this study provided further support that this activity 
is a positive organizational phenomenon that receives attention and 
commitment from top executives (e.g., it is a managerial concern) 
3. From the student’s point of view, this investigation will be a use¬ 
ful pedagogical tool in the teaching of Business Policy and Busi¬ 
ness and Its Environment (Business and Society) courses — especial 
ly as these concerns relate to our understanding of the formulation 
and implementation of corporate social policies 
4. From the businessman’s point of view, this study will be a useful 
guide for comparison and preparation of present or contemplated 
social programs in particular and new programs in general 
5. From the researcher’s point of view, this study will help to supple 
ment and complement his theoretical training and intellectual 
5 
curiosity especially as this pertains to his/her present or con¬ 
templated research endeavors in the areas of corporate social 
involvement, organizational theory and innovation 
6. Finally, this exploratory study will contribute to the field of 
business policy by incorporating a social involvement perspective 
Limitations of Study 
The limitations of this exploratory study on corporate social 
involvement present themselves in the following ways: 
1. As a result of the investigative technique (case study) and small 
sample size (five firms), any conclusions drawn from this study 
will lack statistical verification 
2. Although great care has been exercised so as not to interject one’s 
personal biases, one can not completely eliminate his subjectivity. 
This is true for both the investigator and interviewee and is 
especially true of non-quantitative investigations 
3. Because of the ex post facto nature of the investigative technique, 
many of the actions and processes described had to be reconstructed 
based on interviewee recall, third parties or secondary data 
sources. As such, the detail control associated with field and 
laboratory experiments was not as great 
4. Also, because of the small sample size (five firms) generalizing 
to larger populations is suspect, although this is to be expected 
for an exploratory study 
Overview 
In order to provide greater understanding of corporate social in¬ 
volvement and as basis for the research questions and propositions pre¬ 
sented and investigated in this study. Chapter II, "Models and Structure 
of Social Activity" is focused on describing several explanations for 
corporate social activities along with several conceptual, analytical 
studies on the present status of corporate social involvement. Alsot 
in Chapter II we look at several organizational and policy studies on 
6 
social activity. 
In Chapter III, "Sources and Methods," the methodology to be 
employed in this exploratory study is covered in greater detail. Also, 
the five substantive propositions and one methodological proposition 
along with their individual support will be presented. Additionally, 
the social activities investigated, sample firms and definitions of 
key terms used in this study will be introduced. 
In Chapters IV through VIII, individual profiles of the sample 
programs, their initiation and institutionalizations will be presented 
for the five companies investigated. 
Analysis, interpretations and discussion of the information con¬ 
tained in the profiles relative to the objectives, research questions 
and propositions presented in Chapter III is provided in Chapter IX. 
In Chapter X, The Corporate Social Response Process, we will com¬ 
pare the data contained in the five company profiles to determine if 
the social response patterns as described by others were replicated 
for voluntary social programs investigated in this present study. 
Finally, Chapter XI will conclude this exploratory study by 
offering a summary review of this project and its findings, along with 
conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
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FOOTNOTES 
Witness the plethora of books, articles, and journals expound¬ 
ing upon corporate social responsibility. For a sampling see: James 
W. McKie, Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament (Washing¬ 
ton, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1975). 
2 
Frank T. Paine and William Naumes, Strategy and Policy Formula¬ 
tion (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1974): 16. 
CHAPTER II 
MODELS AND STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTIVITY 
Introduction 
The literature in the field of Business and Society is voluminous 
even if not very rigorous. When one includes the literature found in 
the field of Business Policy, which some have asserted includes the 
Business and Society field, our task of reviewing becomes even more 
difficult.^ 
Although there are probably more intangibles in the study of 
business and its social role than in other fields of business study, 
the Business and Society field is steadily crystalizing. The follow¬ 
ing review of models and structure of social activity bears out suf¬ 
ficient activity to indicate the emergence of a fledging discipline. 
What one can conclude by scanning the works of the many contrib¬ 
utors to the field of Business and Society is that corporate social 
involvement: (1) has long been a positive corporate activity or con- 
2 
cern, (2) continues to be a source of heated debate normatively among 
3 
individuals in various professions, and (3) has developed a sense of 
legitimacy as a result of a) government legislation and court rulings 
4 
in favor of corporate social spending and support, and b) increasingly 
large numbers of corporate executives, public officials and academics 
devoting time to pursuing, describing and explaining this phenomenon. 
In light of the objectives of this study (see Chapter I), our 
8 
9 
task in this present chapter is to present: (1) some categorizations 
and descriptions of social activity, (2) a few of the rationales for 
corporate social activities, and (3) some conceptualizations and 
studies of policy and organizational processes for corporate social 
involvement. 
Social Activity 
A large part of the difficulty in understanding and explaining 
corporate social involvement is the tremendous semantic quagmire schol¬ 
ars and laymen alike have established with the term "social responsi¬ 
bility" when applied to the business world. 
To date, no one individual has adequately operationally defined 
the term. Votaw has eloquently captured the dilemma when he asserts: 
The term (corporate social responsibility) is a 
brilliant one. It means something, but not al¬ 
ways the same thing, to everybody. To some it 
conveys the idea of legal responsibility or 
liability; to others it means socially respon¬ 
sible ’behavior’ in an ethical sense; to still 
others the meaning transmitted is that of 
"responsible for," in a causal mode; many sim¬ 
ply equate it with "charitable contributions"; 
some take it to mean socially "conscious" or 
"aware"; many of those who embrace it most 
fervently see it as a mere synonym for "legiti¬ 
macy," in the context of "belonging" or being 
proper or valid; ...Even the antonyms, socially 
"irresponsible" and "nonresponsible," are sub¬ 
ject to multiple interpretations.° 
Eilbirt and Parket^ surveyed 96 presidents of firms listed in 
the 1971 Forbes "Roster of the Country’s Biggest Corporations." These 
researchers sought descriptive data about, "what is currently being 
dene" by corporations in order to "enable practitioners to compare 
10 
their work against that of other organizations." Their findings re¬ 
vealed several types of social responsibility activities and their 
relative importance (see Tables 1 and 2). 
TABLE 1 
TYPES OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACTIVITIES 
Percent 
Activity Practicing 
Contributions to education 86 
Ecology 78 
Minority hiring 78 
Minority training 68 
Contributions to the arts 68 
Hard core hiring 58 
Hard core training 55 
Civil rights 53 
Urban renewal 53 
Consumer complaints 46 
Understandable accounting statements 42 
Truth in advertising 42 
Product defects 36 
Guarantees and warranties 32 
Consumer oriented label changes 24 
SOURCE: Henry Eilbirt and I. Robert Parket, "The 
Current Status of Corporate Social Responsibility," 
California Management Review 18 (August 1973): 9, Table 2. 
g 
In another study on "Social Responsibility" Buehler and Shetty 
received responses from 232 of the largest United States industrial and 
nonindustrial firms listed in Fortune. These investigators defined 
corporate social responsibility to include three areas: urban affairs 
(i.e., supporting improvements in medical care facilities, fostering 
minority owned businesses, supporting the arts and cultural events); 
consumer affairs (i.e., designing product improvements regarding safety, 
testing reliability, effectiveness and product life, providing improved 
11 
TABLE 2 
ACTIVITIES BELIEVED MOST IMPORTANT 
Firms Ranking 
Activity Among 
Number _Top Three 
Activity Practicing Number Percent 
Minority hiring 75 40 53 
Ecology 75 35 47 
Minority training 
Contributions to 
65 23 35 
education 82 23 28 
Consumer complaints 44 9 20 
Urban renewal 51 8 16 
Civil rights 51 8 16 
Product defects 34 3 9 
Contributions to the arts 65 5 8 
Hard core training 53 4 8 
Truth in advertising 40 • 3 8 
Hard core hiring 
Consumer oriented label 
56 2 4 
changes 23 1 4 
Guarantees and warranties 
Understandable accounting 
31 1 3 
statements 40 0 0 
SOURCE: Henry Eilbirt and I. Robert Parket, "The Current Status 
of Corporate Social Responsibility," California Management Review 18 
(August 1973): 10, Table 3. 
services for handling grievances, repairs, warranties and guarantees); 
and environmental affairs (i.e., providing pollution abatement and 
protection for the environment concerning air and water quality, solid 
waste, noise, and radiation). Table 3 presents their findings relative 
to the degree of involvement for particular types of social activities 
within each of the three categories. 
9 
Ackerman provides us with a matrix of social activity which 
categorizes social activity according to its organizational impact and 
12 
TABLE 3 
PATTERNS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL ACTION 
Activities 
Average 
Ranking3 S.D. F-Ratio 
Urban affairs 
1 Employment and training 2.1 1.2 
2 Contribution to education 2.6 1.3 60.23 
3 Medical assistance 3.1 1.6 df 4/869 
4 Contributions to culture and arts 4.0 1.4 p .001 
5 Urban renewal 4.0 1.7 
Consumer affairs 
1 Quality control 1.9 1.3 
2 Design improvement 2.2 1.5 23.94 
3 Customer service 2.7 1.3 df 4/774 
4 Marketing improvement 3.0 1.4 p .001 
5 Customer information & education 3.2 1.5 
Environmental affairs 
1 Water pollution 2.1 1.4 
2 Air pollution 2.2 1.3 45.93 
3 Waste disposal 2.6 1.4 df 4/749 
4 Noise abatement 3.2 1.3 p .001 
5 Radiation abatement 4.2 1.8 
^he lower the average ranking, the more active is the company 
involvement. The differences in the degrees of freedom are attributable 
to some partially completed questionnaires. 
The average rankings for each activity within each of the three 
areas were tested using least significant difference of mean compari¬ 
sons and the following were found to be significantly different at the 
.05 level: 
Urban—all except 4 vs. 5 
Consumer—all except 1 vs. 2, 3 vs. 4, and 4 vs. 5 
Environment—all except 1 vs. 2 
SOURCE: Vernon M. Buehler and Y. K. Shetty, "Managerial Response 
to Social Responsibility Challenge," Academy of Management Journal 19 
(March 1976): 73, Table 4. 
its level of organizational implementation. Ackerman divides social 
activities into those activities that directly affect operations and 
those activities that have no significant effect on operations. A 
13 
further distinction is made between those activities that are normally 
the responsibility of managers at the operating levels in the company 
and those activities that are the responsibility of corporate level 
personnel. The Ackerman matrix is reproduced here as Table 4. 
TABLE 4 










. Entry or withdrawal 
from businesses 
. Ecology (pollution, 
solid waste) 
. Equal employment 
. Occupational health 
and safety 
. Product safety and use 
. Advertising and selling 
practices 





Affect on Operations 
. Contributions 
. "Special Interest" 
investments 
. Disclosure 
. Governance, Board 
of Directors 
. Civic Involvement 
. Community relations 
. Civic involvement 
SOURCE: Robert W. Ackerman, The Social Challenge to Business 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975): 13, Table II-l. 
Murray similarly classified social activities according to the 
Ackerman matrix but with one significant difference. Whereas Ackerman 
14 
used two levels of implementation (Corporate and Division), Murray 
utilized three levels of implementation (Corporate General Management, 
Corporate Staff Management and Division Line Management). Also, it 
must be noted that Ackerman’s matrix was based on observations made 
in divisionalized manufacturing firms while Murray’s matrix was based 
on observations made in Commercial Banks. Murray’s activity matrix 
is reproduced here in Table 5. 
TABLE 5 









Activities Having No 










Division Line Civic Involvement 






Special Product lines 
or services 
Affirmative Action 










Minority business lend¬ 
ing 
Advertising and Selling 
(truth-in-lending) 
Residential mortgage 
lending to minorities 
Other 
SOURCE: Edwin A. Murray, Jr., ’’Achieving Corporate Social Re¬ 
sponsiveness” (Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University, October 1974): 
1-22, Figure 3. 
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Explanations for Corporate Social Activity: 
Conceptual. Statistical & Survey Studies 
Attention will be focused in this study on how voluntary social 
programs become organizational pursuits. At any one time there are a 
multiplicity of forces and justifications for business assumption of 
social activities. While a number of conceptual speculations have 
been postulated for this phenomenon, systematic investigation in this 
area is scant and incipient. This section will concern itself with the 
review of several explanations advanced for the assumption of corporate 
social activity. It is obvious from this review that social involve¬ 
ment is a function of a number of factors both within and outside the 
control of individual businessmen. Also, while the chief executive 
officer of the company may be the pivotal figure when it comes to 
corporate social activity, the question still unanswered is how the 
social activity was introduced to the chief executive and/or his staff? 
Conceptual: Elkins, Davis 
A number of authors have speculated, initiated and inspired fur¬ 
ther inquiry into social activity motivations. Elkins^ has advanced 
several motivational bases from a positive perspective relative to 
corporate social phenomenon. The Elkins’ paradigm postulates five 
motivations for corporate social involvement: corporate morality 
(executives treat social activity as an ethical imparative), protective 
strategy (engaged in to protect physical property), public relations 
and advertising (promotion of goodwill and a lowering of promotion 
costs), profit seeking (some social activities can be priced profitably 
16 
in the market) and managerial Mego" satisfaction. This last explana¬ 
tion is based upon theories of discretionary behavior.** The managerial 
ego-satisfaction model postulates that managers may pursue social 
activities because they have the power (lack of stockholder control), 
means (pure profit, organizational slack, or discretionary resources) 
and a need for personal gratification (ego-satisfaction through person¬ 
al involvement in social activities). 
12 
Keith Davis presented several normative arguments both for and 
against corporate social involvement. Among the reasons prescribed 
for the assumption of social involvement by Davis are: enlightened 
13 
self-interest, public image, viability of business, avoidance of 
government regulation, socio-cultural norms (i.e., there is a changing 
social contract between business and society and part of the terms of 
the new contract is an expectation by society for business to assume a 
14 15 
larger role in social matters ), stockholder’s interest, business’s 
turn (other institutions have tried and failed), business capacity to 
devote resources to social concerns, corporate social involvement could 
be profitable, and lastly to prevent future and more costly problems. 
Others have argued that a firm should adopt social activities 
within their overall corporate posture on the assumption that social 
involvement makes "good business sense."*^ One "prudential" theory of 
corporate social involvement presented by Bowman and Haire*^ postulates 
that corporate social involvement "not by itself and not uniquely, is 
a signal of good, sensitive, informed, balanced, modem, negotiating, 
coopting management." 
17 
Statistical Explanation for Corporate Social Involvement:: 
Buehler and Shettv ... ■ -— ■ ■ ■ «. 
Statistical studies centering on rationale for corporate social 
18 
activities are limited in this field. Buehler and Shetty solicited 
responses from 144 corporations appearing in Fortune’s 1972 list of 
largest U.S. industrial and nonindustrial firms. All firms contacted 
were cited for their social actions. Using the social activity de¬ 
scriptions presented earlier (Urban Affairs, Consumer Affairs and 
Environmental Affairs), these investigators asked respondents to rank 
their assumption of social activities according to five motivations 
(plus other): image creation, enlightened self-interest, legal com¬ 
pliance, forestall violence and profit. As Table 6 indicates, en¬ 
lightened self-interest was found to be the most important, followed 
by legal compliance, image creation, profit and forestall violence, in 
all three of the social involvement areas — urban affairs, consumer 
affairs and environmental affairs. 
Survey of Executive Perceptions of Corporate Social Involvement: Holmes 
19 
Sandra L. Holmes mailed survey questions to top executives and 
received 192 responses. All firms were listed in the 1974 Fortune 
Directory of the largest industrial and nonindustrial United States 
* ° 
firms. Table 7 is a list of outcomes that executives ’’expected” from 
the social involvement of their firms. 
Organizational and Policy Studies on Social Activities 
A second focus of attention of this study is to trace those organ¬ 
izational responses associated with the institutionalization of voluntary 
18 
TABLE 6 






Motivational Forces Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D 
Enlightened self-interest 1.7 0.99 2.0 1.40 1.9 1.06 
Legal compliance 2.4 1.19 2.5 1.18 2.0 1.04 
Image creation 3.0 1.08 2.8 1.13 2.9 1.06 
Profit 3.9 1.37 2.9 1.49 3.6 1.37 
Forestall violence 3.9 1.03 4.4 .85 4.3 .81 
F-ratio 88.24* 65. 91* 106.52* 
df 4/606 4/545 4/572 
Note: The lower the average ranking, the stronger is the motivational 
force. The difference in the degrees of freedom is attributable to 
missing data. *p .01 
SOURCE: Vernon M. Buehler and Y. K. Shetty, "Motivations for 
Corporate Social Action," Academy of Management Journal, 17 (December 
1974): 769, Table 1. 
social programs. This section will review a number of organizational 
and policy studies centering on organizational responses to social 
activities. 
Conceptual Policy Studies 
Murray views strategy as the "relational link" which defines the 
firm vis-a-vis its environment and vice versa (see Figure 1 below). 
Murray points out that not only are traditional economic, technological 
and political forces impacting on the firm, social forces are also at 
work. In terms of these social forces top management considers social 
+ 
programs and policies, not just as its function of being a good citizen, 
but as a response to insure corporate survival (a major purpose of an 
19 
TABLE 7 
POSITIVE OUTCOMES WHICH EXECUTIVES EXPECTED FROM 
THE SOCIAL INVOLVEMENT OF THEIR FIRMS 
Percent 
Positive Outcomes Expecting 
Enhanced corporate reputation and goodwill 97.4 
Strengthening of the social system in which the 
corporation functions 89.0 
Strengthening of the economic system in which the 
corporation functions 74.3 
Greater job satisfaction among all employees 72.3 
Avoidance of government regulation 63.7 
Greater job satisfaction among executives 62.8 
Increased chances for survival of the firm 60.7 
Ability to attract better managerial talent 55.5 
Increased long-run profitability 52.9 
Strengthening of the pluralistic nature of 
American society 40.3 
Maintaining or gaining customers 38.2 
Investors will prefer socially responsible firms 36.6 
Increased short-run profitability 15.2 
SOURCE: Sandra L. Holmes, "Executive Perceptions of Corporate 
Social Responsibility," Business Horizons 19 (June 1976): 38, Table 2. 
organization) in its environment. 
Figure 1 
Strategy as a Definitional Link 
Firm Corporate Strategy 
(Purpose): 
Material resources Survival 
Financial resources K-> Product/Services 
Technology Growth 
Personnel and manage- Profitability 






SOURCE: Edwin A. Murray, Jr., "Achieving Corporate Social 




In terms of potential effects on long-term 
industry trends, opportunities, and threats, 
social pressures can have important ramifica¬ 
tions. Those social forces of yesterday—non¬ 
economic, qualitative, and perhaps only par¬ 
tially formed—often have become the business 
pressures of today—economic, quantitative, 
and shockingly stark. Accordingly, their 
impact on long range strategic planning—a 
crucial task of top-level management—can be 
profound.^ 
Murray views the policy formulation and implementation process as 
resulting from the organization's constant interaction with its environ¬ 
ment. This open systems view of the strategy formulation process has 
been receiving increasing attention in the literature. Viewed as an 
open system, organizational strategy results from the constant inter¬ 
action of social pressures, as well as economic pressures on the firm. 
This open systems approach is contrasted with traditional "closed 
system" strategies for studying organizations. 
Relevant Organization Theory 
Thompson notes that there are basically two discernable models 
for studying organizations: (1) rational model which flows from a 
closed system strategy and (2) the natural-system model which flows 
21 
from an open system strategy. The distinction between the rational 
model (closed system) and the natural system model (open system) allows 
us to look at the policy formulation process within organizations from 
two perspectives. 
Rational Model. Based on a closed system strategy, the rational 
model assumes that organizations operate in a determinate state where 
21 
all variables are known or predictable. If all variables are known or 
can be predicted then an optimal or maximum decision can be made with 
certainty. March and Simon state that under the closed system logic a 
rational man is one who ’’makes optimal choices in a highly specified 
22 
and clearly defined environment." 
Since a closed or determinate state exists under this model, an 
optimum decision can be prescribed and as such a normative statement 
can be made which tells how one ought to act. 
Thompson in a similar description of the rational model states 
The rational model of an organization results 
in everything being functional - making a positive, 
indeed an optimum, contribution to the overall re¬ 
sult. All resources are appropriate resources, 
and their allocation fits a master plan. All 
action is appropriate action, and its outcomes 
are predictable. 23 
Simon and March offer two difficulties with the rational model, 
First, the model only prescribes a rational choice in a state of com¬ 
plete certainty. Second, the model requires exceedingly demanding 
assumptions about the choice making mechanism, namely that: 
a. all alternatives of choice are given 
b. all consequences attached to each alternative are known 
c. that the rational man has a complete utility-orearing (or cardinal 
function) for all possible sets of consequences. 
Natural System Model. As an alternative to the unrealistic 
assumptions of the rational model, several natural system models are 
offered for studying the policy formulation process (decision making 
process) in organizations. Instead of assuming closure, the natural 
system model assumes "that a system contains more variables than we can 
22 
comprehend at one time, or that some of the variables are subject to 
25 
influences we can not control or predict...” 
According to March and Simon, under the open system logic, ”the 
organizational and social environment in which the decision maker finds 
himself determines what consequences he will anticipate, what ones he 
26 
will not; what alternatives he will consider, what ones he will ignore.” 
Numerous alternatives to the rational model are offered in the 
literature. In later chapters we will map theoretical propositions 
advanced by several open system theorists to determine if corporate 
social involvement can be explained or viewed from this perspective. 
27 
Generally, writers in system theory have described the following open 
system characteristics that pertain to organizations: 
(a) Firms operate in a dynamic and uncertain environment 
(b) Firms affect and are affected by their internal and external 
environments and must learn how to coopt or adapt to their own 
environments 
(c) Firms are composed of a number of constituents or coalitions, 
including the management coalition 
(d) Each coalition places demands on the firm and the goals of the 
organization become varied 
(e) Firms operating in an uncertain environment with limited problem 
solving capacity adopt a satisficing or required profit strategy 
Paine and Naumes apply the open system philosophy in a descriptive 
model of the policy formulation process. Their input-output model, 
reproduced here as Figure 2, assumes the following: 
(a) The key inputs affecting policy makers are environmental forces 
(both external and internal to the firm) 
(b) The environmental forces interact with a given policy generating 
structure to produce outputs (organizational objectives, strategies, 
role performance,organizational outcome) which are designed to 
23 
adjust to and adapt to these pressures on the structure 
(c) The outcomes become part of the environment, and the cycle continues 
(d) The structure is a political one in which an authoritative alloca¬ 
tion of benefits takes place; that is to say, those in authority 
allocate benefits to relevant parties in exchange for support 
(e) The model assumes an open and dynamic situation whereby the environ¬ 
ment and the structure continually interact (contingency approach) 
Figure 2 ^ 
A Descriptive Model of Policy Formulation 
(Feedback) (Outputs) 
SOURCE: Frank T. Paine and William Naumes, Organizational 
Strategy & Policy (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1975): 48, Table 2-2. 
Summary - Natural System Model and Corporate Social Involvement. 
A basic theoretical and methodological assumption of this present study 
is that the natural system model based on its open system strategy can 
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be used to explain organizational actions and processes associated 
with corporate social involvement. The idea that organizations assume 
and respond to social issues and demands and subsequently institution¬ 
alize social programs or policies seems consistent with the natural 
system model and its open system base. This idea will be further 
developed in subsequent chapters — specifically Chapters III and IX. 
Although numerous conceptualizations of the policy process 
relative to corporate social involvement have been offered in the 
28 
literature, these studies usually focus on how an organization should 
behave. In order to provide a proper historical perspective on how 
organizations do behave relative to corporate social involvement as an 
organizational and policy phenomenon, let us now look at several field 
investigations on corporate social involvement. These studies will be 
divided into two broad areas: (1) Surveys of Corporate Social Activi¬ 
ties, and (2) Case Studies on Corporate Social Activities. 
Surveys of Corporate Social Activities 
In recent years a number of surveys have appeared in the litera¬ 
ture centering on the relative status of corporate social involvement. 
These surveys have attempted to describe those organizational efforts 
and actions relative to actual corporate social commitments. From the 
surveys one can ascertain those institutional actions firms are pursuing 
in the formulation and implementation of social programs. 
Parket and Eilbirt 
29 
From the Parket and Eilbirt study cited earlier we can conclude 
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the following: (1) corporate social involvement includes a varied num¬ 
ber of activities with contributions, ecology and minority hiring and 
training being the most prevalent, (2) large corporations (over $1 bil¬ 
lion in sales) are most likely to engage in social responsibility 
activities, (3) large organizations are most likely to assign specific 
social responsibility matters to a social responsibility officer or 
committee (87 out of the 96 firms surveyed used a responsibility of¬ 
ficer or committee arrangement), and (4) companies view social involve¬ 
ment as continuing in the future and in most cases increasing in scope 
(96 out of 96 firms plan to continue their programs and 62 out of 96 
plan to expand their existing programs). Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11 report 
the complete Parket and Eilbirt findings. 
TABLE 8 
STRUCTURE AND BUDGETING FOR CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY ACTION 
la. Organizational Structure 
Number Percent 
Corporate responsibility officer 54 54 
Committee arrangement 33 34 
Activities performed by each 
executive as part of his work 9 10 
Total 96 100 
lb. Specific allocation to activities 
Number Percent 
Yes 24 34 
No 47 66 
Total 71 100 
SOURCE: Henry Eilbirt and I. Robert Parket, "The Current Status 
of Corporate Social Responsibility,” California Management Review 18 
(August 1973): 9, Table 1. 
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TABLE 9 
COMPARISON OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACTIVITIES 
Percent of firms engaged in activity 
Sales over Sales under 
Activity $1 billion $250 million 
Minority hiring 100 62 
Ecology 95 77 
Minority training 91 54 
Contributions to education 91 85 
Contributions to the arts 83 62 
Hard core hiring 79 31 
Hard core training 66 39 




statements 58 62 
Truth in advertising 58 31 
Product defects 50 8 
Consumer complaints 50 22 
Consumer oriented label changes 38 15 
Guarantees and warranties 33 8 
SOURCE: Henry Eilbirt and I. Robert Parket, "The Current Status 
of Corporate Social Responsibility," California Management Review 18 
(August 1973): 11. 
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TABLE 10 
RATIONALE FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PROVIDED TO STOCKHOLDERS 
4a. In relation to annual sales 
Sales Under Sales Over 
$250 Million $1 Billion 
Rationale Number Percent Number Percent 
Yes 6 46 18 75 
No 7 54 6 25 
Total 13 100 24 100 
4b. In relation to having social responsibility officer 
No Officer With Officer 
Rationale Number Percent Number Percent 
Yes 15 38 37 67 
No 24 62 18 33 
Total 39 100 55 100 
SOURCE: Henry Eilbirt and I. Robert Parket, "The Current Status 
of Corporate Social Responsibility," California Management Review 18 
(August 1973): p. 13, Table 4. 
TABLE 11 
CONTINUATION AND EXPANSION PLANS 
5a. Plan to continue 
Yes 96 100 
No 0 0 
Total 96 100 
Plan to expand 
Yes 62 65 
No 22 23 
No response 12 12 
Total 96 100 
SOURCE: Henry Eilbirt and I. Robert Parket, "The Current Status 
of Corporate Social Responsibility," California Management Review 18 
(August 1973): p. 13, Table 5. 
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Baehler and Shetty 
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In another study cited earlier, Buehler and Shetty undertook 
a statistical survey to determine: (1) the nature and extent of com¬ 
pany involvement in social action programs, (2) decision making tech¬ 
niques used, (3) resource allocation problems, and (4) impact of social 
action programs on pricing, employment and profits. Their findings 
confirmed a number of Eilbirt and Parket's conclusions. Buehler and 
Shetty found the following: (1) size in both sales and number of 
stockholders is an important determinant relative to structural organiza¬ 
tional changes for social responsibility (i.e., 81% of the companies 
having over $800 million in sales reported structural changes while 
only 55% with sales under $800 million reported structural changes); 
(2) adjusting price to meet increased cost was found to be the biggest 
problem encountered for all areas of social concern (urban, consumer, 
environment) while obtaining qualified specialists was the least prob¬ 
lematical when it came to corporate social actions; and (3) a large 
proportion of companies had made structural changes within their 
organizations (i.e., established company policies, created new organiza¬ 
tional elements or upgraded existing ones, elected special interest 
groups to the board) before 1969 (55%, 40%, and 42% out of 232 firms 
established company social policies in urban affairs, consumer affairs 
and environmental affairs, respectively). Tables 12, 13, and 14 report 
the Buehler and Shetty findings in greater detail. 
Finally, a number of other surveys have been undertaken in an 
effort to shed some light on organizational processes associated with 
social involvement. Among these studies providing additional insights 
29 
are surveys conducted by Collins, McGuire, and Coult 
31 
Specifics of 
each of these studies will be reported in Chapters III and IX. 
TABLE 12 
NATURE AND TIMING OF SELECTED STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
Percent of Companies Reporting (N=232) 
Companies 
1969 and with no 
Structural Changes before 1970-72 changes 
Established company policies 
Urban affairs 55 13 32 
Consumer affairs 40 16 44 
Environmental affairs 42 21 37 
Created new organizational 
elements or upgraded 
existing ones 
Urban affairs 49 14 37 
Consumer affairs 38 15 47 
Environmental affairs 37 23 40 
Elected special interest 
group representatives 




5 2 93 
5 3 92 
2 1 97 
SOURCE: Vernon M. Buehler and Y. K. Shetty, ’’Managerial Response 
to Social Responsibility Challenge,” Academy of Management Journal 19 
(March 1976): 69, Table 2. 
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TABLE 13 
SIZE, INDUSTRY, PROFITABILITY, OWNERSHIP, AND CORPORATE STRUCTURE 
Percent of Companies Reporting Structural Changes 
(N = 232) 












$800 million 72 64 62 81 70 70 
(N-72) 
Sales below 




















Rate of return 
above 6.0% 69 59 68 59 50 68 
(N=68) 
Rate of return 
below 6.0% 68 55 62 65 54 57 
(N-164) 
Ownership 
Number of stock¬ 
holders above 
30,000 (N=64) 79 61 77 80 64 75 
Number of stock- ** ** * ** * 
holders below 
30,000 (N=168) 64 54 59 54 49 55 
£ 
Represents the average rate of return on total assets for 1967-1972. 
*X^ significant at .01 level. 
**X^ significant at .05 level. 
SOURCE: Vernon M. Buehler and Y. K. Shetty, ’’Managerial Response 
to Social Responsibility Challenge," Academy of Management Journal 19 
(March 1976): p. 72, Table 3. 
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TABLE 14 
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN CORPORATE SOCIAL ACTION 
Urban Consumer Environmental 
Affairs Affairs Affairs 
Average 





1 Adjust prices 
to meet in¬ 
creased costs 2.7 1.63 2.3 1.55 2.4 1.41 
2 Adapting to 
legal & reg¬ 
ulatory changes 3.1 1.61 2.7 1.50 2.5 1.47 
3 Developing the 
required tech¬ 
nology 3.4 1.79 3.4 1.70 2.5 1.56 
4 Justifying in¬ 
creased costs 
to stockholders 3.2 1.74 3.7 1.69 3.9 1.67 
5 Obtaining required 
financing 3.5 1.67 4.0 1.61 3.9 1.60 
6 Obtaining qualified 
specialists 3.5 1.80 4.2 1.58 4.2 1.56 
F-Ratio 5. 64* 32.17* 47.97* 
df 5/925 5/817 5/983 
The lower the number , the more : difficult the problem. The 
differences in degrees of freedom are attributable to some partially 
completed questionnaires. 
The average rankings for each problem within each of the three 
areas were tested using least significant difference of mean comparisons 
and the following were found to be significantly different at the .05 
level: 
Urban—1 vs. 2, 1 vs. 3, 1 vs. 4, 1 vs. 5, 1 vs. 6, 2 vs. 5, and 
2 vs. 6. 
Consumer—all except 3 vs. 4, 4 vs. 5, and 5 vs. 6. 
Environment—all except 1 vs. 2, 1 vs. 3, 2 vs. 3, 4 vs. 5, 
4 vs. 6, and 5 vs. 6. 
*p .0005 
SOURCE: Vernon M. Buehler and Y. K. Shetty, ’’Managerial Response 
to Social Responsibility Challenge," Academy of Management Journal 19 
(March 1976): p. 76, Table 5. 
Case Studies on Corporate Social Activity 
Ackerman 
Of particular importance to us is a case study conduct- 
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ed by Ackerman. Ackerman, after extended interviews with one or more 
executives responsible for implementing social policy in over forty 
corporations and analysis of detailed case studies of corporations made 
by the Harvard Business School Research team, undertook extensive re¬ 
search in two large divisionalized corporations. The major aim of his 
case studies was to trace the social response patterns in divisionalized 
manufacturing firms attempting to implement social programs. Based on 
his extended interviews, case studies and field research, Ackerman 
generalized the following pattern of social response: 
(1) Policy Phase: At this initial step, the chief executive officer 
recognizes the issue to be important and writes and communicates 
a social policy 
(2) Specialists: In Phase two the president appoints a staff executive 
to report to him or one of his senior staff to coordinate the 
corporation’s activities in the area of concern, help the chief 
executive perform his duty and, in general, "make it happen." 
Ackerman notes three obstacles to the specialists efforts to 
institutionalize the social policy: separation of corporate and 
division responsibilities, financial reporting system inadequate 
for social concerns, and traditional executive appraisal systems 
also inadequate for social concerns 
(3) Institutionalization: Phase three of the institutionalization 
phase depends heavily upon the chief executive officer to work the 
social concern into the organization process "through which re¬ 
sources are allocated and careers decided," and the creative use 
of "trauma " 
Ackerman noted that the whole response pattern from Phase 1 
(Policy Phase) to Phase 3 (Institutionalization Phase) takes anywhere 
from six to eight years to complete the cycle. Table 15 highlights the 
significant patterns within each phase for each organizational level 
(Chief Executive, Staff Specialists and Division Management). 
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TABLE 15 
CONVERSION OF SOCIAL RESPONSIVENESS FROM POLICY TO ACTION 
Organizational 
Level 
Phases of Organiza¬ 
tional Involvement 

































system to per¬ 
formance 
measurement 






Issue: Management Problem 
Action: Commit resources 
and modify pro¬ 
cedures 
Outcome: Increased re¬ 
sponsiveness 
SOURCE: Robert W. Ackerman, :’How Comoanies Respond to Social De¬ 
mands, " Harvard Business Review 51 (July-August 1973): 96, Exhibit III. 
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Ackerman’s research represents a major effort in understanding 
the social response process based on field investigation. 
Murray 
Murray sought to replicate the Ackerman findings by in¬ 
vestigating the social response process within two large New York com¬ 
mercial banks engaged in minority loans. Murray,using the Ackerman 
framework,described a very similar pattern to that observed for division¬ 
alized manufacturing firms. Two notable features emerged from Murray’s 
study that were contrary to the Ackerman response process. First, Mur¬ 
ray observed two distinct subdivisions within Ackerman’s Phase 2 
(Specialist Phase), a technical sub-phase and an administrative sub¬ 
phase. During the administrative phase the specialists sought to 
establish pre-requisite measures for assessing organizational perform¬ 
ance thus turning performance measurement from ad hoc scrutiny to a 
systematic reporting scheme. The administrative phase was distinguished 
from the technical learning phase where the organization sought to ob¬ 
tain a handle on the appropriate course of action to pursue in attempt¬ 
ing to satisfy a social demand. 
According to Murray, organizational learning plays an important 
role even in functionally oriented companies such as centralized banks. 
Murray comments: ’’The responsiveness of any firm to social pressure is 
probably more a function of its capacity for organizational learning 
than legislative edicts, regulatory pressure, or outside interest 
i,33 
groups. 
The second distinction Murray observed in comparison to Ackerman 
was that n£ major instance or organizational trauma was found in the 
two banks investigated. This was counter to Ackerman's findings of 
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top management interceding to overturn decisions of line managers or 
threatening loss of bonus or some form of sanction in order to get the 
social programs institutionalized. 
Murray's description of the response process for commercial banks 
is as follows: 
(1) Policy Phase (I): The chief executive officer develops a growing 
concern about a social issue and its impact on the organization. 
The CEO acts as a boundary spanner by "internalizing externally 
imposed demands and internalized personal values." (Phase I) 
(2) Technical Learning Phase (IIA): During this phase, senior manage¬ 
ment designates a specialist to head a separate unit to institute 
social activity. All technical aspects of the program are learned 
during this phase 
(3) Administrative Learning (ITB) : In order to elicit a response from 
the branches, newly developed procedures are promulgated and the 
staff or special unit offer technical assistance 
(4) Institutionalization Phase (III): Renewed interest on the part of 
the CEO instills a sustained organizational commitment to a 
specific social issue by adopting or adapting organizational 
performance measures to activity. Unlike Ackerman, Murray dis¬ 
covered no use of organizational trauma 
Figure 3 represents the pattern Murray observed for two commercial 
banks and the level of commitment within each of the four levels of the 
organization (Chief Executive Officer, Staff Specialists, Minority 
Lending Specialists, and Line Management). 
Callaghan Dennis Callaghan investigated and reported in detail 
the corporate donative gift-giving function from the time of its incep¬ 
tion in five firms selected from the life insurance industry. After 
constructing profiles of each firm's donative activity, he cast the 
techniques and processes he observed in a positive framework. Specifi¬ 
cally using several theoretical reference points of both models employ¬ 































































































































































































































Lindblon and McCaskey) as a basis for comparison, he concluded that: 
(1) the rational model (Closed Systen) holds United explanatory power 
in regards to the organizational process evident in the contribution 
programs of the conpanies under study and (2) propositions included in 
the alternative models (Open Systen) nore closely approximate the 
3A 
organizational process in evidence. Specifics associated with this 
3tudy will be offered in Chapter IZ - Analysis, Discussions and inter¬ 
pretations . 
A. few other investigators have conducted case studies relative 
to corporate social involvement, for example see: Paluszek, Fitch, 
. * . 35 
and Baker. 
Sunnary 
The va3t body of literature focusing on corporate social involve¬ 
ment has taken a normative perspective. For the most part the academic 
community has directed their attention on prescribing an ideal social 
strategy for business organizations. Precisely because of this emphasis 
on normative prescriptions,this investigator has sought works emphasiz¬ 
ing positive, empirical investigations. Our aim in this study is to 
further our understanding of corporate social phenomenon by describing 
organizational acceptance and institutionalization of voluntary social 
programs. 
The purpose of the present chapter was to review a number of 
descriptive studies on organizational processes and policy for social 
involvement, to describe social activities and to present several 
possible explanations for corporate assumption of social programs. 
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The first section of this chapter presented several lists of 
types of social activities and their relative importance as reported by 
businessmen. The activities falling under the rubric social respon¬ 
sibility were varied ranging from contributions to education, minority 
hiring, to consumer oriented label changes. The lists were presented 
in an effort to shed some light on what is meant by the term social 
involvement and to demonstrate what types of activities are being 
reviewed and analyzed in studies on social involvement. 
The second section of this chapter looked at a number of explana¬ 
tions for corporate social involvement. This task was pursued in order 
to demonstrate how social activities may possibly enter the business 
organization. It is important to note that explanations for corporate 
social involvement are varied and their presence may come from pressures 
outside and within the organization. 
The last major section of this chapter focused on a number of 
studies on organizational processes and policy, especially for corporate 
social involvement. Emphasis was placed on reviewing field surveys and 
case studies because of our concern with describing what is actually 
taking place within organizations relative to social activities. As a 
basis for our methodological/theoretical proposition to be presented in 
Chapter III (Sources and Methods),a brief review of two dichotomous 
models for studying organizations were presented: rational and natural 
system models. It was asserted that the natural system paradigm presents 
a framework for explaining and viewing organizational efforts and actions 
relative to the initiation and institutionalization of voluntary social 
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programs. In Chapter IX several theoretical reference points of natural 
system models will be presented and used to analyze, discuss and inter¬ 
pret five substantive propositions to be presented in Chapter III. 
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corporate social involvement. For a sample of these texts see: Robert 
E. Schellenberger and F. Glenn Boseman, Policy Formulation and Strategy 
Management (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978); and George A. Steiner 
and John B. Miner, Management, Policy and Strategy: Text, Readings, and 
Cases (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. 1977). 
2 
For an excellent historical review of corporate social responsi¬ 
bility see: Morrell Heald, The Social Responsibility of Business: 
Company and Community, 1900-1960 (Cleveland: The Press of Case Western 
Reserve University, 1970); Daniel A. Wren, The Evolution of Management 
Thought (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1972); James W. McKie, 
Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament (Washington D.C., 
The Brookings Institute, 1975) and Fred Luthans and Richard M. Hodgetts, 
Social Issues in Business: A Text with Current Reading and Cases 2nd ed. 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1976), see especially part 1 
section 1 "A Historical Perspective,": 2-19. 
3 
The debate over a corporation's role in social concerns centers 
around two opposing views, the fundamentalists, who argue that "business 
serves society best when it minds its business well" and the social 
responsibility advocates, who claim, "business functions by public 
consent, and its basic purpose is to serve constructively the needs of 
society—to the satisfaction of society." For a comparison of the 
contrasting views see: William T. Greenwood, Issues in Business and 
Society: Readings and Cases 2nd ed. (3oston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1971), especially part seven, section A, "The Social Responsibility 
Debate." Henry G. Manne and Henry C. Wallich, The Modern Corporation 
and Social Responsibility: Rational Debate (Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972). For a pure 
fundamentalist's view see Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 
(Chicago: The University Press, 1962). For a synopsis of the social 
responsibility view see Committee for Economic Development, Social 
Responsibility of Business Corporations (New York: Committee for 
Economic Development, 1971). Daniel Bell, Ronald Coase, Martin Green- 
berger, and Everett C. Parker "Corporations and Conscience: The Issues," 
Sloan Management Review, 13, (Fall 1971): 1-24. 
4 
A 1953 Supreme Court decision is particularly noteworthy. The 
Supreme Court upheld a lower court's decision that the Board of Direc¬ 
tors of the A.P. Smith Manufacturing Company could legally use stock¬ 
holders' earnings for social purposes when it declared that "...such 
expenditures may...be justifiable as being for the benefit of the cor¬ 
poration: indeed, if need be the matter may be viewed strictly in 
terms of actual survival of the corporation in a free enterprise system. 
See A.P. Smith Manufacturing Company v. Barlow et al., 346 U.S. 861 
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CHAPTER III 
SOURCES AND METHODS 
Introduction 
As indicated in Chapter II, "Models and Structure of Social 
Activity," a number of authors have presented normative conceptualiza¬ 
tions of why organizations "ought" to take on social activities and 
hov these social programs "ought" to be institutionalized (e.g., take 
on a distinct character). 
It is this author’s contention that a need still exists for more 
systematically controlled descriptive research concentrating on actual 
organizational processes and policies associated with corporate social 
involvement. This investigation will help to add credence to our under¬ 
standing of corporate social phenomenon by describing what is taking 
place in the field in terms of corporate social involvement, by explor¬ 
ing the existing research in the field, and by conducting an exploratory 
case investigation of existing voluntary social programs. The major 
attention of this study is directed towards answering two overall 
questions: 
1. What stimuli, steps or activities lead to the social program as an 
organizational concern for the companies under study (e.g., how did 
the social program get into the organization)? 
2. What actions and/or steps were taken by the companies under study 
to institutionalize the social program arrived at in one above, 
into routines: policies, procedures, standards, and methods 
(e.g., steps to make it an ongoing program for the organization)? 
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Basis For Exploratory Case Study 
Why a descriptive study? This investigator feels that a descrip¬ 
tive study is important and necessary because: 
1. Before we can prescribe a course of action for organizations this 
prescription should be grounded in valid description 
2. Existing field investigations and studies need substantiation, thus 
this study will help to verify qualitatively, propositions, conclu¬ 
sions and findings advanced by others 
3. This study will qualitatively help to verify propositions advanced 
by this investigator 
In light of this, the task of this chapter will be to present in 
detail the methodology to be used in this study, several propositions, 
descriptions of social programs investigated and key terms used by this 
investigator. 
Preliminary Definitions 
As pointed out in the "Social Activity" section of Chapter II, 
the term "social responsibility" has been used in so many different con¬ 
texts that it has lost all meaning. A listing of the various definitions 
advanced for the term social responsibility will add little to our under¬ 
standing and will not facilitate the accomplishment of the objectives of 
this study. 
Thus, for the purpose of this study, the term social involvement 
will be used in lieu of the term social responsibility. Involvement 
infers activity which is not value laden and as such can be described 
and categorized whereas, the term responsibility is so amorphous it 
lends itself incapable of a consistent and agreed upon meaning and 
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accordingly is incapable of valid description. In light of this in 
this study we will limit corporate social involvement to mean those 
specific social programs of a business organization that meet the 
following criteria: (1) they are readily recognizable as a social pro¬ 
gram by the community in which the organization functions, the litera¬ 
ture and by the company; (2) they are purely voluntary; and (3) they 
are ongoing. 
A program will be considered voluntary if it is a non-legally 
binding program (e.g., not a result of government legislation or edict) 
and the business can at any time withdraw support from the program with¬ 
out fear of reprisal. 
A number of activities fall under the rubric social involvement 
(see Social Activity section Chapter II). A description of the social 
activities investigated in this study is contained in the next section. 
Social Activities Reported On In This Study 
Based on the criteria established for corporate social involve¬ 
ment, five social programs in five separate companies were selected for 
inclusion in this study. Table 16 lists the five social programs along 
with the sponsoring companies. 
Corporate Contributions - Cabot Corporation 
In addition to meeting all the criteria established in this study 
relative to our definition of a social program, a corporate contribu¬ 
tion program was selected for study since the donative gift giving 





























































3 rH H CM 
3 iH CO NO rs 
pS *—4 rH "d- 
3 
g o CO co 00 
o o r-. m ON 
o 00 ON ON oo 
3 * •> •» 44 
M o o 00 





3 rH rH o NO 
3 rH NO CO 00 
Pi rH CM CM 
o si- CO s* 
CO o m nO rH 
3 m NO ON co 
3 — •» «4 
CD co o si- 
CO vO CO 
< r~- o NO Sf 
•» •fe 
On rH 
3 ON o NO co 
3 On ON O 
PS CM sr 
O m m NO 
O m 00 ON 
i—4 <r 00 o 
3 » •l n 
3 ON m o 
i—1 ON sf ON —4 
3 CO CM m sr 





3 Td /—v 3 
3 3 Ph 3 3 
60 3 > •H O 
O > S T3 3 -H 
3 >«/ 3 rH 3 
Ph So „ < X 3 
3 g 3 JO 
r—1 •H 3 rH 3 -H 
3 o 3 3 3 •H 3 
•H w O 60 •H 3 3 
O s 3 O 3 3 3 
O w •H 3 O -3 O 





O o So O 
CJ •H 3 •3 3 •H 
3 3 3 3 3 
> 3 04 3 3 3 
3 3 g 3 3 
3 3 O CD -H O 
3 i—1 o 3 3 O* 
3 W a o 3 
T3 3 3 O 
» 3 rH O 3 CO CJ 
W 3 3 3 <J 
3 -3 3 3 
- o /—\ 3 r-S 3 /—V 3 rn /—v O 
M nO 3 VO >> 0 3 3 co ,o 
CO CO 3 CO 3 -4 3 3 CM 3 




CH (fl PO 
O (3 h rj ^ 
•H 3 3 g ON 
O 3 3 •* 
rH H 3 3 rH 









a w 3 
e o 
3 3 Ph 
5-4 4-4 
3 -H 3 



















3 3 rH 
X* rH 3 o 
3 3 3 00 
O 3 3 * 
Fh O 3 CM 


















a cJ e 
•h i 
> *h 
•H 54 Id 







































3 3 • • 
3 o 3 
3 
CO * o 
3 rH 
'3 3 rH 
3 3 O 
3 3 4-H 
•H 3 
3 < 3 
O 3 
> 
3 X 3 
3 3 
3 T3 O 
60 3 •H 
3 r* 3 
3 3 3 
rJ 3 U 
Pd •H 
O 4-4 
O 3 •H 
m 3 3 
•H 3 
3 3 3 
r3 3 rH 





O CJ 3 
•H 
>N 3 3 
3 O 3 
O 3 3 
3 3 3 
3 3 T3 
3 • 3 3 
3 CO 3 W 
•h si- 3 
ca CO M T3 
1 3 
3 no 3 3 
3 rH 4h T3 
3 co 1- 3 
3 •• 3 
3 <—N 3 
0 NO r" CO 
Ph r- 3 
ON r- 3 
QJ rH 3 • O 
,3 
r sr 4h 
H Ss 
w— vO 
Z 3 * • • 3 
a 
S/ nO 3 
• • • • 3 
3 H4 3 ON 3 
O M C. rH 3 
3 M F 4 
3 CJ 
r- 3 3 CJ 
O X C ) 3 W 
CO CO JP co 







il II II 
O O CO 



















































the Cabot Corporation, charitable contributions have been strongly sup¬ 
ported throughout its long history and is considered by the company as 
their primary social involvement activity. The main vehicle of Cabot’s 
contributions is its Foundation. Since its inception, the Cabot Founda¬ 
tion has made donations totaling over $4.7 million. For 1976, the 
Company through the Foundation and direct gift giving made contributions 
of approximately $350,000. For its present size, Cabot donates approx¬ 
imately double the national average in corporate contributions. Chap¬ 
ter IV will detail the activities and processes associated with Cabot’s 
Charitable Contribution activities. 
Social Audit - Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates 
In 1972, under its then President, Eli Goldston, Eastern Gas and 
Fuel was one of the few companies in the United States to undertake a 
social audit. A social audit has been defined as, "a commitment to a 
systematic assessment of reporting on some meaningful, definable domain 
of a company’s activities that have social impact Eastern’s social 
audit entailed the reporting of data in four areas: industrial safety, 
charitable giving, minority employment and pensions (plus descriptive 
summaries of other areas—pollution, ethics) to the public through its 
annual report. Eastern was under no formal constraints to gather and 
publish this information for public scrutiny. The actions leading to 
the initiation and institutionalization of Eastern's social audit will 
be discussed in Chapter VIII. 
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Civic Involvement - Tri-Lateral Partnership Program - John Hancock 
Mutual Life Insurance Company 
The Tri-Lateral Partnership Program was established after John 
Hancock was asked by officials of the City of Boston to assist them in 
implementing a court school integration mandate. Specifically, the 
Tri-Lateral Partnership Program entailed the linking of a Boston Public 
High School to an area business. John Hancock contributed financial, 
technical and managerial resources to an area high school in an effort 
to increase the total educational and vocational experiences of high 
school students. The company’s leadership efforts in the formation of 
the Tri-Lateral Council and its programs (partnership program) was 
purely a voluntary social action on the part of the company and its 
top official, and is described in Chapter VI. 
Minority Educational Assistance - General Electric 
In 1972, as a result of the concern and difficulty a large number 
of business organizations were having in obtaining black engineers to 
fill management positions in their companies, a series of special pro¬ 
grams and activities under the rubric - PIMEG - (Program to Increase 
Minority Engineering Graduates) came into existence. While affirmative 
action/equal employment opportunity is mandated, PIMEG represents a 
voluntary national effort aimed at facilitating organizations in the 
hiring of minority engineers for upper level professional and manage¬ 
ment positions. The creation and impetus of PIMEG as a national program 
was the direct result of General Electric’s own efforts in this area. 
Through GE, PIMEG came into existence and was made possible. Chapter V 
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describes General Electric’s organizational involvement in the PIMEG 
program. 
Minority Vendor Program (MVP) - Raytheon Company 
In 1972, at the suggestion of a middle manager, Raytheon estab¬ 
lished a minority vendor program. The aim of this program was to set 
aside a proportion of Raytheon’s total purchases to minority vendors. 
The company saw the program as a way to help aid unemployed blacks in 
the metropolitan Boston area. The company was under no direct obliga¬ 
tion to establish the program and considers the program as part of its 
social involvement activities. Raytheon’s activities associated with 
its MVP are described in Chapter VII. 
Research Questions 
Two overall objectives of this study are: (1) to examine in de¬ 
tail the initiation and institutionalization of voluntary social pro¬ 
grams in organizations, and (2) to verify findings and propositions 
advanced by others relative to (a) the social response process in 
organizations, and (b) open system logic as a way of viewing and ex¬ 
plaining organizational actions. In light of these objectives several 
research questions are offered as a guide to this study. 
Focuses Relating to Organizations Under Study 
In previous studies there is a noticable lack of research re¬ 
volving around the organizational processes associated with the deci¬ 
sion to engage in a specific social program. Thus the first area of 
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focus is to direct our attention to determining how social programs get 
into organizations. As such, the first area of research in the present 
study is to go back before the final social decision was made to engage 
in the program under study to determine: 
1. What, if anything, provoked initial action? 
2. Who was responsible for introducing the social idea into the 
organization? 
3. What search activity, if any, for alternatives was pursued? 
Relative to the institutionalization of social programs, this 
study seeks to determine: 
4. What actions, steps, methods were employed by the organizations 
under study to institutionalize their particular social program? 
Verification of Previous Studies 
2 3 
Ackerman and Hurray (see Chapter II) observed certain patterns 
associated with institutionalizing social demands. Ackerman focused on 
the social response process in divisionalized manufacturing firms, while 
Murray focused on the social response process in commercial banks. Ex¬ 
cept for two noticeable distinctions: ( (1) Murray observed two sub¬ 
phases for Phase II — a technical learning phase and an administrative 
phase, while Ackerman made no distinction between types of learning; 
(2) Ackerman noted it took creative use of trauma on the part of the 
Chief Executive Officer to get the programs institutionalized in 
Phase III, while Murray observed no use of trauma), the social response 
processes observed were similar. One possible explanation for the 
difference might be traceable to the fact that Ackerman studied the 
response process for social demands (i.e.. Affirmative Action, Pollution 
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Abatement), while Murray studied the response process for a voluntary 
social program (Minority Lending). In view of these two studies, a 
further area of focus here will be to determine: 
5. Whether or not the Ackerman and Murray observations were repeated 
for the programs investigated in this study and if not, 
6. What patterns do exist? 
Numerous paradigms and observations, based on the natural system 
model of organizations, have been advanced relative to the decision 
making process in organizations. J. D. Thompson, March and Simon, and 
4 
Cyert and March have pioneered research employing open systems logic 
in explaining the formulation and implementation of decisions within 
organizations. In light of the propositions and findings advanced by 
several investigators relative to the natural systems model, as a 
strategy for studying organizations, a final area of focus of this 
study is to determine: 
7. To what extent does the natural or open systems logic characterize 
organizational actiona relative to the voluntary social programs 
observed in this study? 
Propositions 
In terms of the main focuses of the research questions and in 
view of the objectives of this study, one theoretical ./methodological 
proposition (Proposition 6) and five substantive propositions (Proposi¬ 
tions 1 through 5) are advanced. The theoretical/methodologlcal pro¬ 
position is based on the fundamental assumption that corporate social 
involvement flows from an open system logic and as such open systems 
theory can be used as a way of studying corporate social involvement In 
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organizations. The five substantive propositions describe corporate 
social actions and are based on an investigation of the research found 
in the social involvement literature (see Chapter II). Each of the 
propositions, along with the research and assumptions from which they 
have been derived are presented below. Definitions of key terms associ¬ 
ated with the six propositions are advanced in Appendix B. 
Substantive Propositions 
Proposition 1 (PI) 
The corporate social involvement literature has repeatedly pointed 
to the Chief Executive Officer as the pivotal figure when it comes to an 
organization’s social involvement activities. 
Coult,~* reporting findings from a Gallagher Report, Inc. survey, 
noted that 61.6 percent of the 250 Chief Executive Officers polled on 
their obligations to society stated that they directly determine corpo¬ 
rate social programs for their companies and monitor them. 
McGuire and Parrish surveyed executives of 250 major companies 
for their views, decisions and expectations on corporate social involve¬ 
ment in urban affairs. Their findings showed that a majority of firms 
reported that while their social programs were decentralized among line 
and staff personnel they are coordinated at the top by the president 
or more often, a vice president. They reported that, "A number of top 
officers said the whole matter of how best to manage urban affair 
activities was really not as important as the adoption of a strong 
policy at the top combined with follow-through." 
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The Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility in a systematic 
investigation of 737 corporate social programs (see Table 17)reported 
that while most programs are sponsored below the Executive or Adminis¬ 
trative department, the third largest sponsoring department for social 
programs for all the firms in the survey was the Executive or Adminis¬ 
trative department (15.7 percent of all programs were sponsored at this 
level). They stated: 
Many of the unusual or experimental programs 
are sponsored by the high-level management group. 
At this level, there is presumedly less hesitation 
to experiment, due to greater job security and job 
freedom.7 
It should also be pointed out that while 84.3 percent of the pro¬ 
grams reported were sponsored by departments other than the Executive 
or Administrative department, no data was provided indicating at what 
level it entered the company and who was responsible for the initial 
decision for the program. 
g 
Sandra Holmes reported that 47.6 percent or 91 of the 192 firms 
responding to her questionnaire ranked the interest of top management 
within the top three of the ten factors given for their firm’s selection 
of areas for social involvement. Another 30.9 percent or 60 firms 
ranked the interest of executives within the remaining seven factors. 
Only 21.5 percent or 41 firms did not consider it within the top ten 
factors. 
Both Ackerman and Murray noted that the first phase of the social 
response process was characterized by the Chief Executive's recognition 
that the social issue is important. Ackerman noted: 
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TABLE 17 
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
SOCIAL PROGRAM PROFILE 
(737 programs, which represent the total sample) 
(229 corporations, which represent the total sample) 
Motivations: Internal 
External 
602 is 100% ^ . , 
Governmental 
All Three 
57.5% Int. & Ext: 15.4% 
21.9 Int. & Gov’t: 1.7 
3.0 Ext. & Gov’t: .3 
.2 
Size: Up to 50 mm 
680 is 100% 501-I^OOOm 
.6% 1,001-5,000mm: 46.9% 
11.3 Over 5,000mm: 24.1 
17.1 
When Started: Before 1965 
< 1AnT 1965-1969 
6o9 is 100% 197Q 
9.4% 1971: 15.6% 
30.5 1972: 18.7 
13.6 1973: 12.1 
Budget Range: Up to $2,500 
347 is 100% $2,501- 5,000 
5 is i.UZ $5,001-10,000 
$10,001- 50,000 
8.9% $50,001-100,000: 13.8% 
8.1 100,001-250,000: 11.8 
7.8 Over 250,000: 21.6 
28.0 
Department Public Relations 
. inn* Public Affairs 
Uroan Affairs 
Community Pelations 
18.4% Personnel: 10.6% 
11.4 Contributions: 5.9 
9.2 Admin, or Exec.: 15.7 
10.2 Other: 18.6 
Co. Personnel: 1-9 
579 is 100% 10-19 
co 20-25: 5.9 
„ Over25: 27.3 
14.0 
Topic Areas The Arts 









5.3 Emp: Oppor., Adv.&Enricn: 4.7% 
7.1 Emp: Asst,Couns. &H. Rel.: 2.8 
3.1 Drug & Alcohol Abuse: 2.0 
2.0 Nutrition: 1.9 
8.0 Health: 2.2 
3.8 Safety: .9 
4.2 Consumer Programs: 4.6 
14.7 Corp. Social Planning: 2.0 
5.5 The Social Audit: .8 
1.5 Miscellaneous: 2.4 
SOURCE: The Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Radnor: 
?a.: Chilton Book Company, 1975): 7. 
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First, the Chief Executive Officer recognizes 
the issue to be important. He may rationalize his 
interest as a matter of corporate responsibility 
or as a farsighted self-interest. Either way, it 
coincides with his recent experiences, often out¬ 
side his business milieu.^ 
In light of the above findings, the following proposition is of¬ 
fered for investigation in this study: 
Proposition 1: The initial decision to engage in 
social programs is originally focused at the top 
of the organization, usually with the chief exec¬ 
utive officer. 
Proposition 2 (P2) 
Proposition one referred to the Chief Executive Officer as the 
person most responsible for his/her organizations social involvement. 
But while the Chief Executive may be the pivotal figure, how did this 
involvement come about? Mintzberg^ describes managers at all levels 
in the organization as performing various roles. Some of these roles 
include the manager as a boundary spanner constantly monitoring and 
interacting with forces both internal and external to his environment. 
Several organizational theorists (J. D. Thompson, Cyert and March 
have viewed the organization as composed of various coalitions that are 
engaged in a continuous bargaining-exchange-learning process. Social 
issues, demands or requests could conceivably enter the organization at 
any of the exchange/bargaining contact points at all levels in the 
organization. Corporate social involvement information may flow from 
the chief executive’s experiences or values or from the experiences of 
his staffs at all levels. 
12 
Coult reported that 37.2 percent of the Chief Executives polled 
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on their obligations to society reported that they are indirectly in¬ 
volved in their company’s social programs by receiving reports and ideas 
from staff. 
Eilbirt and Parket reported in a survey of 96 firms that 54 (56 
percent) of the firms had instituted a corporate social responsibility 
position, while another 33 (34 percent) of the firms utilized a commit¬ 
tee arrangement. The Eilbirt and Parket findings support Coult’s find¬ 
ings that organizations are establishing formal organizational positions 
or units to receive, monitor, analyze and disseminate information in 
terms of corporate social programs and ideas. The Eilbirt and Parket 
survey reported that in a majority of the sample firms the Social Respon¬ 
sibility Officer’s position was close to the top of the organizational 
13 
chart with direct contact to top management. 
14 15 
Both Ackerman and Murray reported in their findings that Phase 
II of the social response process was characterized by the appointment 
of a staff specialist for corporate social involvement. The specialist 
provided the organization with both technical and administrative informa¬ 
tion to "generally make it happen" (e.g., get the program going). 
The Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility reported no less 
than eight different departments had sponsored some 737 social programs 
in 229 corporations (see Table 17). Each department could represent an 
initial source of entry or germination for social programs or ideas. 
Thus, based on the location of organizational functions specifi¬ 
cally established for handling social involvement and the various roles 
that managers assume at all levels in the organization, social challenges, 
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possible programs, threats and opportunities can come into the organiza¬ 
tion at any level of the organization. 
In light of the above findings the following proposition is of¬ 
fered for investigation in this study: 
Proposition 2: The final program or investment 
decision with respect to a social program or 
investment can be the end result of information 
brought into the organization at all levels of 
the organization (Corporate, Division, Depart¬ 
ment) . 
Proposition 3 (P3) 
What happens to the social program once a decision is made to en¬ 
gage in the program (e.g., it becomes a policy concern to the organiza¬ 
tion) ? By what process and means is the program institutionalized? 
Both Ackerman^ and Murray^ observed a learning phase that organizations 
encounter in their attempt to institutionalize the social concern. They 
noted that after the social program becomes an organizational concern, 
various phases and sub-phases are experienced in the program’s imple¬ 
mentation and eventual institutionalization as a daily normal routine 
for organization members. In order to institutionalize the program, 
(1) it is assigned to a staff specialist (upon which administrative and 
technical learning takes place), (2) it is built into the standard 
operating procedures of the organization, and (3) the chief executive 
officer demonstrates his desire (either through trauma or commitment 
to the program) for its adoption to the rest of the organization. Both 
researchers noted that it took from six to eight years to institution¬ 
alize the program. 
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The increased institutionalization of social concerns as a 
permanent organizational activity has been reported by both Parket and 
Eilbirt and Buehler and Shetty. In their study of 96 business organiza- 
f' *K» 
tions, Parket and Eilbirt reported that 54 firms had assigned corporate 
social concerns to a corporate responsibility officer, 33 had assigned 
it to a committee and 9 had assigned it as a part-time activity of 
executives. Of the 96 firms, they noted that 24 (34%) of them had spec- 
18 
ific budget allocations for corporate social concerns. Buehler and 
Shetty noted that companies have increasingly established policies in 
three social areas: urban affairs, consumer affairs and environmental 
affairs. They noted that of 232 firms, the percent increase in estab¬ 
lishing policies in the three areas (urban, consumer, environmental) 
went from 55 percent, 40 percent and 42 percent, respectively, in 1969 
and before, to 68 percent, 56 percent and 63 percent in 1972. Likewise, 
they reported the following increases in the creation of new organiza¬ 
tional elements or upgrading of existing ones for the three areas 
(urban, consumer and environmental), respectively: 49 percent to 53 
percent, 38 percent to 53 percent and 37 percent to 60 percent from 
1969 to 1972.19 
In light of the above findings, the following proposition is of¬ 
fered for investigation in this study: 
Proposition 3: Decisions associated with a particular 
social program become routinized as the organization 
becomes accustomed to (learns or adapts) handling the 
social program in less than an uncertain environment. 
Here, uncertain is defined as a lack of certain knowledge or 
information. As greater information becomes available relative to the 
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program, the environment in which the program functions becomes more 
certain. 
Proposition 4 (P4) 
As a result of the increased attention paid to the administration 
of social programs, as described above, it seems appropriate to postulate 
the eventual decentralization of social program decisions. McGuire and 
Parrish in their survey of large business organizations reported that 
while social programs are co-ordinated at the top of the organization, 
daily operating decisions are decentralized among line and staff person- 
20 
nel. In the survey of 737 corporate social programs reported in the 
Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility, 84.3 percent of the pro¬ 
grams listed were sponsored by departments other than the executive or 
administrative departments (see Table 17). 
Other studies cited earlier (Coult, Parket and Eilbirt, Buehler 
and Shetty) noted the delegation of social program responsibility, 
either on a full or part-time basis, to individuals, departments, and/or 
committees below the executive level. Thus, while the chief executive 
may be the pivotal figure when it comes to initiating social concerns, 
others lower down in the organization become responsible for the daily 
routines associated with the program administration. 
In light of the above research findings the following proposition 
is offered for investigation in this study: 
Proposition 4: As decisions associated with social 
programs become routinized (institutionalized) they 
are pushed down in the organization (the decision 
making responsibility becomes decentralized). 
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Proposition 5 (P5) 
As evidenced by the research cited in Chapter II and this present 
chapter, corporate social involvement is becoming an explicit top manage¬ 
ment undertaking. Additionally, further research efforts have demon¬ 
strated that not only are organizations explicitly incorporating respon¬ 
sibility, structure and budgets relative to their social programs, they 
are preparing for new social activities through increased planning in 
this area. 
Planning is an integral part of the policy formulation process. 
To the extent that increasing numbers of firms are incorporating social 
forecasts or plans in their policy formulation processes, one can 
postulate that social programs are becoming an explicit management 
undertaking. 
Starting with the premise that social forecasting is vital if 
management is to be provided with critical information as to the exter¬ 
nal and internal problems and opportunities associated with the manage- 
21 
ment of his/her business, Newgren sent out questionnaires to corporate 
chief executive officers to determine what businesses are doing in the 
area of social forecasting. Newgren received 183 usable questionnaires 
from firms selected from the Fortune Directory, Standard and Poors In¬ 
dex and Standard and Poors Corporate Register. 
Newgren established an institutionalization score (IS) to deter¬ 
mine the degree to which organizations have formalized the social fore¬ 
casting process. An IS of one indicated no formal social forecasting 
process; an IS of two indicated formal identification but no formal 
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analysis of social trends; and an IS of three indicated formal identifi¬ 
cation and formal analysis of social trends. Of the 183 firms responding, 
69 (32.2%) reported an IS equal to one; 36 firms (19.1%) reported an IS 
equal to two and 78 firms (48.7%) reported a score of three. Thus, near¬ 
ly half of the firms reported that they formally identify and analyze 
social trends. Also, Newgren found that in comparison to corporate 
executives in companies reporting an IS of one or two, executives in 
companies with an IS of three "were not only more likely to encourage 
the inclusion of social change in long range planning, but they were 
22 
also more likely to give strong support." 
Lipson sought to determine the extent to which the "pressure for 
corporate social responsibility affected the corporate planning process.” 
Lipson in 1970 sent out questionnaires to 100 firms selected from the 
Fortune 500 and he received fifty responses. Again in 1974, Lipson 
surveyed the same fifty firms either by telephone or through mailed 
questionnaires. The same questions of the same fifty firms were asked. 
Of the fifty firms responding, 38% in 1970 reported that they incorpo¬ 
rate social goals into annual planning processes, while 64% reported 
this in 1974. In 1970, 12 percent reported that they sought comparative 
industry norms for social programs. This compared to 54 percent in 
23 
1974. J 
Also, other studies cited earlier (Handbook of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Coult, Holmes, Buehler and Shetty, Parket and Eilbirt) 
found that many chief executive officers are either directly or indirect¬ 
ly involved with social programs or concerns, that more and more firms 
63 
are assigning responsibility for social programs or concerns to specific 
individuals, committees and/or departments and larger commitments in 
terms of dollars, manpower and efforts are being made to numerous social 
activities. Together with NewgrenTs and Lipson’s findings, these stud¬ 
ies lead to the premise that more and more organizations are making 
corporate social involvement an explicit management undertaking. 
Thus, in light of the evidence reported above, the following 
proposition is offered for investigation: 
Proposition 5: Social programs or investments 
eventually become an explicit management under¬ 
taking, that is, recognition of corporate social 
involvement is incorporated in the policy formula¬ 
tion process. 
Theoretical/Methodological Proposition 
Proposition 6 (P6) 
Several underlying concepts of open system or natural system 
theory seem appropriate in explaining and viewing corporate process and 
behavior relative to corporate social involvement. The alternative 
theories of the firm literature, which are based on a natural system 
model, have described complex organizations, as open systems in con¬ 
stant interaction with numerous coalitions or constituents (i.e., 
managers, lower level employees, customers, governmental agencies, 
civic groups, other) in their environments. Thompson describes a 
firm’s task environment as those parts of an organization’s environment 
that are relevant or potentially relevant to goal setting and attain¬ 
ment. He asserts, "the relationship between an organization and its 
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task environment is essentially one of exchange, and unless the organ¬ 
ization is judged by those in contact with it as offering something de- 
24 
sizable, it will not receive the input necessary for survival." 
Cyert and March maintain that organizational goals can be traced 
25 
to oargacmtng or exchanges between coalitions. Mo ns on, Saxberg and 
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Sutemeister, and Ike Committee for Economic Development, among 
ethers, have included third party interest groups, civic organizations, 
managers and governmental agencies, among others, as presenting various 
social concerns and issues to the organization. Thus, pressure for 
change can come from outside the organization — political pressure, 
governmental, civic, — and from inside — top managers, other employees. 
*-e contend that an cut come of coalition bargaining and exchanges could 
be the initiation of social programs. Specifically, it is contended 
that social programs are initiated for any one or a combination of the 
following factors: personal values and interests of strategic partici¬ 
pants 'referred to as elite management theory), as a process of buffer¬ 
ing or protecting the organization's main activity (technical core) from 
uncertainty or potential conflict (known as boundary control) and demon¬ 
strated by the establishment of Individual responsibility departments, 
or units to handle social concerns (Social Responsibility Officer, 
Consumer Affairs Department;; as a means of gaining prestige or power 
for tne organization. 
Thompson maintains that while complex organizations face open 
and dynamic task environment# they operate under norms of rationality 
by seeking closure or determinateness — they seek to seal off their 
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core technology from uncertainty. To the extent that corporate social 
programs can achieve this purpose, they will be adopted and institution¬ 
alized as a rational corporate action and the organization has achieved 
bounded rationality. 
Relative to the time it takes to institutionalize social programs 
(e.g.. Proposition 3 maintains social programs will be eventually 
routinized) researchers in open system theory again provide us with 
30 
possible explanations. Linblom maintains that decision-making in 
organizations is undertaken in increments because of the cognitively 
impossible task of identifying all possible objectives, and courses of 
actions to arrive at these objectives when undertaking new policies (or 
31 
decisions). McCaskey asserts that organizations resort to direction¬ 
al planning. That is, when the organization’s environment is unstable 
or uncertain, it is almost impossible to set firm goals or agreements 
on goals. As such, goals are unspecified but action within the new 
undertaking serve to aid in the discovery and formulation of goals. 
Both Linblom’s "incrementalism," and McCaskeyTs "directional planning" 
can be explained according to Simon's conception of "Administrative 
Man." According to this researcher. Administrative Man will satisfice 
(accept less than an optimal decision) because, among other factors, he 
32 
does not have the cognitive ability or time to maximize. 
In light of these theoretical propositions and observations, the 
following theoretical/methodological proposition is offered for in¬ 
vestigation: 
Proposition 6: The natural or open system model 
holds explanatory power relative to the initiation 
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and instltuticrallzarlcr cf social pregr 
decisions. 
Research Metre del cm* 
In pursuing hov social pro grans core into organizations and how 
they are institutionalized, two courses of action were undertaken, first, 
a thorough review cf the corporate social inreiverere literature was 
conducted. Secordip, an exploratory field study was conducted in five 
tims to cua.ttatnve.y test tre orooostttcrs cerrvec 
w ■ - . ■ - » __-- * » 
this stud” and 
findings advanced *07 others (see analysis section below) . 
laser on cur definition cf corporate social in voirerect, seven 
fires were contacted to determine (1) if they had social programs that 
met our definition, and (2) their receptiveness to he included in this 
stud”. In addition to our definition limitation the ml” ether restric¬ 
tions placed on the firms were (1) they he geographically located in 
Sew York or Sew Ingland, and (2) the” nave sales :r assets of greater 
__&_ ... _ • m:at::n vas t.aoec on tre :m 
era use ot rnn cornstrannts ot tnns nn.estnzatrr. _ne snze 
tion was made because cf the fact that it Is usually the largest firms 
in society that are involved with social pregrams cf significant rrgri- 
tude. All six firms contacted volunteered information. Cme of the 
S£* tims, which askec to remain anonymous was usee as a ore-test tor 
me ouest: laire 'see Appendix A) to b e used in the collection of con- 
re severer tnm was nrooten snnte nns senna, ore a- on: 
not meet our sea: 
As evident in the summery profile .able -6, the firms represent a 
67 
cross section of industries from life insurance, to electronics, to 
chemicals. Also, companies are of various sizes above the fifty million 
restriction established. Companies were not restricted on the basis of 
size (above $50 million) or industry because of the following: (1) re¬ 
search has indicated that large organizations in all industries under¬ 
take more social activities and structural changes for social involve- 
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ment than do small companies (Table 9), and (2) research propositions 
in the area of open systems seem applicable to studying program initia¬ 
tion and institutionalization for varying programs in different compan¬ 
ies in varying industries. Thus, several propositions in open systems 
theory should allow us to view or explain voluntary social actions in 
general without industry limitations. This study is unique in this 
3 4 
respect since former studies: Ackerman, Murray, Callaghan, and Post, 
limited their studies on social activities to specific industries. 
Besides information obtained through interviews with corporate 
oersonnel, data wa3 obtained by going through corporate documents and 
undertaking a library search for articles written about the companies 
included in the study. When permitted, all interviews were taped, other¬ 
wise notes were taken. 
Pre-Test 
Three steps were employed in deriving and testing the question¬ 
naire to be used in this study (Appendix A). First, based on question¬ 
naires employed, research questions offered, and conclusions and obser¬ 
vations advanced in other studies on social involvement, an initial 
list of potential questions was derived and discussed with members of 
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the dissertation committee. 
Second, a pre -test of the initial questionnaire was arranged with 
a local subsidiary (approximately 60 million in sales) of a national 
company ($297,767 million in sales). The pre-tested company at the 
request of a local civic official had volunteered to sponsor a "Woman’s 
Regatta.” The pre-tested company donated personnel and financial sup¬ 
port in order to make this program a success for the host organization 
(a local college). The Vice President for Planning and Development (a 
former owner of the subsidiary prior to its acquisition) was the re¬ 
cipient of the request from the civic official (also a personal friend 
of the Vice President). The Vice President was instrumental in (1) gain¬ 
ing higher management support of the program initially, and (2) the 
eventual institutionalization of the program. The program met the 
criteria established previously for inclusion as a voluntary social 
program. The questions derived in step one were asked of the Vice 
President of Planning and Development. Based on this interview some 
questions were rephrased, others deleted, and still further ones added. 
The third step in testing the questionnaire, included final 
discussion of the questionnaire with the chairman of this dissertation. 
It was concluded based on the pre-test that the questionnaire would act 
as an interview guide as opposed to a fixed or structured format. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Research Methodology 
It is recognized that any conclusions generated in this study 
are limited. Two significant limitations of this study are (1) its 
ex post facto characteristics and (2) a noticable lack of statistical 
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verification of the data. However, it is argued that the strengths of 
this study outweigh any of the weaknesses which are present in this type 
of investigation. 
Strengths. The strengths of the investigative techniques center 
on the following six areas: 
1. Intensive investigation by the case method may expose new relation¬ 
ships or findings which may form the basis for generalized and 
testable hypotheses. 
2. Of all the investigative techniques, the case method allows for the 
most realism in describing relationships 
3. The case method, being the most realistic, provides an opportunity 
for researchers, businessmen and society in general to gain insights 
and understanding of human behavior which in the final analysis 
should advance man's development and potential 
4. Intensive case studies enable one to see more clearly isolated 
factors and relationships that could be clouded or obscured by 
* quantitative analysis 
5. Intensive case studies decrease the tendency to misinterpret 
statistical data 
6. Finally, intensive structured interviews which will be an integral 
part of this investigative technique provide: 
a. an opportunity to obtain insight into ways in which personnel 
interviewed "perceive’’ their social programs 
b. an opportunity for the investigator to probe and stimulate 
insights and clarifications that surveys or questionnaires 
are unable to accomplish 
c. Intensive interviews provide an opportunity to verify and 
clarify information gained through other sources (e.g., company 
memoranda, minutes of meetings, policy statements, other) 
d. a more in depth picture (description) of the process that a 
particular firm employs in arriving at and implementing its 
social programs 
e. details of the importance or magnitude involved in formulating, 
implementing, and controlling social programs 
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Weaknesses. The weaknesses of the investigative techniques cen¬ 
ter on the following four areas: 
1. Because of the ex post facto character of the case method, state¬ 
ments of relations are weaker than relations investigated under 
laboratory or field experiments (e.g., controlled experiments) 
a. This is especially evident because of the difficulty to control 
the plethora of rival or competitive relations or factors 
2. The element of subjectivity or accuracy of information obtained 
from the interviewee cannot be entirely controlled by the investi¬ 
gator > 
3. The elements of subjectivity, on the part of the investigator, can¬ 
not be entirely absent either in choosing the cases to be analyzed 
or in assembling and interpreting the data obtained by interviews 
and documents 
4. Because of the small number of firms contained in the sample, the 
ability to generalize to a larger population may be suspect 
Analysis of Data 
The data generated in the field and library research is being 
utilized to construct profiles of each of the five social programs in¬ 
vestigated for each of the five sponsoring organizations. These de¬ 
scriptive profiles will be divided into three main sections: (1) general 
descriptive data of sponsoring organizations;(2) actions and processes 
associated with the program’s initiation and(3) actions and processes 
associated with the program’s institutionalization. These profiles will 
be presented in Chapters IV through VIII. 
The data contained in the profiles will be analyzed, discussed 
and interpreted in two separate chapters. Chapter IX will qualitatively 
analyze the five substantive propositions (PI through P5) in terras of 
data within the profiles, empirical data presented in other investiga- 
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tions and finally in terms of our methodological/theoretical proposi¬ 
tion (P6). Chapter IX will conclude with analysis, discussion and inter¬ 
pretations of P6 in terms of the conclusions arrived at for Propositions 
1 through 5. 
A second analysis chapter (Chapter X) will qualitatively compare 
and contrast observations and conclusions arrived at in the five volun¬ 
tary social program profiles specifically to the social response process 
as reported by Ackerman and Murray. 
Summary 
In this chapter we reviewed: preliminary definitions, social 
involvement activities and their sponsors, research questions, the five 
substantive and one methodological proposition and their basis, re¬ 
search methodology, pre-test of questionnaire, several strengths and 
weaknesses of our research methodology and finally how the data obtained 
will be analyzed. 
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The first study of actions or processes associated with the initi¬ 
ation and institutionalization of a voluntary, on-going social program 
centers on the charitable contributions of the Cabot Corporation. The 
focus will be on contributions made by Cabot either through its home 
office or divisions or through its foundation to qualified charities as 
defined by the Internal Revenue Service. The charitable contributions 
made through the foundation are referred to as "pure" contributions by 
a Cabot official.^- 
Corporate Background and General Information 
The original Cabot business was founded in 1882 by Godfrey L. Cabot, 
2 
primarily to sell natural gas. Today the Cabot Corporation and its 
consolidated subsidiaries have a varied product line centering around 
three broad categories: performance chemicals, engineered products and 
energy. 
In 1976 performance chemicals accounted for fifty-two percent of 
net sales and other operating revenues and twenty-two percent of operat¬ 
ing net income. The energy group accounted for seventeen percent of net 
sales and operating revenue and forty percent of operating net income. 
The engineered products accounted for thirty-one and thirty-eight percent 
75 
76 
of revenues and net income , respectively. 
Of the five companies in this present study, Cabot ranks fourth 
in total revenues with $490.0 million, in total assets with $516 mil¬ 
lion, in net income with $29.3 million, and in employees with 5,590. 
All Cabot financial figures are for fiscal year ending September 30, 
1976. 
The Cabot Corporation’s organization chart is presented in 
Figure 4. 
Cabot Corporation and Its Charitable Contributions 
The company’s main on-going social program takes the form of 
charitable contributions primarily through the Cabot Foundation, estab- 
4 
lished for that specific purpose. The Cabot Foundation was formed in 
1953 and since its inception has made contributions of $4,753,000 to 
various Internal Revenue Service, certified, tax exempt, charitable, 
organizations. Of the $4,753,000, the Cabot Corporation contributed 
$4,718,000 (or 99.3 percent) out of its corporate profits directly to 
the Foundation for charitable contributions. In addition to the 
capital contributed to the Foundation for charitable gift giving, the 
Corporation pays for all of the administrative expenses of the founda¬ 
tion (except those prohibited by law). 
The Cabot Corporation, according to its president, has over the 
years donated from the domestic profits of the company about double 
the average annual amount of charitable giving of companies Cabot’s 
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direct charitable gifts of its divisions, donated approximately $350,000. 
This represents $63 contributed per employee, .07 percent of total as- 
A 
sets and 2.22 percent of net income.^ For a comparison of the contribu¬ 
tion level of the Cabot Corporation with organizations of approximately 
Cabot’s size see Table 18. The organization chart for the Cabot Founda¬ 
tion is presented in Figure 5. Key Cabot Corporation personnel associ¬ 
ated with the Foundation are presented in Table 19. 
Evolution of Charitable Activities at Cabot 
The undertaking of charitable activities by business corporations 
is commonplace. In fact, corporate contributions are the most consis¬ 
tently mentioned and given one of the highest rankings by firms when 
listing their corporate social involvement activities. 
In the Parket and Eilbirt study cited earlier, corporate contri¬ 
butions to education was the most frequently cited social activity of 
all social activities listed by the ninety-six corporate presidents 
responding to the survey.^ Out of fifteen activities listed, twenty- 
three of the ninety-six presidents believed contributions to education 
among the top three most important activities their organizations could 
pursue. Only two other social activities, minority hiring and ecology 
received higher rankings. 
A number of rationales have been presented for a firm’s involve¬ 
ment in social activities. Among the factors cited earlier are corpo¬ 
rate morality, enlightened self-interest, managerial "ego" satisfaction, 




CONTRIBUTIONS PER EMPLOYEE AND PER CENT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
ASSETS — COMPANIES GROUPED BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES, 1972 
Company Size 














Below 250 11 $174 11 .04 
250-299 7 83 7 .03 
500-999 20 88 18 .02 
1000-4999 133 69 126 ,02 
5000-9999 78 47 76 .02 
10000-24999 97 40 95 .03 
25000+ 92 29 91 .03 
Total 438** 34 424** .03 
** Totals in the tabulations differ since respondents did not 
reply to all survey questions. 
(a) Cabot employed as of 9/30/75, 5,560 people 
SOURCE: John H. Watson, III, Bienniel Survey of Company 
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survey by the Russell Sage Foundation, 326 cooperating companies were 
asked to give those factors that most influenced their decision on a 
contribution. The results of the survey show that contribution deci¬ 
sions are influenced by a multiplicity of factors with duty to others, 
worthiness of cause, benefit to company and public relations being the 
g 
most frequently cited influences (Figure 6 ). 
What factors and/or influences were pronounced as responsible for 
provoking the Cabot Corporations strong giving philosophy? How did 
Cabot’s long and generous gift-giving philosophy come about? 
Initiating Actions and/or Steps Associated with the Decision 
to Engage in Charitable Contributions at Cabot 
The Cabot Charitable Contributions program did not come about 
as a result of any significant or isolated event or provocation (e.g., 
crisis in plant, activism, threatened litigation), or as a result of 
any organized and thoroughly researched set of decisions. No informa¬ 
tion was gathered for evaluating the decision to go into charitable 
contributions nor were rival courses of action considered over the 
charitable contributions program. 
Instead, the contributions philosophy and subsequent charitable 
programs and activities evolved over a period of years, and were seem¬ 
ingly consistent with Godfrey L. Cabot’s beliefs, interests and philos¬ 
ophies as practiced by him both in his personal life and as founder, 
owner and President of the Cabot Corporation. Although the manner in 
which charitable contributions are made, and the criteria used to make 
decisions associated with giving (see institutionalization section) 
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Figure 6 
Percent of Corporations Reporting 
Certain Factors Influencing Their Gifts 
Duty to Community 
Worthiness of Cause 
Benefit to Company 
Public Relations or 
Customer Pressure 
Moral Obligation or 
Corporate Citizen¬ 
ship 
Benefit to Employees 
Limit Governmental 
Expansion 
Profit Position or 
Tax Savings 
Example of Other 
Companies 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Percent 
SOURCE: Russell Sage Foundation survey as reported in F. Emerson 
Andrews, Corporation Giving (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952): 
115. 
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have been modified by Godfrey’s corporate successors, Godfrey’s person¬ 
al commitment, sense of duty and service to others still seems to 
permeate the Cabot Corporation. 
Corporate Top Management’s Attitudes, Beliefs, and Philosophies 
After analyzing the information collected in the field interviews 
and reviewing the life of Godfrey L. Cabot, it is obvious that Godfrey’s 
moral beliefs, attitudes, interests and philosophies as practiced by 
him and instilled in others by him, strongly influenced the development 
of charitable activities at Cabot. 
In response to the question, what/who provoked initial considera¬ 
tion of charitable contributions at Cabot, Charles A. McDowell comments: 
The Cabots, at least going back to Godfrey L. Cabot 
have always been concerned about their communities, 
and as individuals and company representatives they 
are concerned with the impact of the corporation on 
the community and the responsibility of the corpora¬ 
tion to the community.^ 
Louis W. Cabot in response to the same question answered: 
The company has had a policy of making charitable 
contributions for many years, not just the company, 
but the Cabot family. ^ 
While the above comments point to a "long" history of charitable 
contributions emanating from the Cabot family both as individuals and 
as corporate representatives, these statements lack substantiation. 
A library review on the life of Godfrey L. Cabot further clari¬ 
fied and elaborated on the genesis of charitable contributions at 
Cabot. 
Godfrey L. Cabot. Upon his death the New York Times described 
85 
Godfrey L. Cabot as a noted Boston philanthropist, a chemical manu¬ 
facturer, traveler, pioneer patron of aviation and solar energy and a 
"Brahmin of the Brahmins, although he never thought like one or acted 
like one."** In his book. Only to God: The Extraordinary Life of 
Godfrey level1 Cabot, Leon Harris describes G. L. Cabot as "...a man 
vho performs over and above his duty by normal standards, who marches 
to his own drums.. .whose life is ordered by such presently demode 
12 
words as duty, probity, integrity and character.11 
According to Harris, G. L. Cabot recognized his position in life 
and the demands placed upon it. In a letter to his wife, Minnie, who 
questioned GodfreyTs philanthropy, Godfrey writes: 
People knew we are rich & subject us to 
annoyances to which all rich people are sub¬ 
jected. We can’t expect to have the laws of 
human nature suspended for our benefit. 
If you are held up ten times a day, I am 
held up twenty and Carnegie two thousand. 
Godfrey also recognized the business aspects of philanthropy, 
according to Harris. In response to hi3 wife’s questioning of his 
gifts of fountains, horse troughs and trees to a town where he had and 
was looking to buy acre gas and oil property, Godfrey wrote that be¬ 
cause of his gifts people were: 
...running after me here day and night to 
sell cr lease gas and oil property etc. etc. ^ 
When I am here I come pretty near being ’It... 
It ~ ~~ be argued based on Harris’ work and others that while 
G. 1. labor did recognize the business benefits of charitable contri¬ 
butions, there is no doubt that many of his gift3 both large and small 
were given out of his sense of duty'* and altruism which emanated out 
86 
of his sense of "noblesse oblige" which according to Harris, "came 
in no small part from the Hebraic feeling of his Puritan ancestors 
that they were a chosen people with extra obligations..."^ 
Godfrey Cabot’s philanthropy reflected his puritan upbringing 
and the tendor of his times. Gift-giving was consistent with Godfrey’s 
personal values and reflects his place along side entrepreneurs of his 
day. Godfrey’s comparison of himself to Carnegie, relative to his gift 
giving reveals his position as an industrialist and philanthropist. 
Table 20 provides us with a sampling of Godfrey L. Cabot’s charitable 
activities. The common feature in all his gifts is that they reflect 
his personal interest and values or those of his immediate family. As 
Godfrey advanced in years, the traditional informal activities of Cabot 
were increasingly structured through his company and its foundations. 
This increased structure seemed appropriate in light of the company’s 
growth in size and earnings and its need for greater professional 
management of contributions. 
Institutionalizing Charitable Contributions at Cabot 
We have focused on how one strong voluntary social program 
(charitable contributions) comes into an organization (Cabot Corporation). 
Now we will center on the question, how, once the voluntary social pro¬ 
gram comes into an organization, is it institutionalized into routines 
(e.g., policies, procedures, structure and controls that provide guid¬ 
ance about how a particular program should be handled)? Specifically, 
the institutionalization of charitable activities at Cabot can be 
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TABLE 20 
GODFREY L. CABOT 
CHARITABLE PROFILE1 
Charitable Activity 
Watch and Ward Society 
Norwich University for 





1895-1940 and after 
1935 and after 
Harvard for Botanical 
Research 
MIT for Solar Energy 
Research 





$ 617,773 1935 
$ 747,700 
$ 10,000/year 1938 
Cabot Stock worth Since 1942 the G.L.Cabot 
$694,760 in 1942 Charitable Trust has given 
over several million dollars 
to various organizations 
This profile is just a brief sample of some of the major contribu 
tions made by G.L.Cabot. Leon Harris in his book Only to God makes the 
following comments relative to G.L.CabotTs philanthropies: 
Cabot (G.L.), all his life, had a real concern for the welfare of 
others, shown by his contributions of fountains and trees and later by 
tremendous gifts to education. (146) 
His (G.L.Cabotfs) public philanthropies, beginning with gifts to 
Boston in his twenties, had continued in no small way wherever he did 
business or traveled. (292) 
In a letter to his daughter Godfrey wrote, "You ought to give 
money away when you’re alive, when it costs you something, if you give 
it away when you’re dead, you're giving other people's money away. If 
you have too much money you have a lonely life." (292-293) 
By the end of the 1930’s various Colleges and Charities were the 
major stockholders of Cabot's company of which he had given away over 
25 per cent. (296) 
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described in two steps: (1) steps in the change process to make the 
program on-going and (2) current steps to keep contributions on-going. 
Step 1 can be viewed in two phases: (1) Purview of Executive and 
(2) Formalization. The second step recognizes the establishment of a 
16 
full-time contributions specialist as a third phase. 
Phase I - Purview of President 
Chronologically this phase encompasses most of Cabot’s ninety- 
five year history (1882-1953) and is marked by G. L. Cabot’s powerful 
and close control of the company. Essentially, contributions (Figure 
7 ) were under the direction of the President’s office and G. L. Cabot 
himself with little or no distinction on a formal organization basis 
among types of contribution recipients (e.g., that is contributions to 
"pure" charities, trade associations, employees). Also, little formal 
















Colleges and other 
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Although no formal written policies or procedures were established 
to control contributions, contributions of the organization were kept 
strong and on-going by the President and his attitude, actions, and 
charitable deeds. Harris writes: 
Cabot’s (Godfrey L.) attitude so permeated his 
company that his chief counsel (Fred C. Femald) 
could remark with no evident self-consciousness 
that he had chosen the law after considering the 
ministry because he felt he could accomplish more 
good in business than in the church.^ 
The actions and/or steps to institutionalize charitable contribu¬ 
tions during this phase can best be characterized as: (1) recognition 
by the President in attitude, actions and deeds that charitable contri¬ 
butions should be supported by the organization, (2) supervision of 
charitable activities was the main responsibility of the President’s 
office (e.g., no delegation of responsibility down to lower level 
managers or establishment of a formal structure for charitable activities), 
(3) no formal effort to increase division support of or involvement in 
charitable activities and (4) no effort to distinguish types of chari¬ 
table activities internally for the organization. 
In summary. Phase I can be described as the incipient stage of 
the institutionalization process of charitable activities at Cabot in 
that charitable contributions were given organization recognition and 
were on-going, but no formal steps were taken to control or delegate 
organization responsibilities for charitable activities. 
Phase II - Formalization 
Chronologically this phase covers the second longest period of 
time (1953-1969) and is marked by the adoption of formal procedures for 
90 
charitable activities (Cabot Foundation) and the delegation of formal 
responsibilities (part-time specialists). 
For the first time a portion of the charitable activities were 
assigned to a charitable foundation. The Cabot contributions that were 
funneled through the foundation were controlled by formal rules and 
regulations as established by the Foundation’s Agreement of Association 
(Appendix C), its bylaws and its part-time administrative representa¬ 
tives. Also, for the first time an attempt was made to structure chari¬ 
table contributions according to two types: "pure charities," the 
responsibility of the foundation and other contributions (i.e., trade 
associations, employee assistance), and the responsibility of individual 
divisions or staff function (i.e.. Personnel, Research and Development). 
The vast bulk of pure charitable activities (80-90%) were funnel¬ 
ed through the foundation with the remaining charitable activities under 
the supervision of others (Figure 8) 
Cabot Foundation: Purpose and Responsibilities. The Cabot 
Foundation was established in 1953 and is presently housed at the Cabot 
Corporation’s Executive Offices in Boston. Among the main purposes of 
the foundation (Appendix C) are: 
To aid by contribution or otherwise any corporation, 
foundation, fund, or trust which is a charitable organ¬ 
ization, ...» created or organized in the United States, 
or of any State or Territory, or of the District of 
Columbia, or of any possession of the United States, 
organized or operated exclusively for religious, chari¬ 
table, scientific, veteran rehabilitation service, 
literary, or educational purposes or for the prevention 
of cruelty to children... 
To receive, hold and administer in accordance with 
the directions of respective donors, funds given in 
trust for the promotion of any corporation’s objects 
or objects cognate thereto. 
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Prior to 1965, when a part-time Director was appointed, the 
management of the Foundation was the responsibility of its Board of 
Directors and its Officers (Comprised mostly of Cabot personnel). During 
this phase the Foundation was established for administering the "pure” 
charities of the Cabot Corporation and little, if any, coordination 
between Division activities and Foundation activities took place. 
Approval of grants, request for Foundation funding and other 
Foundation business (i.e., purchase and sale of securities and other 
property, appointment of directors or officers and other) was conducted 
at annual meetings or at special meetings called from time to time. 
Particular Foundation administrative details (i.e., preparation of 
Foundation budget, monitoring or recommending of grant requests and 
recipients and other) was delegated on a part-time basis to Cabot 
personnel with other functional responsibilities. 
After 1965, as a result of increasing contribution activity, both 
through the Foundation and the Divisions, a part-time Director was 
hired to manage the Foundation and assist Division managers with their 
charitable activities. 
Other Charitable Activities 
As described in Figure 8 , charitable activities of the Cabot 
Corporation were funneled through three sources: Foundation, Division, 
and Other (i.e.. Staff Unit, Foreign Subsidiary). The charitable 
activities of the Division or Other unit was assigned to individuals 










of all corporate 
contributions) 
Cabot Corporate Staff 





Divisions Other (Employee Pro¬ 





of all corporate 
contributions) 
Cabot Foundation established to distribute Cabot Corporation’s 
charitable contributions to qualifying charitable organizations 
Divisions free to distribute contributions in accordance with 
charitable budget or schedule with the assistance of the Cabot Founda¬ 
tion 
Cabot Foundation administered under the direction of Cabot 
Corporate Staff on a part-time basis 
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The Cabot Corporation in addition to voting annually an amount 
of money to the Foundation would also support direct individual divi¬ 
sion or other unit charitable activities. The size of the contribution 
was determined by individual managers and approved by the President’s 
office. Assistance in the preparation of a charitable budget could be 
obtained through the part-time director of the Foundation. 
In addition to the formal procedures established for charitable 
activities mentioned above, a spirit of charitable contributions was 
maintained by G. L. Cabot, prior to his death in 1962, by sending fre¬ 
quent letters and memoranda to Corporate Officers reminding them "to 
keep a spirit of service in now what had become a tremendous company" 
20 
(in terms of dollars and profits). Also, Tom Cabot, Godfrey’s suc¬ 
cessor and Louis Cabot, Tom's successor, both maintained a strong 
sense of duty and, like their predecessor, both actively supported 
charitable contributions at Cabot. 
Phase III - Written Policy and Clarification of Charitable Contribution 
Responsibilities and Philosophy 
Phase III is the last and most recent phase (1969-Present) and is 
marked by two subphases: Phase IIIA - The Appointment of a Full-Time 
Executive Director of the Cabot Foundation, and Phase IIIB - Written 
Contributions Policy. Both subphases represent a broadening of 
individual responsibilities for contributions and a clarification of 
contribution philosophy. 
Subphase IIIA - Full-Time Specialist. This phase marked organ¬ 
izational recognition for a full-time staff specialist to handle the 
94 
charitable contributions of the entire Cabot Company (i.e., Foundation 
and Domestic Operations). 
In addition to administering all the details for the Foundation, 
the Director was given additional responsibility to assist and coordi¬ 
nate Division managers in their divisional charitable activities. Prior 
to subphase IIIB, division managers were required to establish a budget 
with the Director’s assistance, but were not required to make their 
contributions through the foundation (Figure 9). 
Thus, for the first time, a contributions specialist was appoint¬ 
ed who did not have other functional responsibilities. 
Subphase III3 - Written Contributions Policy. This second sub¬ 
phase marks the final and most detailed effort by the organization to 
formalize charitable contributions. In 1975 a "Corporate Charitable 
Giving Policy" (Appendix D) was established. The central elements 
of the new policy are: (1) establishment of types of contributions 
and their organizational responsibility; (2) redefinition and clarifica¬ 
tion of Foundation and Division Responsibilities; (3) establishment 
of a formal charitable reporting system; and (4) formal declaration 
of the Company’s Giving Philosophy (Figure 10). 
Types of Contribution and Organizational Responsibility 
Essentially six specific classes of contributions and memberships 
were established: Qualifying Charities (Administered through the Cabot 
Foundation), Scholarships for Children of Employees (Corporate Person¬ 
nel Department), Matching Grants (Cabot Foundation), Educational Assist¬ 
ance (Division), Research Grants to Universities (Director of Technology) 
95 
Figure 9 
Charitable Contributions Program 
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and Memberships in Non-Charities (Division) (see Appendix D). 
Clarification of Individual Responsibilities 
Executive Director. The Director of the Cabot Foundation is 
responsible for: a) administering all corporate domestic contributions 
and membership fees to qualifying charitable organizations, b) assist¬ 
ing divisional managers in the establishment of annual charitable 
21 
budgets or schedules covering the intended gift from the foundation 
(over $100) for each division, c) make specific division charitable 
expenditures to qualifying organizations in accordance with budget, 
d) determining charitable qualifications of perspective recipients of 
division gifts, e) supplying all necessary information to division and 
f) budget preparation for the Cabot Foundation. 
Division Manager. The division manager is responsible for: 
a) overall enforcement of Corporate Giving Policy, b) seeing what 
gifts and donations to qualifying organizations are administered through 
the Cabot Foundation, c) clearing all questions of conflict of interest 
and legality with the legal department, d) administer payments direct 
to nonqualifying charities and e) the establishment of an annual 
charitable giving budget or schedule out of their capital budget. 
Procedural Requirements. All costs associated with gifts and 
administration of the six classes of contributions are to be submitted 
to the Assistant Controller and reported by him in an annual Corpora¬ 
tions Contributions Report. 
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Overview of the Institutionalization, of Charitable Contributions 
at the Cabot Corporation 
The three phases of the institutionalization of charitable 
activities at the Cabot Corporation narked the gradual replacement of 
informal procedures and controls during Phase I (e.g., G. L. Cabot’s 
close supervision) with formal procedures and controls during Phase II 
(e.g'., Cabot Foundation, Part-Time Director) and Phase III (e.g., Full- 
Time Director, Written Charitable Giving Policy). Each subsequent 
phase witnessed the increased delegation of charitable activities down 
to Divisions or Foundation Directors. Also, as charitable activities 
increased in scope, new formal procedures and controls were established 
(e.g., budgets, reports, classes of contributions). 
Lastly, throughout the three phases, top management support of 
charitable activities at Cabot was strong. But while top management 
support was strong, formal control mechanisms were needed to increase 
divisional efforts in this area (Figure 11). 
Summary 
Corporate contributions have long been considered an integral 
part of a business corporation’s social responsibility. In fact, 
charitable contributions provoke the least discourse when it comes to 
defining an organization’s social involvement. 
The Cabot Charitable Contributions were viewed in this present 
chapter as one particular type of voluntary social program. The focus 
of our attention was on two questions: (1) how did a strong charitable 

































































--, how was it institutionalized into routines. 
Relative to the first question, it was pointed out that Cabot’s 
personal sense cf duty was the prire force in bringing about contribu¬ 
tions at Cabot. 
Relative to the second question, three phases were described, 
eaoh reflecting increased fcmalization cf charitable activities. Dur¬ 
ing These I, the activities centered around the President’s office. 
Prase 11 saw the develtprerc cf a separate entity for charitable 
contributions in the fern of the Cabot Tourdacion, while These III 
witnessed the co-ordination cf all charitable activities into a fomal 
written Charitable Contributions Policy. 
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FOOTNOTES 
Pure contributions is the term used by Arthur Phillips, the for¬ 
mer Executive Director of the Cabot Foundation, used to describe those 
charitable contributions made by the Cabot Foundation to Internal 
Revenue Service qualifying charities or organizations. This is in 
contrast to those contributions made to organizations directly out 
of the Cabot Corporation capital budget. 
2 
The Company name was changed to the Cabot Corporation in 1960. 
Prior to this time the company name was Godfrey L. Cabot, Inc. 
3 
In its performance chemical group the company is the world’s 
leading producer of carbon black, used as a reinforcement in rubber 
and plastics and as a pigment in inks, coatings and plastics. Other 
products in this group are Cab-O-Sil used as an anti-caking agent and 
Cab-O-Grip used as an anti-slip ingredient. 
In its energy group, the company explores for, develops and pro¬ 
duces crude oil and natural gas primarily in the United States, and 
imports, terminals, stores and sells liquified natural gas (LNG). 
In the last group, engineered products, the company designs and 
manufactures oil well servicing and workover equipment, produces mobil 
drilling rigs, electric furnaces, vacuum-degasses steels and alloy 
steel forgings. 
All financial data and product descriptions were taken from 
Moody's Industrial Manual, 1976: 230-232; and from various Cabot 
Corporation publications. 
^There are many reasons for establishing a charitable foundation. 
According to Louis W. Cabot, Chairman of the Board of the Cabot Corpo¬ 
ration, the Foundation was established as (1) a legal convenience to 
funnel the Company's charitable contributions which were growing in 
relation to the company's profit and (2) a Foundation makes contribu¬ 
tion activities more orderly. 
Charles A. McDowell, the Executive Director of the Foundation 
comments that a Foundation does the following: (1) it centralizes and 
controls the procedural steps of corporate giving; (2) it smooths out 
your annual contributions so that you do not become an eratic or un¬ 
reliable source of contributions as do many companies that do not have 
Foundations, and (3) you can budget your contributions on an annual 
basis and you will not be taxed at an exorbitant rate by the govern¬ 
ment. Thus, a Foundation has legal, organizational and social benefits 
for the Company. 
^See Appendix D, Cabot Corporation memo to all U.S. and Canadian 
Employees by Robert A. Charpie, President, Cabot Corporation. 
^Income was based on continuing operations prior to a deduction 
of $23 million loss from discontinued operations. 
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Henry Eilbirt and I. Robert Parket, "The Current Status of 
Corporate Social Responsibility," California Management Review 18 
(August 1973): 5-14. 
g 
F. Emerson Andrews, Corporation Giving (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1952): 114-117. 
9 
Charles A. McDowell, Executive Director of the Cabot Foundation, 
Inc., Cabot Corporation, Executive Offices, 125 High Street, Boston, 
Massachusetts, June 1977. 
^Louis W. Cabot, Chairman of the Board, Cabot Corporation, 
interviews held at the Cabot Corporation, Executive Offices, 125 High 
Street, Boston, Massachusetts, June 1977. 
^New York Times, November 3, 1962: 25. 
12 
Leon Harris, Only to God: The Extraordinary Life of Godfrey 
Lowell Cabot, (New York: Atheneum, 1967): xiii-xiv. 
Harris was given a free hand in writing Godfrey L. Cabot’s bi¬ 
ography. Harris’ research was based on interviews with members of 
the Cabot Family, their relatives, connections, business associates, 
friends, Godfrey’s personal letters and journals, and material found 
in the two volume work History and Genealogy of the Cabot Family, 1475- 
1927. 
13 
Harris, Only to God: 176. 
^Harris, Only to God: 160. Harris also noted, "Cabot had taken 
every short cut imaginable to make what money he had go as far as 
possible in his business. He made agreements with county courts to 
supply the county courthouses with free gas if they would allow him 
to lay his pipeline above ground on the edge of the county road at no 
charge for the right of way..." (Harris: 278). 
In noting Godfrey L. Cabot's strong drive for power Harris writes 
"Not only do chief executives of large businesses have a pleasing and 
reassuring power over their own employees; but if their firms carry 
large bank deposits or place substantial advertising or make contribu¬ 
tions..., they also have instant communication, a respectful audience 
for their views among bank presidents, editors, real estate owners, and 
politicians, who seek them out and value their own opinions in all 
matters of business, art, international affairs, and education." 
(Harris: 284). 
^Harris, Only to God: xii. 
16 
In commenting on the evolution of charitable contributions at 
Cabot, Louis W. Cabot, Chairman of the Board of the Cabot Corporation 
stated: contributions, at first, were something the Chief Executive 
Officer could handle, but as contributions grew and the activity as¬ 
sociated with contributions increased (i.e., request, size of contribu- 
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tion, types of contributions), contributions became, at first, the 
part-time duty of someone with other functional responsibility and, 
eventually, it reached a point where it became worthwhile to have a 
full-time person. 
^3y formal activities it is meant the employment of a staff 
specialist, budgets, reports, organizational responsibility or other 
explicit control mechanisms. There was no evidence that these tech¬ 
niques existed during G. L. Cabot’s close involvement with contribu¬ 
tions. 
18 
‘''Harris, Only to God: 306. 
19 
Arthur Phillips was the first part-time director of the Cabot 
Foundation. Mr. Phillips prior to his appointment as full-time 
director held numerous positions at Cabot (see Personnel Profile, 
Table 19). 
^Harris, Only to God: 306. 
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All Cabot Corporation contributions made to Internal Revenue 
Service designated charitable organizations over one hundred dollars 
must be made through the Cabot Foundation. Each division manager on 
an annual basis will submit, to the Cabot Foundation Board of Directors, 
a tentative list of perspective recipients. The Cabot Foundation 
Board of Directors has final responsibility for approving or denying 
division requests. The Executive Director’s recommendation is 
considered important by the Foundation Board on all contribution 
matters. 
All contributions under one hundred dollars are the responsibility 
of division managers and are made directly out of their operating bud¬ 
gets. 
Presently no set corporate formula exists for allocating the 
contribution activity amongst divisions equally. The total dollars 
available for contributions through the foundation are assigned to it 
by the Cabot Corporation Board of Directors and are based on a percent¬ 




The second initiation and institutionalization of a voluntary 
cn-gcing social progran is General Electric’s participation in the 
Program tc Increase Minority Engineering Graduates (PIXEG). While 
PIXEL- presently represents a national effort under the leadership and 
coordination of the National Academy of Engineering (MAE), PIXEL’s 
initial inpetus vas at General Electric.'1' The initial impetus for 
PIXEL and its institutionalization at General Electric are the main 
focuses of this chapter. 
General electric 
The predecessor Company to General Electric was founded in 1373 
by Themes A. Edison to manufacture and sell his incandescent lamp. 
Today the company is engaged primarily in the development, manufacture 
and sale of equipment for the generation, transmission, control and 
utilization of electrical power. General Electric is the largest 
manufacturer of electrical and electronic equipment in the United 
States and is one of the largest United States Corporations. 
With $15.7 billion in sales, $12.1 billion in assets, $933.0 mil 
lion in net income and 330,000 employees, General Electric is the 
largest firm in this study. The Company operates throughout the world 
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and offers a varied and diverse product line divided by type of market 
into six broad categories: Natural Resources, Consumer, Industrial 
Components and Systems, Industrial Power Equipment, Aerospace, and 
2 
International (Table 21). 
General Electric and Its Social Involvement 
General Electric, like many large corporations, has experienced 
both sides of public recognition from praise to criticism. Being so 
large, (over $15 billion in sales) General Electric’s products, services, 
policies, actions and decisions affect a large number of constituents: 
employees, managers, stockholders, customers, local, state and federal 
governments, various interest groups, competitors and others. 
As a result. General Electric is a "visable" company that, according 
to one of its representatives, "has to have social responsibility be- 
3 
cause society’s problems are General Electric’s problems." 
The Company’s social involvement takes many forms. Table 22 
is just a brief sampling of some of the social programs and activities 
the company has sponsored or supported. 
Baker studied six large business organizations in an attempt to 
determine each firm’s "identity and social responsibility policies."^ 
General Electric was among the companies investigated. In describing 
General Electric’s awareness of its obligation to society. Baker com- 
General Electric is aware that the biggest are ex¬ 
pected to do more; it believes that industry’s major 
challenge in the urban crisis is to provide jobs for 
the disadvantaged. GE believes a company must be crea¬ 
tive in its approach to solving social problems as it 
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SAMPLE CAPSULE SUMMARY 01 ’ CORPORATE SOCIAL INVOLVEMENT AT GE 
Date Social Activity 
Dollar Budget/ 
Contributions Descriptions 
1976 GE Foundation3 $3.8 Million . Grants made to education 
1968 Woodland Training 
Center^ 
n/a Objective to take hard¬ 
core unemployed off wel¬ 
fare roles by providing 
a training program 
1969 Nela Day Camp $1,500 To provide a summer day 
camp experience for 
children 
1970 Gerald L. Phillippe 
Awards 
$5,000 GE Foun¬ 
dation & Corp. 
Public Relations 
Awards to GE employees 
for their contributions 
to the community 
1972 Explorer Scouts 
(Career Education 
Program) 
No budget, man¬ 
power contributed 
by GE 
Objective to acquaint 
senior high school stu¬ 
dents with career op¬ 
portunities 
1972 Encounter ’73: A 
Dialogue for 
Tomorrow 
$20,000/yr.(est) To stimulate quality 
eleventh grade students 
to the benefits of 
technology 
1973 Guidance Counselor 
Seminar 
$2,000/yr. To acquaint junior and 
high school counselors 
with business 
1972 Program to Increase 
Minority Engineering 
Graduates 
$90,000; expected Program designed to in¬ 
to put $20,000 crease by mid-1980s, the 
into NAE effort number of minorities pur¬ 
suing engineering educa¬ 
tion 







See above; Co-sponsors of 
this program are the top 
15 companies in U.S.A. 
through National Academy 
of Engineering 
a 1976 Annual Report, General Electric Company 
Other than the foundation information, summary of social programs 
was taken from Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility, 1975 
(Radnor, Pa.: Chilton Book Company, 1975). 
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PIMEG is offered as one example of GE’s creative approach and 
commitment to solving a social problem both in terms of its own opera¬ 
tions and society. 
PIMEG. As mentioned earlier, PIMEG is a national program present¬ 
ly under the leadership and coordination of the National Academy of 
Engineering (NAE). NAE’s stated mission for PIMEG is: 
To provide effective national leadership and co¬ 
ordination of activities which are best calculated 
to achieve parity representation in engineering by ^ 
Blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and American Indians. 
PIMEGTs national goal is to achieve parity^ representation in 
engineering for each of the minorities through the attainment of parity 
in engineering school enrollments: (1) at the freshman level by 1982-83, 
and (2) at the B.S. level by 1985-86.^ 
General Electric and Its Management Philosophy 
In order to provide greater understanding of PIMEG’s initiation 
and institutionalization at General Electric, a brief discussion of 
GE's management philosophies relative to its organization and person¬ 
nel is necessary. 
General Electric is an extremely large, diversified, decentralized, 
technically oriented conglomerate. The company considers itself a 
technological leader with its products, services, and systems possess¬ 
ing a high degree of engineering knowhow. Based on its size and tech¬ 
nical emphasis, the company is a heavy recruiter of graduates with 
9 
technical degrees. As will be seen below, the company’s size and 
technical emphasis is reflected in its organization and its recruitment. 
109 
evaluation and advancement of employees, especially in its managerial 
ranks. 
General Electric’s Organization. Organizationally, the company 
has a 9 member Corporate Policy Committee, 9 Sector and Group Execu¬ 
tives (i.e., V.P. and Sector Executive Consumer Products and Services 
Sector, V.P. and Group Executive Aerospace), 23 corporate staff officers 
(i.e., V.P.-Corporate Public Relations, V.P. Corporate Employee Rela¬ 
tions) and approximately 60 Presidents, V.P. and/or General Managers 
of Divisions within 9 Operating Groups (i.e., Major Appliances, Power 
Generation, Aerospace, other). Each of the Divisions within the nine 
operating groups are further broken down into Departments (approxi¬ 
mately 170). 
A new concept established at GE is the use of Strategic Business 
Units. For planning purposes GE has established 43 strategic business 
units. For administrative purposes the Company still employs over 50 
Divisions. But in some instances the products within various Divisions 
share the same strategic markets. While each Division still remains 
separate, for strategic planning purposes products within separate 
Divisions are combined. Overall, while GE has approximately 60 Divi¬ 
sions it has 43 SBU (Strategic Business Units). A SBU can be: a 
regular division, an entire operating group, or a department within a 
division or any combination of groups, divisions, departments^ (see 
Figure 12). 
Other than two organizational changes (addition of the strategic 
business units for planning purposes, and addition of two Vice Chairmen 
110 
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with Operating Responsibility) GE’s organizational philosophy is 
essentially that instituted in the 1950s by Ralph Cordiner, then, Chief 
Executive Officer. 
Cordiner thoroughly decentralized GE into a divisionalized organ¬ 
ization run by largely autonomous general managers. Structurally, 
Cordiner established three separate components: the operating group, 
the executive office, and the service function. ^ 
The operating groups were headed by executive vice-presidents and 
were divided into several product divisions headed by vice-presidents 
or general managers. In turn, each division was divided into product 
departments, each headed by a manager. Essentially, the day-to-day 
decisions of GE were decentralized down to the lowest possible level 
within the organization with each operating manager responsible for 
the profitable operation of his/her department. 
The executive officers were responsible for formulating overall 
company objectives and policies and did not have day-to-day operating 
responsibility for the separate product departments. Under Cordiner 
I O 
and his successor, Fred J. Borch, the executive officers had "cognizance" 
over, but not direct operating responsibility for assigned operating 
groups. 
The service units were available for the assisting and advising 
of the operating groups, but had no formal authority other than the 
13 
"authority of knowledge." 
The decentralized organization structure places heavy responsibility 
on low level managers. One positive outcome of this is that GE is con- 
112 
stantly preparing, training and evaluating young managers for higher 
level management positions within the company. This policy of "growing 
its own," to be discussed below, is reflected in the large number of 
GE top executives who have come up "through the ranks.But GE’s 
organizational philosophy has also, as will be discussed below, partly 
contributed to the lack of minorities in high level management positions 
at GE. 
Recruiting, Evaluating and Promoting of Managerial Employees 
Because of the technological nature of GE’s products, services 
and systems, the company has been a major employer of engineers. With¬ 
in its exempt employee ranks, thirty-seven percent or close to 30,000 
of its 80,000 exempt employees as of December, 1974, held a four year 
technical career. One recent GE study showed that of 359 persons with 
college degrees in its upper levels of management, 83 percent or 297 
of these individuals joined the company within five years of graduation. 
Another GE study showed that within the top 20 percent of the positions 
at the company, more than 60% of the employees held four year technical 
degrees. These figures support the company’s claim that, "GE is and 
has always been a technical culture, and has traditionally grown its 
16 
own." In one recent article commenting on GE's top management 
loyalty to their company it was pointed out that, "The one universal 
quality (of GE top management) is that all of its upper-rank men are 
up-from-the-ranks general managers."^ 
GE promotes its prospective managers on a basis of a series of 
formal evaluation processes culminating in a yearly review by GE’s 
15 
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Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and his Vice Chairman, Before 
reaching this evaluation phase each prospective manager is evaluated 
and screened by the company's Executive Manpower Component, Each 
potential manager is appraised according to his/her overall perform¬ 
ance on a number of predetermined goals and objectives. For instance, 
each manager of a strategic business unit must map out formal plans, 
strategies, goals and objectives for a number of key operating areas, 
such as: 
- sales and profit goals 
- levels of capital investments 
- targets for increased market share 
- targets and goals for minority hiring 
- desirable acquisitions 
- new product development 
18 
- other. 
Each strategic unit manager and his subordinates are subjected to 
indepth review and evaluation by top management. 
It should also be noted that while it is easier to evaluate and 
promote managers based on quantifiable goals, social goals usually 
lack quantification. GE has through its SBUs and its Equal Opportunity/ 
Minority Relations Components (to be discussed below) made managers 
responsible for establishing equal employment goals. Similar to 
financial goals, GE managers and their subordinates are held respon¬ 
sible for and accountable for equal opportunity goals. All managers 
are responsible for the following equal employment policy: 
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Goals should be definitely established and a 
measure and audit process for the achievement of 
these goals be put in place with an appropriate 
reward and penalty system for each foreman, su¬ 
pervisor, or manager who has the responsibility 
for hiring and terminating employees. 
Summary. Thus, in summary, one can see from the elements of GE’s 
management philosophy discussed above that GE breeds its own managers 
for long term careers at GE; that the probability is high that GE 
managers are college graduates with a technical degree; that GE de¬ 
centralized, profit-centered organization provides for the nurturing 
and development of prospective GE managers; and lastly, GE’s technical 
emphasis is applied to social as well as economic programs (e.g., mi¬ 
nority hiring). 
It will be shown that while GE legally had to establish equal 
opportunity goals and hold managers responsible for meeting these goals, 
PIMEG evolved out of the difficulty GE managers were having meeting 
these minority/equal employment goals. 
Initiation of PIMEG at GE 
Minority hiring is one social activity considered very important 
by most businessmen. In the Parket and Eilbirt study cited earlier, 
75 (78%) of the 96 responding firms practiced minority hiring. Of 
the 75 firms practicing minority hiring, 40 (53%) of their presidents 
ranked this activity among the top three social activities believed 
most important to their firms. Out of a long list of social activities, 
these same presidents ranked minority hiring most important followed by 
20 
ecology and minority training. 
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* 9 1 
Although minority hiring is most likely not a voluntary program, 
many organizations have engaged in voluntary and innovative programs to 
facilitate their efforts in this area. GE’s PIMEG program is a volun¬ 
tary social program aimed at the company’s efforts to increase the num¬ 
ber of blacks and other minorities in its managerial ranks. 
How did PIMEG get into General Electric? Like the charitable 
contributions program of the Cabot Corporation, PIMEG did not come 
about as a result of any one significant or isolated event or provoca¬ 
tion (i.e., crisis in plant, activism). But contrary to Cabot’s 
Charitable Contributions program, PIMEG did evolve out of an organized 
and systematic investigation for a solution to a defined G.E. problem: 
lack of black engineering graduates for hire. 
Figure 13 is a partial organization chart depicting the main 
organization units at GE involved with PIMEG’s initiation. The stages 
leading to PIMEG at GE are described below and as will be described, 
the PIMEG Program entered the organization at the Corporate Staff 
Level, specifically Corporate Educational Services, which acted as a 
catalyst, for both senior top executives and operating management in¬ 
volvement . 
Actions and Processes Associated with PIMEG*s Initiation 
Recruiting. Like many business organizations, GE found itself 
confronted with increased governmental and societal pressure to increase 
equal employment efforts at GE during the mid-1960’s. In response to 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Affirmative Action Orders, other Govern¬ 
mental legislation. Social Pressure (i.e., civic groups, activists) 
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effort to recruit black and other minority graduates. The main focus 
of GE recruitment was on black graduates possessing engineering or 
technical degrees. Despite, (1) the establishment of an Applicant 
Referral Center to give black candidates "high visibility" in the 
company, (2) more trips by GE recruiting personnel to college campuses, 
especially black colleges with engineering programs, and (3) a renewed 
emphasis by top management on the importance of equal employment op¬ 
portunity at GE, GE’s success in its recruitment and advancement of 
black candidates was so poor that Fred Borch, then, Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer commented: 
Certainly, the rate of progress would prove in¬ 
adequate to satisfy the new requirements of the 
government, the new expectations of the public, 
the mij^rity communities and the new business 
needs. 
Equal Opportunity/Minority Relations (EO/MR) Components. As a 
result of its lack of success in its recruitment of blacks, the Com¬ 
pany through its Corporate Employee Relations Component (Figure 13) 
established EO/MR components in 1968 at various levels in its operating 
businesses. The main purposes of the EO/MR components were to formal¬ 
ize the establishment of goals and programs for the hiring and advance¬ 
ment of minorities and to conduct systematic indepth reviews by top 
management of each individual manager’s performance in this area: 
The EO/MR status and the programs of all operating 
businesses of the company were systematically exam¬ 
ined by top level management in a round of scheduled 
Session II EO/MR Reviews. 
In addition to the EO/MR components, the company established for 
the first time in 1969 a regional recruiting office in Dallas, Texas. 
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This was a logistical move to place the company’s recruiting office 
closer to a number of predominately black colleges with engineering 
graduates. 
As a result of the Session II EO/MR Reviews for 1969 by Group 
Executives and Staff Officers, a number of problems were identified: 
- GE operating managers were still having trouble recruiting 
minority professionals, managers and skilled employees. 
- GE as a whole was having difficulty advancing its minority 
employees upwards in the organization. 
- GE operating components and staff components were having 
difficulty developing creative community programs to meet 
"high priority EO/MR challenges that are relevant to the 
needs of the business." 
It was from these Session II reviews that the company recognized 
that: 
...engineering educational background is the pre¬ 
dominant common characteristic of people in the 
Company’s professional and managerial workforce. 
Yet, accelerated recruitment efforts were not yield 
ing minority engineers in sufficient numbers to 
correct the imbalance within a few years. 
Corporate Educational Services. Corporate Educational Services 
(Figure 13) had responsibility for GE’s college recruiting. At a meet¬ 
ing in early 1970 with the Senior Vice President for Corporate Admin¬ 
istrative Staff and the Vice President for Corporate Employee Relations, 
the manager for Corporate Educational Services suggested that GE’s 
problem was not in its college recruiting efforts, but in a lack of 
supply of black engineering graduates. 
As a result of this meeting. Corporate Educational Services during 
late 1970 and early 1971 conducted a number of studies. Modeling and 
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analysis of emerging demographic data revealed: 
The real problem was that the available supply 
of minority engineers was woefully insufficient. 
To satisfy the Company’s needs would require 
drastically increasing the supply of newly 
graduating minority engineers over a period of 
years. 
It was from these studies conducted by Corporate Educational 
Services that PIMEG grew. For instance at a meeting in May, 1971 
Mr. Hershner Cross, then Senior Vice President for Corporate Admin' 
istrative Staff reported to other Corporate Officers that: 
...consider the question of engineers. The 
Company will hire about 1000 engineers in 1971. 
But the number of black engineering graduates 
from both black and white schools in 1971 will 
be around 400. We would have to recruit almost 
all of the current black engineering graduates 
in the nation to meet our goal. I think you’ll 
agree that with all the other companies pushins 
on the same front, that isn’t too realistic... / 
PIMEG. Further study by Corporate Educational Services during 
late 1971 and early 1972 pointed out: 
- GE is a "degree culture" and in fact, a highly "engineering- 
degree culture (i.e., 60% of the top 20% of all management 
positions are occupied by persons who hold 4-year technical 
degrees, 1% of the top 20% of the positions were filled by 
minorities) 
- That the dimensions of the shortage of minority engineers is 
so massive, that the traditional patterns and pace of attract¬ 
ing, educating, recruiting, developing and promoting of minor¬ 
ity engineers could not achieve parity even by the turn of 
the next century 
- The depth of the shortage in the educational pipeline stretches 
back through the colleges down to the high schools and junior 
high schools because minority persons tended or were counseled 
to shy away from math, science and other school work essential 
to college students in engineering ^8 
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Based on these conclusions reached by Corporate Educational 
Services, several possible solutions to the defined problem (e.g., lack 
of black engineering graduates to hire), were offered at various meet¬ 
ings by Corporate Educational Services and other Corporate Staff Officers 
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and Operating Executives. Out of several solutions discussed, it was 
decided that a Minority Co-Op Program would be pursued. To test and 
evaluate the feasibility of this alternative, a Cooperative Education 
Committee was established. 
The Cooperative Education Committee members held conferences, 
conducted a survey of 210 engineering colleges, and traveled throughout 
the country to discuss the merits of the Co-Op Minority Program with 
other employers, governmental agencies, the colleges of engineering, 
minority organizations, professional societies and associations, 
foundations and various other segments of society. 
By September, 1972, the following conclusions were reached by the 
Cooperative Education Committee: 
1. The Minority Education Program was inadequate because it lengthened 
the educational cycle by at least a year and many schools and 
operating components who provided employment were not in a posi¬ 
tion to gear up to Co-Op Programs 
2. The solution had to be bigger than just Co-Op and should provide a 
plurality of programs encompassing all facets of career preparation 
for minorities including: guidance, motivation, education, funding 
and employment, and 
3. As big as GE is, the problem and its solution is larger than GEfs 
capabilities and must be a national effort 
As a result of these conclusions, the notion of PIMEG was con¬ 
ceived and introduced into GE. PIMEG represents a plurality of pro¬ 
grams aimed at achieving a 10-15 fold increase (400 to 4000-6000 an- 
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nually) in minority engineering graduates by the mid-1980's. 
Summary. The initiation of PIMEG at GE took eight years and 
encompassed several phases. Each of these phases produced outcomes 
that triggered a series of actions or efforts that eventually cul¬ 
minated in PIMEG. Figure 14 describes the main aspects of each phase 
of PIMEGfs initiation at GE. 
Institutionalizing PIMEG at GE 
PIMEG is an on-going voluntary social program initiated in 1972 
and aimed at helping GE managers meet their affirmative action goals 
and guidelines. GE has used a number of methods and approaches to 
maintain component interest and support in PIMEG. Involvement and 
support in any PIMEG program by GE personnel has been completely vol¬ 
untary . The company did not employ any threats or sanctions (e.g., 
use of trauma); formal policy statements, or PIMEG specialist to 
force involvement. Instead, the company instilled the concept of PIMEG 
in its operating and staff component managers through a combination of 
the following actions and/or steps: Top Management Actions, PIMEG 
Structure, Financial Support and Various Tools aimed at Communicating 
and Assessing PIMEG at GE (i.e., Workshops, Surveys, Reprints of 
Articles and Speeches in Corporate Publications, Letters, PIMEG Re¬ 
porter, Other). 
Institutionalizing Actions and Processes at GE 
Top Management Actions. Top management at GE have undertaken a 
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nel and have made PIMEG a viable GE and National Program* For instance, 
top executives have served on National PIMEG Committees; given speeches; 
pledged financial support; conferred with numerous representatives from 
Government, Education, Minority Organizations, Professional Associations 
and Societies, and others on the merits of PIMEG; and attended conven¬ 
tions, conferences, and meetings in support of PIMEG both at GE and on 
a National level. 
These actions by top executives are well publicized in GE publica¬ 
tions and given high visibility in the Company. As such, GE operating 
and staff managers receive strong signals from top management that 
PIMEG is a GE commitment and should receive local support. 
GE’s commitment to PIMEG is shown in a letter by Hershner Cross 
to all Group Executives, Division General Managers and Department 
General Managers (Appendix E ) in which he states: 
As you know. General Electric is playing a major 
role in the national program to increase minority 
engineering graduates (PIMEG)...Our commitment to 
the PIMEG effort is illustrated by Reg Jones’ 
recent statement to the OIC Convocation in 
Minneapolis: "Progress toward integrating our 
technical management structure depends upon in¬ 
creasing the supply of minority engineers...1’ve 
agreed to chair the council which includes the 
heads of some of the nations leading corporations, 
universities, minority organizations and govern¬ 
ment officials." 
Clearly, this is a highly important project for 
us all, and one job obviously in our own interest. 
Thus, the first step to instill PIMEG at GE was strong top 
management support in the concept of PIMEG both nationally and at GE. 
PIMEG Structure at GE. PIMEG is not housed in or the responsi¬ 
bility of any single organizational component at GE. Instead, PIMEG 
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activities are sponsored by various staff and operating component 
managers with assistance from corporate staff components (i.e., Corpo¬ 
rate Education Services, Corporate Employee Relations, Corporate Com¬ 
munity Relations). 
PIMEG fs national effort on the corporate level is coordinated by 
the manager of Corporate Educational Services, (L. E. Saline), who is 
GE’s corporate representative at large and the chairman of the PIMEG 
committee at GE. 
The PIMEG committee meets once every 3 or 4 months to "talk over 
all aspects of the PIMEG program and to keep up to date on the status 
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of PIMEG activities at GE and nationally." The PIMEG committee is 
composed of 12 Corporate Staff and Operating personnel. Among the 
activities of this committee are: to represent the company externally 
and internally by serving on national committees, consulting, conduct¬ 
ing seminars and writing and giving speeches about PIMEG. 
The methods and actions to keep PIMEG on-going take many forms 
and are the responsibility of different corporate staff components. 
Some of the methods and actions taken are described below. 
Methods and Actions to Keep PIMEG On-Going. In addition to top 
level commitment to PIMEG, both managerial and financial, and the ef¬ 
forts of the PIMEG committee, the following methods and actions are 
employed to institutionalize PIMEG: constant publicizing of PIMEG 
activities and personnel involvement in Company publications; workshops; 
surveys; support and promotional materials, and continued financial 
support. 
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Publicizing PIMEG. Internally, articles, speeches and PIMEG 
activities and involvement from top corporate management to local 
component managers have been published in the following GE publications: 
The Investor, The Monogram, News and Notes, Public Affairs Monitor, 
Report for Managers, Equal Opportunity/Minority Relations Information, 
PIMEG Executive Reports, Report to Relations Professionals, the in- 
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house Syndicated News, PIMEG Reporter and others. 
The PIMEG Reporter is a GE publication that is devoted entirely 
to describing GE involvement in PIMEG. The main objectives of this 
publication is to communicate the PIMEG program to GE people and to 
spark involvement and ideas in local GE components. 
Externally, the company has publicized PIMEG by placing advertise¬ 
ments in major magazines (i.e., Atlantic Monthly, Business Week, Forbes, 
Reader*s Digest, Time and others); given speeches, written articles, 
prepared and distributed support and promotional materials (i.e., educa¬ 
tional films, booklets, kits), held conferences and other. 
Workshops. The company, through a number of its corporate staff 
components, has conducted a series of workshops in several of its plant 
cities. The objective of these workshops was to get local GE people in¬ 
volved in PIMEG. These workshops proved significant for they were personally 
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supported by and some times attended by top officers of the company. 
Surveys. Since GE component participation is difficult to quantify. 
Corporate Education Services conducts surveys (once every two years) to 
ascertain what components are doing relative to PIMEG and to generate 
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and spark greater interest in the PIMEG program. 
Surveys are used according to Mr. James L. D'Acosta because PIMEG 
has no formal reporting system and it involves "a lot of voluntary 
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action by a lot of people around the company." 
Support and Promotional Materials. The various corporate staff 
components have created, generated and distributed printed and audio 
visual materials for use by local GE people to be used in-house and 
the community for PIMEG related purposes. 
Corporate Educational Communications through an independent re¬ 
search firm developed many of the materials used by GE people to help 
them with their PIMEG programs. A major tool generated by this group 
was, "Expo-Tech." Expo-Tech entailed a "hands-on, see and do, portable 
traveling exhibit keyed to the minority junior high schools." The 
Expo-Tech project costs over $200,000 and tours major cities where GE 
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plants are located. 
Financial Support. Continued involvement in PIMEG has been made 
possible by strong financial support by the Company. According to 
the Executive Report on PIMEG, the Company spent, out-of-pocket, un¬ 
officially approximately, $2 million on PIMEG related activities in 
1972, 1973, and 1974. 
In addition to direct GE financial support, the GE foundation 
spent another $1.5 million dollars in 1972, 1973, and 1974 for financial 
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support of minority students and programs. 
According to James L. D’Acosta, the PIMEG program still received 
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in 1977, financial support in similar amounts to previous years. 
Summary 
The rubric "PIMEG" stands for a series of national programs aimed 
at increasing the number of minority graduates in engineering. The 
catalyst for PIMEG was GE's efforts to find out why it was having 
problems meeting its affirmative action/Equal Employment Opportunity 
guidelines in its professional and managerial levels. 
PIMEG activities at GE are coordinated by a PIMEG committee com¬ 
posed of 12 corporate staff and operating personnel. PIMEG’s initiation 
and continued support at GE was made possible by support from top level 
GE management. Together with the PIMEG committee’s efforts and the con¬ 
tinued support of top management, PIMEG has been increasingly partici¬ 
pated in by GE people throughout the company. This participation has 
come about even though GE people are not required to participate and 
are not formally evaluated. According to members of the PIMEG committee 
this participation comes about because: (1) lower level managers know 
and see top level management participation in the program and see 
this as a "cue” that the program is important, (2) participation by 
managers in the program is well publicized within the company thus 
giving managers high "visibility," (3) PIMEG participation gives 
managers "visibility" in the community, (4) managers want to compare 
favorably with other managers who are participating in the program and 
(5) participation can help the manager meet affirmative action goals. 
Participation in PIMEG by GE people can take many forms. Appendix 
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F is a summary of examples of programs falling under the PIMEG um¬ 
brella. 
Conclusions 
Several observations can be made relative to PIMEG's initiation 
and institutionalization at GE: 
1. PIMEG represents an additional voluntary social program to existing 
voluntary and nonvoluntary equal opportunity/minority relations 
programs at GE 
* 
2. PIMEG evolved over several years and is an end result of several 
prior activities and outcomes 
3. PIMEG?s initiation was at the Corporate Staff level and reflected 
an organized and systematic investigation by various levels of the 
organization of a GE problem 
4. PIMEG’s initiation and institutionalization was participated in by 
senior top management 
5. A combination of formal and informal methods was used to make PIMEG 
on-going 
6. PIMEG was considered important by top management 
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FOOTNOTES 
^NAE accepted the national leadership in the Fall of 1973, A 
partial list of organizations participating in PIMEG includes: Pro¬ 
fessional Associations and Societies (i.e., Engineers Council for 
Professional Development, American Society for Engineering Education); 
Minority organizations, governmental agencies, foundations, other 
companies (i.e., Bechtel, Xerox, U.S. Steel, IBM); universities. 
2 
Financial figures and product descriptions were obtained from 
General Electric 1976 Annual Report (Fairfield, Conn.; General Electric 
Company, 1976); and Moody's Industrial Manual (1976): 5869-70. 
3 
GE’s social responsibility role was stressed by Mr. L.E. Saline, 
GE’s Manager of Corporate Education Services and Corporate PIMEG 
Representative at an interview held at the Company’s Management De¬ 
velopment Institute, Croton-On-Hudson, New York, July, 1977. Also, 
various corporate and other publications have stressed GE’s social 
responsibility. See: Henry G. Baker, Sr., "Identity and Social 
Responsibility Policies," Business Horizons 16 (April 1973): 23-28; 
Zershner Cross, "General Electric Tomorrow,” remarks to the Association 
of Program Managers, Erie, Pennsylvania, June 30, 1969. Mr. Cross Is 
a GE Vice President and Group Executive who participated in the PIMEG 
initiation and institutionalization. 
"baker, "Identity and Social P.esponsibllity Policies,": 23-28. 
"Baker, "Identity and Social P.esponsibllity Policies,": 24. 
< 
~?ZIEG: A Report or. the First Two Years of the Program to Increariu 
Minority Engineering Graduates (General Electric Company, Corporate 
Education Services ^lecenber 1974): 53. 
In terns of parity, the National PIMEG goal i« to bring minority 
grad-cates in engineering up to their proportion in the general popula¬ 
tion. For Instance, in 1973, 11.1 percent of the U.S. population wan 
black but only 1.4 percent of total Engineering degree went to black*. 
If parity vu to be achieved for black* in 1973, 5052 degrees should 
have beet gra' tec 1:• ' g' • ng nf f },«• 6W d«-gf 
actually awarded. 
'General Electric, PI’fZC Reports 53. 
of lecester 1974, 37 percent of General Electric's 80,000 
exempt employee* 'eld four year technical degrees end within the top 
21 percent of the n*'4^<went positions at GE, 60 percent of these 
positloss were held by individuals with s four year technical degree. 
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The concept of Strategic Business Units (SBU) and the added 
operating responsibility for GE's Vice Chairman were instituted by 
GE's present Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Reginald H, Jones 
in 1973. Mr. Jones' expressed purpose for instituting these changes 
was to gain increased control of GE?s highly decentralized organiza¬ 
tion that was developed by preceeding former Chairmen and Chief Execu¬ 
tive Officers: Ralph Cordiner and Fred J. Borch. For a review of the 
SBU concept at GE see: Melvin E. Salveson, "The Management of Strategy," 
Long Range Planning 7 (February 1974): 19-26; and "GE: Not Recession 
Proof; But Recession Resistant" Forbes 115 (March 15, 1975): 26-28; 
33-34. 
See: Elkins, "An Organizational Model of Oligopoly," (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Indiana University, 1967): 122-123; Elkins undertakes 
a thorough analysis of GE's management structure up through the late 
1960s. Also see: Ralph J. Cordiner, New Frontiers for Professional 
Managers (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956). 
Under Chairman Borch, the Corporate Executive Office made up 
of three vice chairmen had cognizance over but not direct operating 
responsibility for assigned components. Mr. Jones eliminated the 
notion of cognizance and gave each vice chairman responsibility for 
specific components. See: "GE: Not Recession Proof," Forbes: 27. 
13 
Elkins, "An Organizational Model of Oligopoly,": 123. 
For instance, Reginal H. Jones, Chairman, started at GE in 
1942 as a traveling auditor, Walter D. Dance, Vice Chairman, started 
at GE in 1948 as a sales counselor, and Jack S. Parker, Vice Chairman 
started at GE as a department manager. 
^General Electric, PIMEG Report: 1. 
^General Electric, PIMEG Report: 1. 
^"GE: Not Recession Proof," Forbes: 27. 
18 
See: "GE: Not Recession Proof": 29 and Salveson, "The Manage¬ 
ment of Strategy,": 21-23 for a discussion of GE's strategic business 
unit concept. 
19 
Theodore V. Purcell, "How GE measures managers in fair employ¬ 
ment," Harvard Business Review 52 (November/December 1974): 104. 
20 
Henry Eilbirt and I. Robert Parket, "The Current Status of 
Corporate Social Responsibility," California Management Review 18 
(August 1973): 5-14. 
Hinder Executive Order 11246, all business and institutions hold¬ 
ing federal contracts (or subcontracting for a federal contractor) are 
required to develop numerical goals, plans, and timetables for imple- 
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mentation to increase the number of females and minority-group employ¬ 
ees in all categories within their business. See: Arthur Elkins and 
Dennis W. Callaghan, A Managerial Odyssey (Reading, Ma.: Addison- 
Wesley Publishing Company, 1975): 157. 
22 
General Electric, PIMEG Report: 3. 
23 
General Electric, PIMEG Report: 3. 


























Among the solutions considered were: 
-massive scholarship aid, utilizing existing colleges 
-long term loan programs 
-engineering scholarship program for members of families of 
minority employees at GE 
-operate (and pay cost of) the engineering school at an exist¬ 
ing black college 
-buy an existing black college 
-establish a GE institute 
-establish a minority co-op program with existing schools 
30 
Hershner Cross is GE’s Senior Vice President for Corporate 
Administrative Staff. 
31 
James L. D’Acosta, interview held at GE’s Management Develop¬ 
ment Institute, Croton-On-Hudson, New York, July 1977. 
32 
General Electric, PIMEG Report: 28. 
33 
The workshops were conducted by teams of people from corporate 
staff components. The 1973 workshops were held in 7 U.S. cities and 
were attended by 212 component representatives and 49 leaders and 
corporate staff representatives. 
o / 
4D'Acosta interview, July, 1976. In 1974, 52 PIMEG programs 
were sponsored by 40 GE local components in 29 GE component locations. 
In 1976, 80 PIMEG programs were held in 38 GE component locations. 
35 
General Electric, PIMEG Report: 47. Also see: "Starting the 
search anew," Industry Week 18 (November 25, 1974): 24-26. 
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36 
General Electric, PIMEG Report: 43. Also, the PIMEG program 
in general and GE's involvement in particular has been written up in 
various publications. See: Ruth G. Shaeffer, "Corporate Leadership 
in a National Program," Conference Board Record 13 (September 1976): 
7-9. 
CHAPTER VI 
JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. 
Introduction 
The third voluntary social program is John Hancock’s involvement 
in the formation of the Tri-Lateral Council for Quality Education, Inc,, 
and its programs and activities. Similar to G.E.’s involvement in 
PIMEG, Hancock was instrumental in the Tri-Lateral Council’s initiation 
and institutionalization and is just one of 18 firms and organizations 
involved with the Tri-Lateral Council and its programs. 
John Hancock 
John Hancock is a mutual life insurance company which was 
incorporated in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1862. The com¬ 
pany ranks as one of the largest mutual life insurance companies in 
the United States (Table 23). As of fiscal 1976, the company had $3.2 
billion in premiums, investments and other income, $14.0 billion in 
assets and $94.8 billion in life insurance in force. 
The company is headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts and is 
a major employer in the City of Boston. Throughout its domestic and 
international operations the company employs over 22,000 employees. 
The company is licensed to write ordinary life insurance, annui¬ 
ties, group annuities, group, group accident and health, personal 
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John Hancock and Its Social Involvement 
Like many large business organizations, John Hancock is actively 
engaged in a number of different corporate social actions and has been 
for a long number of years. For instance, in 1976, in addition to 
direct corporate contributions, the company listed the following social 
actions under the heading "corporate citizenship" in its Annual Report: 
loaned executives to the federal government, released highly trained 
people to participate in studies of state efficiency, aided in revising 
a city's school budgeting system and, "on a very human scale, shared 
many of its resources with youngsters seeking career information and 
2 
guidance." This last corporate activity (career guidance and informa¬ 
tion), known as the Partnership Program, is a main program under the 
direction of the Tri-Lateral Council for Quality Education and is the 
focus of this chapter. 
John Hancock does not have a formal written social policy, but the 
top Corporate Executives of the Company, according to Mr. Robert C. 
3 4 
Volante and William L. Boyan, Jr., "expect" company managers to take 
part in and be concerned with social involvement. Mr. Gerhard D. 
Bleicken, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer and Mr. 
J. Edwin Matz, President and Chief Operations Officer in their annual 
message to policyholders stated: 
We view...socially responsible actions performed 
by the company and its thousands of people across 
the nation as being both worthwhile in their own 
right and of great long-term value to John Hancock 
and its policyholders. They, in effect, represent 
a vast policy we take out to help insure the future 
of the society in which we..., will live and work. 
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Tri-Lateral Council for Quality Education, Inc. The Tri-Lateral 
Council is composed of representatives of the Boston business community 
(through the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce and Metropolitan Boston 
Office of the National Alliance of Businessmen), and representatives of 
the Boston School Department. 
The two main focuses of the Council are to: (1) formulate short¬ 
term strategies for the business community response to Judge Garrity’s 
Phase I Boston School desegregation order (1974-1975) and (2) deter¬ 
mine for the long-term how the business community could assist the 
Boston School Department in providing a quality education system for 
all students.^ 
While the Tri-Lateral Council has sponsored a number of programs 
to implement its mandates, our focus will be on (1) John Hancock’s 
initial involvement in the Council’s formation and (2) John Hancock’s 
institutionalization of its role with the Tri-Lateral Council and the 
Council’s Partnership Program at the company. The Partnership Program 
will be focused on because it represents the major effort of the Tri- 
Lateral Council since its inception. 
The Tri-Lateral Council for Quality Education was incorporated 
in January, 1975 under Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 180. In¬ 
corporation was necessary so that the council could (1) have a full¬ 
time staff (Figure 15) responsible for its administration and the 
co-ordination and communication of its various programs and (2) to 
become a conduit for foundation, federal and other funding sources. 
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Figure 15 
' Tri-Lateral Council for Quality Education, Inc, 
Organizational Chart (1975-1976) 
Officers of the Corporation: 
Chairman of the Board (Robert J. Lamphere, John Hancock) 
Vice Chairpersons (2) 
Secretary 
Treasurer 
Board of Directors (9 members): 
5 from Greater Boston Businesses 
John Hancock (Robert J. Lamphere) 
New England Mutual Life 
New England Telephone Company 
State Street Bank and Trust 
Kennecott Copper Corporation (Ledgemont Lab) 
1 from the National Alliance of Businessmen 
3 from the Boston School Department 
Recently Constituted Working Committees: 
Program Development 
Communications (Robert C. Volante, John Hancock Second Vice 
President for Electronic Data Processing is 
the Chairman of this committee) 
Occupational Education 
Voting Members: 
There are 25 voting members representing Greater Boston Businesses, 
National Alliance of Businessmen and Business and Professional Consortia 
(i.e., Massachusetts Society of CPA's, Inc., Legal Consortium, Greater 
Boston Real Estate Board). 
John Hancock holds two of the votes with Robert J. Lamphere holding 
an at large position and Robert C. Volante representing the John Hancock 
Company. No other company or consortia holds more than one vote. 
SOURCE: "Tri-Lateral Council for Quality Education, Inc.: An 
Overview," John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, company report 
on the status of the Tri-Lateral Council, Attachments 2 and 3. 
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John Hancock and Its Organization 
Organizationally, John Hancock has a centralized management 
structure with a seven member Executive Committee, a Chief Executive 
Officer and Chairman of the Board, a President and Chief Operations 
Officer, five Executive Vice Presidents, twenty Senior Vice Presidents, 
35 Vice Presidents, 48 Second Vice Presidents and over 22,000 employees. 
The Executive Committee is composed of: Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer, President and Chief Operations Officer, Executive 
Vice President for Financial Operations, Executive Vice President for 
Group Operations, Executive Vice President and Secretary, Executive 
Vice President Insurance Operations, Executive Vice President Field 
Management and Marketing and the Senior Vice President and General 
Council. The Executive Committee is the main decision making body 
at John Hancock. 
Mr. Bleicken, as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, is pri¬ 
marily concerned with the operation of the company vis-a-vis its "out¬ 
side" (external environment), while Mr. Matz has primary responsibility 
for the internal workings of the entire John Hancock company.^ 
The executive vice presidents, besides their executive committee 
responsibility have functional responsibility as noted. The Senior 
Vice Presidents, Vice Presidents and Second Vice Presidents are re- 
g 
sponsible for various line, staff and service functions of the company. 
Initiation of the Tri-Lateral Council at John Hancock 
In the Eilbirt and Parket study cited earlier, corporate contribu¬ 
tions and support to education is considered an important social activity 
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9 
for business organizations. The Tri-Lateral Council for Quality 
Education represents 18 business corporations involved with, on a 
one-to-one basis, assisting and supporting 16 Boston High Schools in 
their efforts to implement the federal desegregation order and improve 
the quality of education in the school system. This one-to-one rela¬ 
tionship between a Boston high school and a business corporation is 
known as the Partnership Program. John Hancock’s Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer, Mr. Bleicken,spearheaded the formation of the Tri- 
Lateral Council and the partnership program. 
John Hancock Asked to Organize the Business Community 
John Hancock’s involvement with the formation of the Tri-Lateral 
Task Force, the forerunner to the Tri-Lateral Council, was not a result 
of any planned effort by top management, crisis, activism, or direct 
provocation aimed at the company. Instead, John Hancock was asked by 
the City of Boston, (Spring 1974), specifically representatives of the 
Boston School Department, to assist them with implementing Judge J. 
Arthur Garrity's desegregation order. Mr. Bleicken, to whom the re¬ 
quest was directed, offered his own and his company’s assistance. 
Thus, while there was no immediate crisis or provocation facing 
John Hancock ,there was a recognized crisis or fear on the part of the 
City of Boston in light of the courts desegregation order. Mr. Robert 
C. Volante comments: 
It happened out of a fear on the part of the city 
at the time with the desegregation of Boston Public 
Schools. City officials came to us (John Hancock), 
and specifically to our Chairman, Mr. Bleicken - who 
has a reputation of being out in the forefront on 
social responsibility matters.^ 
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Thus, John Hancock's role in the Tri-Lateral Council got into the 
company through its chairman of the Board and Chief Executive officer. 
Mr. Bleicken's first action was to assemble his colleagues in the 
city, notably heads of large companies. At various strategy meetings 
between top corporate executives and their representatives,^ a number 
of alternatives were discussed. This task force of Greater Boston 
business leaders and representatives of the school department "drew on 
12 
the experience of other cities in developing partnership programs." 
Thus, while the task force discussed various alternatives, the 
decision by John Hancock to engage in the Tri-Lateral Task Force and 
its formation was not weighed against other social or economic alterna¬ 
tives and in fact was a unilateral decision made by Mr. Bleicken. 
According to Mr. Volante there was rio time to gather and evaluate 
all information relative to John Hancock's decision to spearhead this 
effort, since the City of Boston was facing an immediate crisis. The 
company, according to Mr. Volante, did literally react to the city's 
request. Mr. Volante comments: 
...at the outset we had to act fast, we did not 
know what we were doing or what this thing was 
going to develop into. ^ 
Also, the time spent on this decision to engage in this voluntary 
program was minimal because the decision did not represent a major 
financial investment. Mr. Volante states: 
We are only talking about a fifteen thousand 
dollar expenditure. We do not have to go into 
great depth because the risk is down. 4 
The major problem encountered with the decision to engage in the 
program, at the beginning, was a lack of verifiable objectives. The 
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company did not face any other major problems (i.e., organizational or 
policyholder resistance) with its decision to engage in this voluntary 
social program. 
When questioned why John Hancock spearheaded the formation of 
the Tri-Lateral Council and its Partnership Program, the following 
reasons were offered by Messrs. Volante and Boyan: 
1. John Hancock is a highly visible corporate entity in the city of 
Boston through its advertising, employees, policyholders and 
corporate headquarters and offices 
2. John Hancock has a large stake in the welfare of the City of 
Boston because of one above and because it is one of the largest 
tax payers to the city (over 40% of Boston's budget goes to 
education) 
3. John Hancock is noted for its social involvement 
its effort to increase the quality of education 
4. Mr. Gerhard D. Bleicken is noted for his personal involvement in 
social activities and he is considered a very powerful and in¬ 
fluential figure in the city of Boston and elsewhere ^ 
Summary. The initiation of John Hancock's relationship with the 
Tri-Lateral Council is outlined in Figure 16. As can be seen, and as 
reviewed above, Mr. Gerhard D. Bleicken was the main catalyst and 
decision-maker in John Hancock's decision to engage in the voluntary 
social program under study. Mr. Bleicken was directly asked by the 
city of Boston to assist them and he agreed. The decision was made 
with little investigation and analysis. The company's major problem, 
at the beginning was a lack of verifiable objectives relative to its 
role in the council and its Partnership Program. The company encountered 
no other major problems. 
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Figure 16 
Initiation of John Hancock's Relationship 
With the Tri-Lateral Council for Quality Education 
Spring 1974 City of Boston 
Garrity's desegre- City faces potential crisis 
gation order 
Chairman receives re¬ 
quest from city and 
commits his company 
Little time to search 
for alternatives 
No problems encountered 
from organization or 
policyholders 
John Hancock 
Possible reasons for 
Hancock's involvement 
highly visible in 
community 
large stake in welfare 
of city 
Company noted for its 
past social programs 
Chairman noted for his 
personal social in¬ 
volvement 
Spring and Summer 
1974 
Boston Business Community 
Organized 
Strategy meetings called by Hancock's chairman 




Tri-Lateral Council, Inc. 
Present Expanded membership and programs 
for Tri-Lateral Council 
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Institutionalizing John Hancock’s 
Participation in the Tri-Lateral Council for 
Quality Education and Its Partnership Program 
John Hancock undertook a number of actions and steps to institu¬ 
tionalize its participation in the Tri-Lateral Council and in particular 
its partnership program with a Boston City High School. John Hancock's 
involvement in the Tri-Lateral Council is on a purely voluntary basis 
and has been on-going since the council's inception in mid-1974. The 
Tri-Lateral Council itself was made permanent by the end of 1975 with 
its incorporation. With this incorporation came a formal organization, 
adoption of a three-year plan with a stated mission and objectives, a 
budget projecting income and expenses over a three year period, an 
executive director, regular meetings, permanent committees, established 
programs and other routines.^ 
John Hancock's Institutionalization Process 
John Hancock did not employ the use of trauma, threats or sanc¬ 
tions (i.e., loss of bonuses, incorporated in formal evaluations), 
formal policy statements, or specialists to entice or force organiza¬ 
tional involvement in this voluntary social program. Those taking 
part in the social program were either asked by their supervisors to 
participate and willingly accepted or volunteered their services on 
their own accord. At no time was participation in the program mandatory 
or did the company meet any organizational resistance. 
The company's partnership program with its high school was com¬ 
pletely and successfully institutionalized according to the programs 
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co-ordinator by the second year of its operation. The steps and 
actions taken to institutionalize this program are described below and 
entail the following elements: strong chief executive commitment, 
assignment of key personnel to its Tri-Lateral positions, wide corpo¬ 
rate promotion and publicity relative to its Tri-Lateral participation, 
adoption and implementation of formal control mechanisms, increased 
lower level organizational involvement, commitment of financial and 
other resources, and other innovative and creative activities sponsored 
by John Hancock for its high school partner. 
Chief Executive Commitment. As described in the initiation 
section above, John Hancock’s chief executive officer was instrumental 
in mobilizing the business community to form the Tri-Lateral Task Force 
and also in commiting his organization to the voluntary program. The 
chairman demonstrated his commitment to the program by (1) assigning 
key Hancock employees, who have the authority and responsibility to 
make decisions for the company, to important positions in the Tri- 
18 
Lateral organization (see below), (2) by,himself,serving on important 
committees in the Tri-Lateral Council (i.e.. Chairman of the Steering 
Committee), (3) by supporting the program publicly to his employees 
and policyholders through company publications and actions, and (4) of¬ 
fering his own and the company’s support (financial and otherwise) to 
the program. 
Key Hancock People. John Hancock assigned two of its officers 
to the Tri-Lateral Council in addition to its chairman. The Senior 
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Vice President for Policyholders Service Administration was the Tri- 
Lateral Council's first chairman of the board and is presently a mem¬ 
ber of the board. The Second Vice President for Electronic Data Pro¬ 
cessing is Hancock's Partnership Program Co-ordinator, a voting member 
of the Tri-Lateral Council and Chairman of the Council's Communications 
working committee. Also, a large number of other Hancock officers have 
volunteered their services or been asked by their superiors or peers to 
assist the company in its Tri-Lateral endeavors (see Figure 15 ). 
The assignment of key Hancock officers to Tri-Lateral activities 
is significant. Mr. Volante comments: 
I am high enough up in the organization to sell 
the program fast.^ You will find in many of the 
other partnerships lower level people involved who 
can not commit their companies. I can commit my 
company to a lot of things,..., I can sell another 
vice president, I can get things done fast.^O 
Thus, the assignment of key officers to the program does the 
following things, it: (1) adds prestige to the program, (2) enhances 
communication and co-ordination of the program, (3) allows fast deci¬ 
sions, and finally (4) enhances commitment to the program from lower 
level employees. 
Corporate Publicity. In order to communicate the program to its 
employees, the company made wide use of the corporate newspaper and 
other publications. A public relations campaign was initiated by 
Mr. Volante. At the beginning, weekly articles were placed in the 
company's newspaper, then, monthly articles and presently, once every 
two months. According to Mr. Volante, "now everybody knows about it. 
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they see me and they associate me with the program." 
As mentioned above, the assignment and participation of key 
Hancock officers in the Tri-Lateral Council and its programs helps to 
promote and publicize the company’s commitment to the program. 
Policyholders were informed about the program through a slide 
presentation held at the company’s annual policyholders meeting and 
through the Annual Report. The 1976 Annual Report devoted three pages 
to the program and among other things stated: 
In Boston, a unique example of our involvement 
(in social concerns)^ enters its fourth year in 
September. It is an on-going "partnership" be¬ 
tween John Hancock and the city’s English High 
School. 
As one of 18 corporations involved similarly 
with the 16 city high schools, the especially 
active Hancock English High relationship has 
served as a model for other businesses nation¬ 
wide.^ 
Finally, the company has printed a number of promotional materials 
relative to this voluntary social program. 
Formal Control Mechanisms. The adoption of formal control mech¬ 
anisms in the second year of the programs operation signaled the insti¬ 
tutionalization of the program according to Mr. Volante. The first 
year was a "trying out" period. The company waited for requests from 
its high school partner before it acted. According to Mr. Volante: 
I did not get very much direction from the company. 
We did not have much time to think about it. At the 
outset I did literally re-act. 
The second year became much more organized, we had 
a plan, objectives, a budget, specific things we were 
going to do. It was the way we were used to working 
in the business world. J 
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Besides the adoption of a formal plan, budget and objectives, 
other routines established were: formal program data sheet (Appendix G ) 
to monitor and control all programs under the Tri-Lateral umbrella, 
their costs, effectiveness, people involved and other pertinent informa¬ 
tion; formal reporting system (Mr. Volante reports to the executive 
committee once a year on the status of the Tri-Lateral programs); 
steering committee formed*by Mr. Volante to help him plan, organize, 
control, follow through and assist him with the program; annual assess¬ 
ments of the partnership program between the Headmaster of English High 
School and Hancock’s program co-ordinator; periodic visits to the high 
school by Hancock people, including its Chairman and President; the 
appointment of Mr. Volante as the program co-ordinator. 
Lower Level Involvement. During the first two years of the Tri- 
Lateral Council program at John Hancock, Mr. Volante estimated that he 
devoted over 20 percent of his time to the program. Since that time 
Mr. Volante estimated that he spends approximately 10-15 percent of his 
time on Tri-Lateral activities. 
Mr. Volante stated that the program has "blossomed” at the lower 
levels of the organization, "especially if we measure manpower involved 
in the program over the last three years." 
Matters pertaining to the program have been pushed down to a 
steering committee composed of six people. The steering committee stays 
"privy" to all partnership activities and assists the program co-ordina¬ 
tor (Mr. Volante) with the program. 
The following quote by Mayor White of the City of Boston demon- 
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strates John Hancock’s active and strong participation in the Tri- 
Lateral Council: 
"Very few people in the city appreciate the di¬ 
mension to which John Hancock has contributed to 
the educational process...hundreds of employees 
in this building (John Hancock Tower) are matched 
up against hundreds of these youngsters at English 
High...”24 
Resource Support. The company has an annual budget of $15,000 
allocated for their partnership program with English High School, In 
addition to this $15,000 "out-of-pocket” expense Mr. Volante estimates 
about a $75,000 staff time expenditure. The staff time estimates in¬ 
clude employee time devoted to program related activities and the 
programs administration. 
Also, the company loans and makes available its technical and 
physical resources for meetings, curriculum development and enrichment, 
guidance and career information, and other program related activities. 
Other. John Hancock has established a number of major on-going 
programs relative to its partnership program. Among the programs 
developed are: The Executive Intern Program (company officers host 
students); Work Exploration Program (employees volunteer to spend a 
day or more with students interested in a particular program); 
Restaurant Management Program (students allowed to spend four weeks 
with the company’s food service division); Project Close-Up (students 
sponsored by Hancock spend one week in Washington D.C. to get an inside 
view of government). 
Also, to recognize its efforts at Boston English High School, the 
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company received a bronze plaque from the school marking its involve¬ 
ment in and continued commitment to the partnership program. 
Problems Encountered Institutionalizing the Partnership Program 
The major problems encountered by Mr. Volante in institutional¬ 
izing this program were: lack of verifiable objectives for the program 
at its outset and the rapidity in which he had to organize and imple¬ 
ment the program. 
Mr. Volante commented: 
I did not get very much direction from the 
company. We did not have much time to think 
about it... 
At the outset we had to act fast, we did 
not know what this thing was going to turn 
into, we did not know what we were doing.^ 
Mr. Volante mentioned that in the three years of the programs 
operation Mr. Bleicken has not had to reinforce his role in the partner 
ship program. The company never faced any organizational resistance 
from employees or policyholders. Mr. Volante stated: "They (policy¬ 
holders) are not concerned about $15,000 (out-of-pocket) when we’re 
spending millions on other things.” (See Chapter IX). 
Although the company employs no bonuses or financial incentives 
for participation in the program, the response to the program from 
Vice Presidents to lower level employees "has been heartening” accord¬ 
ing to Mr. Volante. One incentive for participation mentioned by 
Mr. Volante is that it gives employees an opportunity to communicate 
and interact with company officers, "that sooner or later is going to 
work to someone’s advantage.” 
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Summary, Participation in the Tri-Lateral Council by John Hancock 
represents an on-going voluntary social program that has been success¬ 
fully institutionalized by the company. During the institutionalization 
process,which took approximately two years, the company employed the 
following steps: 
- Top Executive Commitment (Chief Executive Officer Initiation) 
- Assignment of key Hancock officers to program (Vice Presidents) 
- Use of widespread promotion of program activities 
- Formal Control Mechanisms (Budgets, Plans, Reporting System, other) 
- Increased lower level involvement (Steering Committee, Volunteers) 
- Continued Resource Support (Financial, Technical, Physical) 
- Special Programs and Awards 
The company did not employ a full-time specialist, written policy 
statements or the use of trauma (i.e., sanctions, threats) to get par¬ 
ticipation in the program. Nor did the Chief Executive Officer have to 
intervene to force organizational involvement or re-inforce the Co¬ 
ordinators role. 
Major problems encountered in the programs institutionalization 
were lack of verifiable objectives and the rapidity at which the pro¬ 
gram had to be organized and implemented. Other than these problems 
which required time to solve, the company did not face any other major 
problems with the program1s institutionalization. 
Conclusions 
Several conclusions can be advanced relative to the initiation 
and institutionalization of the Tri-Lateral program at John Hancock: 
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1. The original decision to engage in the Tri-Lateral Program was 
focused at the top of the organization 
2. The program initiation decision was made with very little informa¬ 
tion generated from other levels of the company 
3. The decisions associated with the operation of the Tri-Lateral 
program at John Hancock were routinized (i.e., co-ordinator, plans, 
objectives, budgets, control mechanisms) 
4. Activities associated with the social program’s operation were 
pushed down or decentralized (i.e., steering committee made up of 
subordinates to co-ordinator, volunteers) 
Top management did recognize the importance of social involvement, 
but its affect on the strategy formulation process at John Hancock 
is unclear (although the co-ordinator did report to the Executive 





Financial data - and product descriptions taken from: John 
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, Annual Report, 1976 (Boston; 
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 1977); 1, 22, 23. 
2 
John Hancock Annual Report, 1976: 2. 
3 
Robert C. Volante, Second Vice President, Electronic Data Pro¬ 
cessing. Interview held at the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance 
Company, Corporate Headquarters, John Hancock Place, Boston, Massa¬ 
chusetts, June 1977. 
4 
William L. Boyan, Jr., Second Vice President, Department of 
Administrative Services. Interview held at John Hancock’s Corporate 
Headquarters, May 1977. Mr. Boyan commented as follows: The company 
has no policy statement for programs on social involvement—it is 
an activity that is expected as part of your work...Mr. Bleicken 
expects social involvement by his actions and other manager actions. 
^John Hancock Annual Report, 1976: 2. 
^See: John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, "Tri-Lateral 
Council for Quality Education, Inc.: An Overview," (1975): 1. Also, 
see: John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, "Tri-Lateral Council 
Three Year Plan," (Draft) February 6, 1976: 1 and 2. 
^Volante interview, June, 1977. 
g 
Organizational descriptive data was taken from John Hancock 
Annual Report, 1976: 20. 
9 
See: Henry Eilbirt and I. Robert Parket, "The Current Status 
of Corporate Social Responsibility," California Management Review 18 
(August 1973): 9-10. 
^Volante interview, June, 1977. 
^^Mr. Boyan on occasion acted as Mr. Bleicken’s representative. 
12 
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, "Tri-Lateral 
Council for Quality Education," (1975): 1. Other cities were not 
mentioned by name. 
13 
Volante interview, June, 1977. 
14. 
Volante interview, June, 1977. 
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In 1972, John Hancock was asked by the President of the United 
States and the National Alliance of Businessmen to help combat un¬ 
employment in the United.States. According to Mr. Boyan, the company 
viewed the problem as "too many students not being properly prepared 
for careers." As a result John Hancock, through its chairman, under¬ 
took an Education Prep Program to educate Boston area teachers and 
students on career guidance and information. It was partly on the 
success of this program that the company was asked to assist the 
school department in implementing its desegregation order. 
^Slr. Bleicken joined John Hancock in 1939 and assumed the 
position of Chairman in 1970. Mr. Bleicken has served on several Boards 
including: World Affairs Council, Boston 200 Corporation, member- 
Center for Blood Research; Trustee Boston Museum of Science, Tax 
Foundation, Inc.; overseer Boston Symphony Orch. Mr. Bleicken has 
received many awards for his service to society and holds a number 
of other important positions. See: Who’s Who in America, 1976: 300. 
^See: John Hancock: "Tri-Lateral Council Three Year Plan," 
(1976): 1-8. 
18 
According to Mr. Volante, the company places value in the 
program by assigning officers to oversee John Hancock’s involvement 
in the program. This is in comparison to other participating businesses 
that have assigned individuals with little or no decision making re¬ 
sponsibility to represent them in the tri-lateral. 
19 
Mr. Volante mentioned that his first action on becoming pro¬ 
gram co-ordinator was to sell the program to peers, colleagues and 
subordinates and that he did not have to worry about the top of the 
company since the program eminated from the Chairman of the Board. 
20 I 




Comments in parenthesis inserted. 
John Hancock Annual Report, 1976: 9. 
Volante interview, June, 1977. 
24 
Remarks made by the Honorable Kevin H. White, Mayor of the 
city of Boston, at the dedication of the John Hancock Tower as quoted 
in the John Hancock Annual Report, 1976: 11. 
25 




The fourth on-going, voluntary social program is the Minority 
Vendor Program (MVP) at Raytheon. 
Unlike the Program to Increase Minority Engineering Graduates 
(PIMEG) at General Electric and the Tri-Lateral Council for Quality 
Education Program at John Hancock, the Minority Vendor Program is 
not a_ joint venture sponsored or supported by Raytheon along with some 
other business or nonbusiness entities. Instead, the MVP is housed 
entirely at Raytheon and is very similar to the Cabot Charitable 
* 
Contributions program in this respect. 
We will focus on the Minority Vendor Program at Raytheon although 
there are other business and nonbusiness organizations (i.e., U.S. 
Commerce Department - Office of Minority Enterprises, National Minority 
Purchasing Council, other) that have similar minority vendor programs 
or supply assistance or support to minority enterprises. 
Raytheon Company 
The Raytheon Company (original name: American Appliance Company) 
was incorporated on July 22, 1922, to manufacture and distribute re¬ 
frigerators, an invention of Charles G. Smith, one of the company's 
original co-founders.^ Today, Raytheon is a worldwide organization that 
154 
155 
develops, manufactures, and sells a wide assortment of products and 
services to industrial, governmental and consumer markets. Raytheon 
divides its products and services into four main areas: Electronics 
(Commercial and Governmental), Energy Services, Major Appliances and 
Other (heavy construction equipment, textbooks, voice recordings, other). 
See Table 24 for product descriptions and contributions to sales and 
net income for each of the four major product areas. 
As of December 31, 1976, Raytheon had $2.5 billion in sales, $1.5 
billion in assets, $85.2 million in net income and 52,957 employees. 
According to the 1975 Forbes survey of the largest U.S. business cor- 
9 
porations, Raytheon ranked 124th in sales, 208th in profits and 448th 
2 
in assets (Chapter III, Table 16). 
Raytheon and Its Social Involvement 
As stated previously, it is not an objective of this study to 
rank or rate a company according to its social responsibility activity. 
Raytheon, like most large companies, is actively engaged in numerous 
corporate social actions in a number of different areas. 
In 1954, the Raytheon Charitable Foundation was formed. Since 
that time the Company has set charitable contributions at 1 percent of 
corporate earnings before taxes. 
In 1968, through its then chairman of the Board, Charles Adams, 
Raytheon entered into a joint training center to teach the unskilled 
individuals in the Boston area the basics of drafting, clerical work, 
or electronic assembly. The company guaranteed graduates of this pro- 
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Mr. Adams has been actively involved in a number of social 
activities. He has served as the Chairman of the United Way of Massa¬ 
chusetts, trustee of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, trustee of 
the Industrial School for Crippled Children of Boston, trustee of 
Boston’s Children Hospital Medical Center.^ Mr. Adams, along with the 
company’s current Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board, 
Mr. Thomas L. Phillips, and its current President Mr. D. Brainerd Holmes, 
have actively supported the company’s social programs dealing with 
inner city problems. 
Mr. Phillips’ support of minority enterprises was evident in the 
mid-1960s when he contributed $5,000 of Raytheon money and established 
a number of business contacts for a fledgling minority enterprise.^ 
Mr. Phillips, in addition to serving on a number of corporate boards, 
has been a trustee of Gordon College, Northeastern University and the 
Joslin Diabetes Foundation.^ 
Mr. Holmes has also served on a number of boards and has been 
associated with universities and colleges. Mr. Holmes’ active support 
of the company’s Minority Vendor Program was instrumental in the pro¬ 
gram’s institutionalization.^ 
Minority Vendor Program. The company’s minority vendor program 
was established in 1972 as an indirect way to aid unemployed blacks in 
the inner city. The program is completely voluntary and is on-going. 
In 1976, Raytheon bought products and services valued at $4.3 million 
from 140 minority businesses. Minority businesses, according to federal 
definition are enterprises that are at least 51 percent owned by Blacks, 
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American Indians, Orientals, Aleuts, or Americans with Spanish sur¬ 
names. Of the 400,000 minority owned businesses in 1972, approximately 
g 
half were owned by blacks. 
The National Minority Purchasing Council estimates that the 
amount spent on purchases from minority owned businesses will exceed 
$1 billion in 1977. This compares to an estimated $87 million spent 
9 
on purchases from minority businesses in 1972. 
Raytheon and Its Organization 
The company’s organization structure is divided into two broad 
areas: Corporate Staff Management and Operating Management. In addi¬ 
tion to the two top managers, the Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer and the President, there are 18 Vice Presidents or 
directors with corporate staff responsibility (i.e., Vice President, 
Public and Financial Relations, Vice President, Corporate Development, 
Director of Procurement) and 29 Presidents, Senior Vice Presidents or 
Vice Presidents who are operating managers of Raytheon subsidiaries or 
divisions (i.e.. President, Raytheon Service Company, Senior Vice 
President, General Manager Microwave and Power Tube Division, Vice 
President, Manager Division Manufacturing, Missile Systems Division). 
Raytheon has a decentralized structure with 11 divisions, 7 major 
operating subsidiaries and 47 plants and laboratories in the United 
States. 
Procurement Operations. According to Raytheon’s former Minority 
Relations Manager, Mr. Herbert Lyken, procurement at Raytheon repre¬ 
sents approximately 50% of total sales. As such, procurement opera- 
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tions (i.e., purchases, contracts, specifications) are substantial, 
Mr. James M. Hill, Jr., as Director of Procurement at Raytheon, 
is responsible for formulating and implementing procurement policies 
and procedures and reports directly to Mr. Holmes, Raytheon’s Presi¬ 
dent. Raytheon’s purchasing operations are depicted in Figure 17. 
In addition to corporate staff procurement operations there are numer¬ 
ous procurement operations housed within the various divisions and 
plants (Raytheon has over 500 buyers in its various facilities). 
As noted, the Manager of the Minority Vendor Relations Program 
reports directly to Mr. Hill. The Minority Vendor manager assists both 
buyers and vendors in meeting Raytheon’s MVP goals and guidelines. ^ 
Initiation of the Minority Vendor Program at Raytheon 
How did the MVP get into the Raytheon Company? The MVP did not 
come about as a result of any direct indepth management research or 
investigation, crisis, provocation, threatened legal action or external 
demands. 
Instead, the idea was internally introduced to top management by 
a Raytheon participant in the company's Advanced Management Training 
Program, Mr. Herbert Lyken. The MVP suggestion was offered directly 
to Mr. T. L. Phillips, Raytheon’s President at that time (1972). The 
idea, according to Mr. Lyken, was quickly accepted by Mr. Phillips. 
Actions and/or Events Leading to MVP 
The Raytheon Company, a leading government defense contract, 
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demands of the 1960s. The company's top executives, both Mr, Charles 
Adams, then Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, and 
Mr. Thomas L. Phillips, President, while already active in the Boston 
community (see profiles above in Social Involvement Section), "felt 
this pressure and felt an obligation to help," according to Mr. Hill.^ 
As an offshoot to the company's equal opportunity employment 
program, Raytheon's top management (Adams, Phillips), spearheaded an 
inner city training program for the disadvantaged. 
Training Program. In 1968, with the backing of both C. Adams 
and T. Phillips, Raytheon became a strong supporter and organizer of a 
special training center for the area's (Boston area) "culturally de¬ 
prived and chronically unemployed." The aim of the training program 
was to help make these individuals employable by teaching them a 
vocational skill, such as clerical work, drafting, electronic assembly. 
The company concentrated on those skills that could be utilized at 
Raytheon. In addition to the training program, the company offered 
graduates of the program a guaranteed employment of one year at Raytheon 
upon completion of the training program. 
While every attempt was made to train these individuals and find 
them employment, the program was not successful at Raytheon, for the 
company could not retain graduates of the program in their employ for 
12 
any considerable length of time. 
Advanced Management Training Program. An Advanced Management 
Training Program is sponsored by the company at Raytheon for company 
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personnel who are being prepared for top management positions. The 
program is highly regarded by the company’s management and all top 
executives of the company have come through the program or are honor¬ 
ary graduates. The program entails formal, indepth, in-house manage¬ 
ment training. 
At the end of the formal training program, the company’s President 
has traditionally asked for suggestions and improvements relative to 
Raytheon’s overall operations from the program’s graduates. Mr. Herbert 
Lyken, one of the few blacks in the program, had no difficulty suggest¬ 
ing the MVP to Mr. Phillips. Mr. Lyken, from the marketing department 
of Raytheon’s Equipment Division, mentioned that he was troubled by the 
"noticeable void at Raytheon Company in helping minority vendors." He 
added, "it was not just Raytheon, all large companies were not helping 
the minority vendor." Mr. Lyken stated: 
Mr. Phillips grasped my idea quickly and asked 
me to form a small group of black Raytheon employees 
(4-5 people) to work with him on a first hand basis 
to help get the program started. 
According to Mr. Hill, who Mr. Phillips consulted with about the 
MVP "idea," Mr. Phillips saw in the MVP the possible accomplishments of 
the objectives of the training program for the disadvantaged which had 
just been terminated. Mr. Hill commented that Mr. Phillips fully sup¬ 
ported the MVP, for if the MVP succeeded, the objectives of the train¬ 
ing program could be achieved and Raytheon would be providing "in¬ 
direct employment" to those whom they were trying to help. 
Summary: Minority Vendor Program Initiation 
The decision to engage in the MVP was made by Mr. Phillips and 
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was based on the suggestion of Mr. Lyken that a void existed in large 
businesses, specifically Raytheon, relative to their support of 
minority vendors. Mr. Phillips consulted with other top executives 
(Mr. C. Adams, Mr. Hill) prior to making the final decision, but was 
commited to the program from the start according to both Mr. Hill and 
Mr. Lyken. 
The MVP alternative was not systematically weighed against other 
possible alternatives. The suggestion was "quickly grasped" by Mr. 
Phillips and he based the decision to enter the program on its per¬ 
ceived benefits at that time (1972): it could achieve the goals of 
the training program by providing indirect employment and training to 
disadvantaged individuals. 
The company encountered no_ major problems or obstacles in making 
the initial decision to engage in the program. The bulk of the activi¬ 
ties and problems encountered centered on the program’s implementation 
and institutionalization (Figure 18 ). 
Institutionalizing the Minority Vendor Program 
In institutionalizing the MVP (i.e., steps to make it on-going), 
the company employed a number of actions and routines (i.e., policy 
statement and procedures written in corporate purchasing manual, con¬ 
tinued top executive commitment and involvement, publicity) to gain 
organizational involvement and compliance. The MVP is distinguished 
from prior social programs reviewed in this study in that while the 
program is voluntary, participation and/or support of the program by 
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Figure 18 
Initiation of Minority Vendor Program at Raytheon 
1960s Raytheon Company 
Environmental and social 
pressure felt by large 
companies including 
Raytheon (Hill)a 
Top management (Phillips) 
demonstrates increased 
concern for social pro¬ 
blems 
Mid-1960s Minority Training pro- Aim to help unem- 
gram established ployment problem 
in inner city 
Training Program Fails 
Early 1970s Phillips asked partici¬ 
pants in company advanced 
training program for sug¬ 
gestions —company becomes 
sensitive to minority ven- 
dor program 
1972 Minority Vendor Program Minimal buyer par- 
initiated ticipation; plan¬ 
ning without goals 
Mid-1970s Increased Structure added 
to MVP 
1977 MVP "Institutionalized" "Just as much a 
a part of plan¬ 
ning as anything 
else under the 
general manager’s 
authority" (Hill) 
james M. Hill, Director of Procurement, Raytheon Company. 
165 
general managers, purchasing managers and buyers was mandatory. 
It took six years to institutionalize the program — "make it 
just as much a part of planning as anything else" — according to 
Mr. Hill. 
Raytheon’s Institutionalizing Actions and Processes 
The company employed a combination of the following steps and/or 
actions to institutionalize its MVP: Top Management Commitment and 
Involvement; Staff Specialists; Formal Policies and Procedures in 
Operating Manual; Publicity; and Corporate Support. 
Top Management Commitment and Involvement. Raytheon’s top execu¬ 
tives, Chief Executive Officer, President and Director of Procurement, 
J 
made effective use of their offices, persuasion and their own active 
participation in the program to help institutionalize the MVP. 
President’s Actions. Mr. Phillips, starting with the Program’s 
initiation (1972), undertook the following actions: hired a staff 
specialist (Mr. H. Lyken) to work with Mr. Hill in writing a policy 
and rough procedures for the MVP; issued memoranda to all corporate 
managers and personnel announcing the program and "letting it be known 
that the program emanated from the corporate executive office," and 
used the power and status of his office (made effective use of the 
administrative chain of command) to serve notice to those division 
managers and department managers who were not making an effort to 
reach established goals that "he meant business." 
Mr. Hill mentioned that in order to make everyone in the company 
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believe that the MVP was on-going and not just another "fad" or 
"social program," the president would "keep the heat on all the time 
by calling nonperforming managers on the carpet — at corporate staff 
14 
and operating meetings." 
Mr. Phillips as Chief Executive Officer of the Company and 
Mr. D. B. Holmes, as present President have maintained strong and active 
involvement with the MVP (i.e., use their office as leverage, memoranda). 
Director of Procurements Actions. Mr. Hill, as Director of 
Procurement, has corporate responsibility for the MVP. Mr. Hill, ac¬ 
cording to both Mr. Lyken and Mr. Warner^ actively supported their 
efforts in implementing the program. Mr. Hill’s initial involvement 
centered on assisting Mr. Lyken in the formulation of initial policies 
and procedures to get MVP on board. Also, Mr. Hill used the leverage 
of his office to help both Mr. Lyken and Mr. Warner overcome any prob¬ 
lems. (See problem section below.) 
In addition to these actions, Mr. Hill hired an outside consultant 
Ken Gusset Associates - who had previously consulted for Raytheon and 
had consulted for minority businesses to help Raytheon sponsor a sym¬ 
posium on minority businesses. The symposium on minority enterprises 
was held at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was attended by 
businessmen, educators, politicians, social workers and others. At the 
symposium, Raytheon took an active role in seeking support of and get¬ 
ting others (i.e., businesses, educators) interested in minority vendor 
programs. 
Staff Specialists. The MVP was initially the responsibility of 
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Mr. Lyken from the program1 s inception to 1974... The bulk of Mr. Lyken’s 
activities centered on writing procedures and policies (with Mr. Hill) 
for inclusion in the purchasing operating manuals, and finding and 
helping vendors. 
Mr. Lyken was hired, according to Mr. Hill, because he was 
’’familiar with the problems of minority vendors and was sensitive to 
black cultural problems.” Mr. Lyken, according to Mr. Hill, was in¬ 
strumental in "conceptualizing" the MVP at Raytheon, but had difficulty 
implementing the program. According to Mr. Lyken, he had the problem 
of starting from scratch since there was no prior (or very little) in¬ 
volvement with minority vendors at Raytheon. 
Thus, during the first year, Mr. Lyken spent the bulk of his time 
just finding qualified vendors - "which were at a minimum" - and getting 
the program going (on board). Fixed goals and procedures were almost 
impossible to establish. According to Mr. Hill: purchasing managers 
were given a list of possible goals, but were told to set their own 
objectives ..."we did not know what goals to establish, so instead of 
evoking goals we were going to wait and set them based on experience." 
During the second year of the program, (1) verifiable goals (e.g., 
number of new vendors added, total dollar orders given, value variances) 
based on the first year’s experience were established and (2) buyers and 
managers were asked to and held responsible for building minority 
vendor goals into their formal MBO reviews (according to Mr. Hill, MBO 
is widely practiced at Raytheon and it was normal to incorporate minority 
goal performance in MBO reviews). In addition to fixing goals, monthly 
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reports were required from buyers relative to their MVP activities. 
Despite these efforts, Mr. Lyken had difficulty implementing 
the program at the buyer level and left the company for "a better 
position elsewhere." According to Mr. Hill - Lyken was great for con¬ 
ceptualizing and organizing, but had difficulty implementing - "he did 
not understand the buyers’ problems." Mr. Lyken commented that one of 
the difficulties in getting the program implemented was due to the pro¬ 
gram being viewed as "social" and not economic and hence buyers did not 
consider it important or essential. (See problem section below.) 
Second Staff Specialist. Mr. Charles S. Warner replaced Mr. Lyken 
in 1974. Mr. Warner concentrated on educating both buyers and vendors 
about the program. Emphasis was placed, according to Mr. Warner (through 
seminars, slide presentations, other), on breaking the stereotype think¬ 
ing of both minority vendors and buyers. Minority vendors had to be 
shown, according to Mr. Warner, that the MVP at Raytheon "was not a 
give away" that buyers were held responsible for a number of purchasing 
requirements (i.e., price, quality, delivery) and were leary about 
dealing with new and unknown entitites. On the other hand, Mr. Warner 
had to also break the stereotype thinking of buyers that "minority owned 
businesses were inferior to other vendors and very risky to do business 
with." Mr. Warner spent a considerable amount of his time in the field 
researching and acquiring new and qualified vendors, holding meetings 
with buyers and vendors, and asking for suggestions or recommendations 
from buyers and vendors. Also, goals and procedures were continually 
monitored, analyzed, reviewed and revised by Mr. Warner. 
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Formal Policy and Procedure in Operating Manuals, Raytheon runs 
on policy and operating manuals according to both Mr. Hill and Mr. Lyken. 
A company the size of Raytheon needs formal mechanisms (i.e., operating 
manuals) to guide actions. In order to get the MVP on board, according 
to Mr. Hill, steps had to be taken to incorporate MV policies and pro¬ 
cedures into the operating manuals. 
The early years of the MVP centered on writing policies and pro¬ 
cedures and refining them as the program moved along. A corporate goal 
of 1% of total purchases was established for all divisions to comply 
with (in 1976 minority purchases amounted to .8% and for the 1st quar¬ 
ter of 1977 minority purchases were 1.4%). In addition to the corporate¬ 
wide 1% goal, formal goals (# of new minority vendors used, total dol¬ 
lar purchases from minorities, costs, variance) were incorporated in 
MBO reviews for all purchasing department managers and buyers. Also, 
procedures were established for collecting and reporting information 
(i.e., formal monthly progress reports, meetings, goal charts). Specif¬ 
ic steps and job descriptions for buyers were established for their 
minority-purchase operations (e.g., buyers who were responsible for 
purchases from small businesses were also made responsible for co¬ 
ordinating minority purchases at their specific plant or facility). 
Appendix H is one of the many forms used to aid buyers in their 
minority vendor activities at Raytheon. This form (Appendix H ) is 
used to help screen potential minority vendors for company buyers. 
Mr. Hill commented that in order to get a program institutional¬ 
ized you need, in addition to constant persuasion and education, a 
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policy manual, a procedure manual and implementing procedure (Chapter X 
looks at Raytheon’s response in greater detail). 
Publicity and Corporate Support. Articles about the minority 
vendor program have appeared in the company’s various corporate publica¬ 
tions including Raytheon Report, a bimonthly publication reporting 
diverse, multimarket and international activities of the company to 
customers, employees and members of the financial community, among 
others. 
Corporate executives have issued numerous memoranda concerning 
Raytheon’s MVP. Also, various promotional devices (i.e., pamphlets, 
slide presentations, symposiums) are used to communicate and educate 
employees and the public to the company’s MVP. 
Corporate Support. In addition to the administrative costs of 
the Minority Relations Program (i.e., salaries of staff specialists, 
co-ordinators, division and executive time involved with program, 
promotional activities, other) borne by Raytheon, the company supplies 
minority vendors with functional support. This support is offered to 
minority vendors who have the potential to become a viable source of 
supply for the company. 
Raytheon will supply perspective and existing Minority Vendors 
with functional support in: production control, quality control, 
analyzing specifications, preparing bids, material acquisition, and 
surplus equipment. According to Mr. Hill: 
While we intend to offer unusually extensive 
support in the initial phases of doing business 
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with minority-owned enterprises, our objective 
is to have such companies become fully competi¬ 
tive and independent.^ 
Summary, According to Mr. Hill, the company had a difficult time 
(see problem section below) making everyone in the company believe that 
the program was on-going — not just a fad. In order to overcome this 
and convince those responsible for the program’s success (i.e., general 
managers, purchasing managers, buyers) that the program was permanent, 
a number of actions and routines were used: continued top management 
involvement and intervention, staff specialists, formal operating pro¬ 
cedures and policies, constant persuasion and education, strong use of 
administrative chain of•command, publicity and corporate support. 
Mr. Hill mentioned that while many of the general managers be¬ 
lieved in the program intellectually, they did not put the heat on the 
buyers to perform. At meetings of general managers and top executives, 
the President would single out those nonperforming division general 
managers — call them on the carpet — and make it known to all present 
that he, as president, expected their performance to improve. 
Thus, both formal (goals, routines, procedures) and informal 
(education, persuasion) mechanisms were used over a six year period 
to fully get the MVP under control. 
Problems Encountered by Raytheon in Institutionalizing its MVP 
Several problems were encountered by top management in the in¬ 
stitutionalization of the MVP. The problems centered on three main 
areas: organizational resistance, program administration, and vendor 
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relationships. 
Organizational Resistance. One of the main factors blocking the 
program's institutionalization was strong buyer resistance. According 
to Mr. Hill, it took six years to get the purchasing departments to 
respond — to identify those who were "stonewalling” it. Among the 
reasons given for buyer resistance were: threat to buyer security, 
racial, stereotyping, and general resistance to a new program. 
The MVP posed a threat to job security for buyers because buyers 
were being forced to establish relationships with minority vendors 
that they had no prior dealings. Since buyers are formally evaluated 
in their job performance, it was easier and safer for buyers to main¬ 
tain relations with established vendors than to chance possible poor 
results with new and unproven minority-owned vendors. 
Also buyer perceptions and attitudes played an important part 
in stalling the program's institutionalization. Many buyers did not 
view the program as on-going, but as just a fad. Others had precon¬ 
ceived notions of the capabilities of minority businessmen. Buyers 
were quick to view all minority businessmen as inefficient. This 
stereotyping, along with general resistance to the new program, led 
to the "stonewalling" of the program. 
Finally, many buyers resisted because of the difficulty in find¬ 
ing minority-owned vendors that could meet the company’s technical, 
quality and delivery requirements. 
As asserted above, it took constant pressure from top executives, 
formal policies, procedures and goals, continuous education of buyers 
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to break down their resistance, and awareness by top management of the 
buyerTs problems. 
Administrative. The biggest problem administratively was the 
lack of experience that the company had with this type of program. 
Problems here centered on the length of time required to fully insti¬ 
tutionalize the program, defining and communicating to buyers what 
constitutes a minority-owned business, and what were appropriate goals, 
procedures and routines needed to implement the program. 
The company’s response during the early years was geared to 
learning the requirements of the program. Seminars were attended, 
suggestions were sought from corporate personnel and generally a trial 
and error approach was taken. 
Mr. Hill mentioned that in the beginning they established informal 
goals and procedures and allowed the purchasing managers to set their 
own objectives based on these informal procedures. 
Mr. Hill stated: 
...the executive office gave purchasing managers 
a list of kinds of goals, but we did not know what 
goals to set yet...their are two ways to set goals, 
you can evoke them or you can set them with experi¬ 
ence. 
Mr. Hill continued: 
The first year of the program (1972) our objective 
was to educate and persuade the purchasing managers, 
to let them decide their own goals. The second year 
(1973) we had some performance so corporate was able 
to ask for some suggestions, assign tasks and goals, 
to begin employing MBO and have managers write down 
goals, discuss, revise, get approval and report 
regularly... If goals were still not met and no 
effort extended to meet them, then we began using 
persuasion and continuous heat. 1 
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According to Mr. Hill, the company did not threaten purchasing 
managers or buyers with a cut in salary or other direct means, he 
stated, "there was no need for salary reviews for the MVP,,, the guy 
who is not performing is generally a poor performer overall, non¬ 
performers in the MVP are nonperformers generally." 
Mr. Warner credits the (1) strong backing of Hill and other top 
executives (Hill reports to Mr. Holmes), (2) education of the buyers 
through slide presentations, and their association with successful 
minority enterprises, and (3) constant monitoring of new minority 
vendors’ performance, with eventually getting the program accepted and 
institutionalized. 
Minority Vendor Relations. The biggest problem encountered here 
according to both Mr. Hill and Mr. Warner was the difficulty in finding 
minority-owned vendors that could meet the needs of a technical com¬ 
pany. Many of the company’s products in its electronic operations (50% 
of sales) require a high degree of technical know-how. 
Other problems revolved around the expectations of some minority 
vendors who expected Raytheon to give them purchase orders because of 
their minority status. Mr. Warner stressed to new minority vendors 
that the MVP at Raytheon was "not window dressing, that it is not a 
give away, that we do not do it like ABC company." 
Lastly, a problem was experienced with the stereotype thinking 
of purchasing managers and buyers. Buyers assumed all minority-owned 
businesses had a high rate of failure or were generally poorly managed. 
As a result, buyers were hesitant to deal with minority vendors and 
175 
purchasing and general managers were reluctant to penalize their buyers 
for nonperformance. 
In order to help counter the stereotype thinking of buyers, the 
minority vendor relations manager, and his co-ordinators at various 
plants, (1) continuously looked for new qualified vendors (i.e., estab¬ 
lished own list, used lists composed by minority support agencies, 
other), (2) supplied functional support to existing vendors that had 
potential to serve Raytheon, and (3) supply as much follow-up and 
monitoring to as many existing minority vendors as possible (i.e., 
visit plants, visit minority facilities, generally smooth relations). 
In summary, the problems encountered in institutionalizing the 
MVP centered on: organizational resistance; no definable or verifiable 
objectives (early in program); lack of control mechanisms or standards 
(early in program); inability to communicate with both vendors and 
buyers the objectives of the program. 
Summary. The Minority Vendor Program is an on-going voluntary 
social program at Raytheon. While voluntary, Raytheon top management 
has made participation by purchasing managers and buyers in the pro¬ 
gram mandatory. 
Steps to institutionalize the MVP took the form of: top corporate 
commitment (throughout program’s institutionalization); formal goals, 
policy statements, and procedures incorporated in the company’s pur¬ 
chasing manual; formal minority vendor structure (minority vendor re¬ 
lations manager, minority vendor co-ordinators at various Raytheon 
facilities); incorporation of minority vendor goals in the company’s 
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formal MBO network; constant heat and pressure applied by top corporate 
management to instill performance (to overcome buyer notions that pro¬ 
gram was "just a fad"), constant education of buyers and vendors alike; 
publicity of program (seminars, meetings, corporate publications); 
corporate functional support to vendors; and lastly, time to gain com¬ 
mitment . 
Problems encountered in the program’s institutionalization 
focused on: organizational resistance (threat to buyer’s job security, 
preconceived notions about minorities and "social" programs in general); 
administrative (corporate lack of experience in setting goals and re¬ 
quirements for social programs); and minority relations (lack of minor¬ 
ity enterprises, preconceived notions of minority vendors). 
Conclusions 
----- « 
Several observations can be made relative to the MVP initiation 
and institutionalization at Raytheon: 
1. The initial decision to engage in the MVP was focused at the top 
of the organization 
2. The final program decision was a result of the efforts and 
recommendations of people lower down in the organization (Lyken 
and efforts of other Raytheon blacks) 
3. Decision processes associated with the MVP at Raytheon were 
routinized (i.e.. Minority Vendor Relations manager, co-ordinators; 
goals, policy, procedures spelled out in corporate purchasing 
manuals) 
Processes and actions associated with the program’s operation were 
pushed down or decentralized (i.e., minority relations manager, 
co-ordinators, buyer responsibility, decision responsibility re¬ 
mained close to the top) 
4. 
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5. Top management did corzit themselves to social involvement but 
no clear evidence exists that the MVP is an integral and conscious 
part of overall corporate strategy 
6. On-going voluntary social programs that require mandatory employee 
participation take longer to institutionalize and present more 
problems than on-going voluntary programs that do not require 
mandatory participation from employees 
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FOOTNOTES 
^For a narrative history of the Raytheon Company see: Otto J. 
Scott, The Creative Ordeal: The Story of Raytheon, (New York: Atheneum 
1974). 
2 
For a review of Raytheon’s financial data and product descrip¬ 
tions see: Raytheon Company Annual Report 1976 (Lexington, Ma.: 
Raytheon Company 1976). 
3 
The failure of this inner city training program eventually led 
to the initiation of the MVP in 1972. 
4 
Who's Who in America, 1976: 13. 
^See: David Gumpert, "The Venturers: Archies Williams Aims his 
Black-Run Firm at the White Community," Wall Street Journal cxc (De¬ 
cember 7, 1977): 1 and 35. 
^Who’s Who in America, 1976: 2486. 
^Who’s Who in America, 1976: 1486. 
g 
Raytheon Company "Raytheon Purchases from Minority Firms 
Increased 85% in ’76," Raytheon Reports (May-June 1977): 3. 
q 
Gumpert, "The Venturers": 1. 
^Descriptions of Raytheon’s organization structure and procure¬ 
ment operations were based on interviews with company personnel and 
various company publications including: Raytheon Company Annual Report 
(Lexington, Ma.: Raytheon Company, 1976) and "Raytheon MVP" a pamphlet 
distributed by the company to perspective minority vendors. 
^ James M. Hill, Jr., Director of Procurement, interview held at 
Raytheon Company, Executive Offices, 141 Spring Street, Lexington, Ma., 
June, 1977. Mr. Hill mentioned that corporate social involvement is a 
result of a series of factors. In addition to social pressure, top 
management concern, size, and profit also influence social actions. 
12 
Possible reasons for the program’s failure according to Mr. Hill 
were: Minorities felt "uncomfortable out of their own environment" 
(inner city to suburbs); no transportation to suburbs; organizational 
factors at Raytheon. 
13 
Mr. Herbert Lyken, Minority Vendor Relations Manager, Raytheon 
Company. Mr. Lyken is presently a professor at the University of 
Massachusetts, Boston. Interview conducted by telephone January, 1978. 
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^Hill interview, June 1977. 
^Mr. Warner was hired to replace Mr. Lyken upon his departure 
from Raytheon in 1974. Several field interviews and telephone conversa¬ 
tions were held with Mr. Warner. Field interviews were held at: 
Raytheon Company, Executive Offices, 141 Spring Street, Lexington, Ma.: 
May 24, 1977 and June 23, 1977. 
16 
Raytheon Company, "Raytheon MVP" - "Message from the Director 
of Procurement,": 1. 
^Hill, interview, June 23, 1977. 
CHAPTER VIII 
EASTERN GAS AND FUEL ASSOCIATES 
Introduction 
The fifth voluntary, on-going social program is Eastern Gas and 
Fuel Associates’ corporate social accounting program. The emphasis in 
this present chapter, as with the reporting of the previous four social 
programs in this study, is on how the social audit as a separate entity 
got into the company and what routines were utilized to make it on¬ 
going. 
The arguments advanced by researchers concerning the merits, 
purposes, definition and processes associated with undertaking a social 
audit are relevant to this present study only to the extent that these 
considerations influenced actions and/or processes associated with 
Eastern’s social accounting program. 
Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates 
Eastern is a large, diversified company engaged in the produc¬ 
tion, transportation and distribution of the raw materials of energy 
(i.e., coal, coke, gas). The company is headquartered in Boston, 
Massachusetts, and was formed in 1929 as a Massachusetts Voluntary 
Association. 
As of the fiscal year ending December 31, 1976, Eastern Gas and 
Fuel Associates had consolidated net sales and revenues of $711,289,000, 
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net income of $65,731,000, total assets of $753,420,621 and over 
11,000 employees (Table 25). Eastern, in 1975, ranked 296th in sales, 
230th in assets, 162nd in net income and 339th in employees in the 
Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest United States Industrial Corpora¬ 
tions. * 
Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates is the parent corporation for 17 
companies divided into four basic areas: coal, coke, gas utility, 
marine and other (real estate and related activities). 
Eastern and Its Social Involvement 
Like most large companies. Eastern is actively engaged in various 
social programs, but unlike others. Eastern has undertaken, through 
its former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Eli Goldston, a leader¬ 
ship role in advocating corporate "social responsibility." 
Mr. Goldston was so widely known and quoted in business, academic 
and civic circles that his death in 1974 was rated in Business and 
Society Review by John Paluszek as one of the top ten corporate social 
responsibility happenings in 1974. Mr. Paluszek wrote about Mr. Gold¬ 
ston as follows: 
Was there a better example of the adage that one 
man can make a difference? 
While chief executive officer of Eastern Gas and 
Fuel Associates, Mr. Goldston did things that other 
corporate leaders only dreamed of - or worse, never 
dreamed of... He was a model chief executive officer 
o 
from the standpoint of social responsibility. 
As a scholar, businessman and lawyer (four earned degrees in 
business and law from Harvard), Mr. Goldston was sought after as a 
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programs sponsored and advocated by Eastern are: executive sabbati- 
34 5 
cals, new housing for the ghetto, and corporate social accounting. 
Mr. Goldston was a firm believer that corporate social involve¬ 
ment was a means by which to expand your customer base and overall 
corporate profits. In commenting on how his company became initially 
involved with the BURP project, Mr. Goldston stated: "Our companies 
became involved initially because of marketing interest of Boston Gas 
(an Eastern Subsidiary) in the sales opportunities of such a vast re¬ 
habilitation program... "When you BURP, think gas!"^ 
In a 1969 article, "New Prospects for American Business," Mr. 
Goldston wrote: 
...the newer attitudes we need are becoming 
common among big business leadership, and private 
business can now be drawn into participating in 
the solution of many current social problems.^ 
Four major areas are seen today as places for 
substantial growth in sales which, it is hoped, 
will be carried down from higher sales to the 
real objectives of higher earnings. 
1. New or more products to the existing market 
2. New markets abroad 
3. New markets among the emerging poor 
4. New activities once considered the province 
of government^ 
In the same article Mr. Goldston wrote, "...increasing attention 
is being paid to business participation in social problems in the 
conferences where businessmen exhort and educate one another and grad- 
9 
ually arrive at a consensus on ’business policy.'" 
Social Accounting. In 1972 Eastern became one of the first firms 
in the United States to publish as a supplement to their annual report 
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a social accounting of their health and safety, minority employment, 
pensions, and corporate giving activities. This social accounting 
disclosure in these four areas (plus others) have become a permanent 
part of the company’s annual report. Eastern’s social accounting 
program is aimed at reviewing selective company activities that have 
a social impact and is conducted by its own personnel (See Table 26). 
What is a Social Audit. Various definitions of the social audit 
have been advanced. But, unlike a financial audit, no definitive 
answers appear in the literature relative to what constitutes a social 
audit. Those definitions that are offered are arbitrary and lack 
substance. In line with definitional problems, there is no agreed 
upon, method, process or approach in undertaking a social audit for an 
organization. 
Simply stated, the social audit, "is concerned with the social 
performance of a business in contrast to its economic performance as 
measured in the financial audit.Bauer and Fenn define the social 
audit as, "a commitment to systematic assessment of reporting on some 
meaningful, definable domain of a company’s activities that have social 
impact. 
Numerous types of social audits have been advanced and in some 
12 
cases actually applied. The process audit or program management 
audit which is an attempt to determine the effectiveness of selected 
programs of an organization that have social significance or social 
impact best describes the approach taken by Eastern in their social 
accounting. Eastern investigated and reported on selected social pro- 
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TABLE 26 
PROFILE OF EASTERN’S SOCIAL ACCOUNTING PROGRAM 
Audit Content: Quantitative and descriptive assessment of organiza¬ 
tional performance in selected areas having social significance 
and impact 
Prepared: Internally by company personnel 
Audience: Company management, stockholders and interested public 
Intended Use: Top management’s desire to learn more about itself 
and its activities; to exert pressure on operating managers 
to comply with new public expectations (in law and custom) 
as to the conduct of large corporations; to provide evidence 
that management is socially concerned and making an effort to 
meet proper expectations of stockholders and general public 
Scope: Specific programs such as — Industrial Safety, Charitable 
Giving, Minority Employment, Pensions; plus descriptive summary 
in other areas such as — pollution control, corporate ethics 
Current Status: The program is presently a permanent section of the 
company’s annual reports 
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grams at their company. Mr. Goldston pointed out that topics for the 
first report were selected because "they are the most readily measurable, 
because our goals with respect to them are comparatively simple and 
clear, and they lie in areas where management can rather directly in- 
13 
fluence results." Programs were not necessarily selected because of 
their importance or how they might make the company look (Appendix I). 
Eastern and Its Organization 
Eastern's management structure is highly decentralized with 17 
companies under the direction of a small, highly specialized central 
staff. Operating managers are given a high degree of flexibility in 
the management of their operations and are encouraged to utilize in- 
14 
novation and entrepreneurial attitudes. 
An "Operations Committee” made up of the top corporate officers 
of the company (Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Vice Chairman 
and Chief Operating Officer, President and Chief Administrative Officer, 
5 Senior Vice Presidents and Several Vice Presidents and Functional 
Officers) is responsible for setting and monitoring overall corporate 
strategy. This group meets regularly to set goals, and make selective 
deployment of personnel and capital over a certain dollar amount. In 
1976 Eastern had 16 officers responsible for the overall management of 
17 companies making up Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates. 
Corporate Public Relations is responsible for assembling data 
for the social audit from the various staff and operating functions 
within Eastern, presenting it to the Executive Committee for approval, 
and finally preparing it for publication in the company's annual report. 
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Up until his retirement in 1976, Mr. Osborne F. Ingram, Vice President, 
Corporate Public Relations was responsible for the collecting and dis- 
15 
seminating of the social accounting data. 
Figure 19 is a partial organization chart for Eastern Gas and 
Fuel Associates. 
Initiation of the Social Audit at Eastern 
According to Mr. Ingram, who worked closely with Mr. Goldston on 
the social accounting program, the social accounting concept was intro¬ 
duced to Eastern through its former President, Eli Goldston. The deci¬ 
sion to engage in the program was not comparable to an economic deci¬ 
sion where a line executive will present a proposal and analysis follows. 
The social audit was widely talked about in the literature at that time 
(late 1960s and early 1970s) and Mr. Goldston saw in it, among other 
things, a way to gain public recognition for himself and the company.^ 
Based on interviews with Mr. Ingram, Eastern Gas and Fuel Associ¬ 
ates' Corporate Publications, articles written by Mr. Goldston and a 
series of Harvard Business School cases on Eastern Gas and Fuel’s Social 
Audit, the social audit got into the company through a series of events 
and actions focusing in two broad areas: President's Commitment to 
Social Accounting and the company’s need to know about itself and its 
activities. 
President’s Commitment to Social Accounting 
On several occasions prior to its adoption at Eastern, Mr. Gold¬ 
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on how government might possibly provide economic incentives and con¬ 
trol mechanisms for business to take a more active role in solving 
social problems formerly left to government, Mr. Goldston wrote: "A 
novel method of incentive and control might be to require expansion 
of the simple profit scoreboard of business to include an annual public 
accounting of its performance in other directions: growth in minority 
group employees, reduction in pollution...^ 
As the 1971 Fairless lecturer at Camegie-Mellon University, Mr. 
Goldston reaffirmed his position that a change in the traditional 
scorekeeping of business was needed in light of the rapid change in 
society's priorities. Mr. Goldston commented: 
...our priorities have been changing with some 
rapidity. Many of our political, economic and 
commercial measures of progress have become ob¬ 
solescent. We need a kind of social accounting 
that goes beyond GNP for the nation and goes 
beyond net profit for the firm. ^ 
It is obvious from the above comments that Mr. Goldston was 
strongly committed to the notion of social accounting. Mr. Goldston 
viewed the firm as both an economic and social entity and as such, the 
traditional scorekeeping of business performance should be broadened 
to include the "quantification of social concerns." 
Eastern's Need to Know About Itself and Its Activities 
In addition to Mr. Goldston's public endorsement of corporate 
social responsibility and social accounting in particular (his philo¬ 
sophical commitment), two pragmatic events provoked the formal initia¬ 
tion and institutionalization of social accounting at Eastern. These 
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two events focused on the company’s, (through Mr. Goldston as Presi¬ 
dent) , need to know about its activities relative to corporate contri- 
* V 
butions, and miner health, safety and security (i.e., pension benefits). 
Corporate Contributions. Eastern, like most large corporations, 
had made contributions a regular part of the company's social activi¬ 
ties. When Mr. Goldston first came to Eastern as its President in 
1962, he found the charitable contributions program very disorganized 
and unplanned. Contributions were made based on managers’ likes, 
dislikes, interests and tradition (we give so and so X amount of 
dollars because that's what we gave last year). Faced with this 
chaotic situation and in conjunction with the company’s new five year 
planning forecast, Mr. Goldston hired outside consultants to look into 
the company's contribution program. As a result of the consultants’ 
investigation, the company formalized its contribution program by: 
establishing a contributions budget where one percent of pre-tax in¬ 
come would be allocated for contributions and spent "where we make it;" 
and decisions on corporate giving were "driven down the ranks" - each 
of the nine top executive members of the Operations Committee would be 
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responsible for a certain part of total corporate giving. 
Miner Health, Safety and Security. During the late 1960s, the 
coal mining industry, which Eastern is an integral part of, came under 
heavy attack because of miner health. Coal companies faced wildcat 
strikes and federal and state legislation because of the "black lung 
disease" controversy, and miner safety. "Black lung" (or pneumoconiosis) 
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was thought to be caused by high dust levels in the coal mines. Through 
the company's investigation we learned - or thought we learned, accord¬ 
ing to Mr. Goldston, three things: "(1) many, but not all of the 
leaders were politically motivated and a few were a little nutty, (2) 
dust could not be measured and (3) there was no evidence that it 
harmed health." 
Upon his return to Boston from the mines, Mr. Goldston came 
across an article by a Harvard psychiatrist who had spent some time in 
Appalachia (location of some of Eastern’s coal mines). The article 
was a strong denounciation of coal operators on the "black lung" issue. 
This article provoked Mr. Goldston to hire an outside public health 
specialist and others to conduct a thorough investigation. Further 
investigation revealed that dust levels could indeed be measured 
("when the measuring devices arrived and were put to use, we and most 
of the industry were embarrassed") and there was a correlation between 
heavy smoking and black lung (miners who could not smoke in the mines 
often chewed tobacco or took snuff which interfered with their masks 
or respirators, thus those most susceptible to black lung - heavy 
smokers - took the least precautions). 
In commenting on the black lung issue Mr. Goldston stated: 
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"What was called for, I suppose in retrospect, was a social audit..." 
Lastly, it was brought to Mr. Goldston*s attention that miners 
needed 20 years of company service in order to qualify for their pen¬ 
sion. Miners with less than 20 years (and many had over 15 years but 
less than 20) were left without pension benefits. This fact, when 
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brought to Mr. Goldston’s attention, disturbed him greatly. Again, 
a social audit possibly could have revealed this to the company in 
time for it to make the necessary changes according to company of¬ 
ficials 
Summary; Social Accounting Initiation at Eastern 
The decision to engage in social accounting at Eastern can not 
be traced to one event or provocation, but to a combination of factors 
including; top management philosophical and pragmatic commitment to 
corporate social involvement in general and corporate social account¬ 
ing in particular, and several occasions and events during Mr. Gold¬ 
ston’s presidency where the company had a need to know about itself 
and its activities (i.e., contributions, miner safety, health, pension 
benefits), and when the information was not readily available. 
Thus, the social accounting idea and decision was introduced to 
the company through its president, Mr. Goldston. The decision, ac¬ 
cording to Mr. Ingram, was made without investigation of other alterna¬ 
tives or the formal gathering of information for its evaluation. The 
need for social accounting in business in general and at Eastern in 
particular was a proposition long supported by Mr. Goldston (Figure 20). 
Mr. Ingram made several observations about Eastern’s partici¬ 
pation in social accounting, namely: (1) Mr. Goldston was the sole 
driving force; (2) the decision can not be compared to an economic 
decision which is more formalized in that a formal proposal is sub¬ 
mitted by a line executive for investigation; (3) while Mr. Goldston 
strongly supported social involvement as an individual, he also saw 
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Figure 20 
Initiation of Social Accounting at 
President's commitment 
Mr. Goldston was widely 
quoted during the 1960s 
and early 1970s as a 
strong spokesman for 
corporate social respon¬ 
sibility and social ac¬ 
counting for business 
Company's need to know about 
itself and its activities: 
Two Examples: 
Disorganized and unstructured 
contributions program at 
Eastern during 1960s 
"Black Lung" controversy 
forced the company to investigate 
its mining operations 
Pension Program - company was faced 
with a number of different pension 
programs and no control over its pension 
as was pointed out by employees retiring 
with more than 15 years with the company 
without pensions. 
Other: 
Social audit was a new and widely 
discussed topic of the late 1960s 
and Mr. GoIdston saw in it a way to 
gain public recognition for himself 




initiated summer 1971 
(see Figure 21) 
Summary: Social decision to engage in social accounting was made 
by Mr. Goldston 
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in it public recognition for himself and his company; and (4) social 
accounting was introduced at a time when it was widely talked about 
in business and education and Mr. Goldston was quick to advocate such 
a concept — "it was a thing of the times and Mr. Goldston pushed it." 
While the actual decision to engage in social accounting at 
Eastern did not confront any obstacles or problems, its institutional¬ 
ization did and these will be reviewed in the institutionalization 
section below. 
Institutionalizing Social Accounting at Eastern 
Eastern was one of the first companies in the United States to 
conduct a social audit of several of its activities that have a "social 
impact" and regularly report and comment on these activities in its 
annual report. The manner and approach taken to institutionalize 
social accounting at Eastern reflected the uncertainty present with 
the still new and evolving concept of social accounting itself. As 
such, the early stages of Eastern’s social accounting program were 
viewed as "experimental" and a way, according to Mr. Goldston, to "ac¬ 
quire additional useful insights into this new art." 
In light of the newness of social accounting, the implementation 
of social accounting at Eastern can be categorized into three stages, 
each with its own actions, processes and problems: experimental, 
formal commitment and institutionalization. 
During the program’s institutionalization, several problems were 
encountered and can be categorized as: attitudinal, organizational. 
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and technical. Figure 21 is a descriptive history of the events and 
actions taken relative to Eastern’s social accounting program during 
1971 to 1976. 
Experimental Phase I 
Eastern’s first attempt at social accounting in the summer of 
1971 failed. Mr. Goldston assigned a Harvard MBA student to investi¬ 
gate Eastern’s activities in minority employment, industrial safety 
and adequacy of fringe benefits. The student was under the direction 
of Lawrence E. Thompson who had assumed a Senior Vice President role 
at Eastern while he was on leave from the faculty of the Harvard Busi¬ 
ness School. 
This first attempt failed because of several problems which at 
the time could not be overcome. Organizationally, Eastern is a highly 
decentralized organization with autonomous operating companies and 
because of this autonomy the student had difficulty obtaining informa¬ 
tion. The information the student did obtain was usually already 
compiled because of government reporting requirements (i.e,, Minority 
Employment data as required by EEOC). 
Also, the first attempt was hindered because of attitudinal prob 
lems. Commenting on the failure of this audit, Mr. Goldston stated: 
Executives trained to a scoreboard showing only 
net income and return on invested capital provide 
with reluctance figures on minority employment and 
pollution reduction. 
I think this resistance is made up of three elements: 
(a) normal resistance to anything new, (b) a realiza¬ 
tion that in the absence of top management monitoring 
reasonably good results have not been obtained in many 
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ance in these areas will be weighted by top manage¬ 
ment in judging executive performance.22 
In addition to organizational and attitudinal problems, many 
technical problems prevented this first audit from being conducted. 
Technically, the correct methodology for conducting a social audit was 
lacking in that the company was unsure as to: what should be audited; 
how chosen programs should be measured and evaluated; how obtained 
information should be presented and to whom. 
Another significant event which halted the organization's effort 
in this first audit was the departure of Mr. Goldston for a six month 
leave of absence in 1972. During his departure all activity concerning 
the social accounting program came to a complete stop. 
Thus, this first attempt at a social audit was marked with very 
little if any formal control procedures and mechanisms to help institu¬ 
tionalize the program (i.e., no formal announcement or policy state¬ 
ments, no full-time company personnel was assigned responsibility for 
23 
the program, no standard procedures and routines were established 
for controlling and monitoring the social accounting program). 
Second Attempt. Upon his return from his executive sabbatical 
in mid 1972, Eastern under the direction of Mr. Goldston undertook a 
second social accounting of selected social programs. The programs 
selected for inclusion in this second audit were chosen because: 
(1) they were the most readily measurable; (2) goals with respect to 
them were comparatively simple and clear; the programs were in areas 
where management can directly influence results which could have a 
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significant impact on earnings per share. In general, the company 
concentrated on programs where questions could be asked that would 
elicit a factual and quantifiable response. For these reasons the 
categories chosen were Industrial Safety, Minority Employment, Pen¬ 
sions and Charitable Giving. The questions asked were: 
- The frequency and 
- The number of fatalities 
- The percentage and level of minority employment 
- Corporate giving by category of interest, as compared to 
forecasted donations, and as a percentage of pre-tax income 
- The nature of all pension plans 
- The extent of pension plan coverage for both already retired 
and currently active employees.^ 
The responsibility for conducting the social accounting in these 
areas was assigned to corporate personnel who were normally involved 
in that area. For example, Mr. H. Brown Balden Baldwin, Director of 
Health and Safety was responsible for collecting data for the 
industrial safety figures. Mr. Ingram, Vice President of Public 
Relations, Mr. J. Thomas Cathcart, Vice President for Administration 
and Mr. William L. Helm, Jr., Vice President, Financial Planning, all 
worked on minority employment. Mr. Ingram as Public Relations Vice 
President was fully involved with the whole social accounting effort 
and was responsible for deciding how the information should be present 
ed. 
No one specialist or outside consultant was employed either in 
advising on the social audit or in conducting the actual audit itself. 
Mr. Ingram commented that although there were some bureaucratic 
delays in assembling the data, all requests for data were acted on 
willingly by operating managers with little resistance to the program. 
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Requests for data were generally made by letter or verbally by tele¬ 
phone. In some instances, data was already available because of its 
use in other areas (i.e., minority employment reporting, corporate 
giving handled through Eastern's foundation). The requests for in¬ 
formation was not uniform or standardized but left generally to the 
divisions for interpretation. 
As with the first attempt there was no company-wide letter or 
announcement to operating managers relative to the social accounting 
program. 
Since a major objective of these early audits was to learn more 
about the company and its activities, no pre-set standards or norms 
were employed to compare performance in audited areas against other 
25 
companies or industry data. 
Generally, during this second attempt attitudinal and organiza¬ 
tional problems, while still present, did not hinder the social ac¬ 
counting program. Major problems in this second attempt revolved 
around the technical problems of: in what form should the data be 
presented to the public, to management; and questions of interpretation 
— what does the data mean; how reliable is it; is it what we should be 
auditing? 
Mr. Goldston had from the start intended for the data to be made 
public, but problems encountered were: to whom should the information 
be presented, how should it be presented and what effect, either posi¬ 
tively or negatively, will it have on the company if it is presented 
to the public. 
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Toward Social Accounting at Eastern, The results of the second 
audit, according to Mr. Goldston, helped clarify many of the company’s 
goals and problems in the areas investigated. Although the audit did 
provide useful information, it was still considered as an experiment 
by Mr. Goldston and needed further work. The results of the second 
audit were presented to stockholders as an insert for the company’s 
1972 Annual Report. The insert according to a letter by Mr. Goldston 
was "designed as an experimental exploration of two aspects of social 
accounting for "self-auditing" purposes: 
1. What are some internal topics on which management can presently 
assemble and organize reasonably accurate and coherent data? 
2. Which issue of social accountability are of external interest, 
and to what extent are stockholders in particular interested, 
if at all?"26 
The returns from the survey (500 stockholders out of 8800 re¬ 
sponded) were generally favorable and Mr. Goldston took this as a vote 
of confidence from the stockholders that the social accounting program 
should be continued. 
Formal Commitment - Phase II 
In addition to surveying their stockholders, Eastern also sub¬ 
mitted their social accounting report and questionnaire to undergraduate 
and graduate college students. Commenting on the favorable results of 
both surveys. Eastern’s new President stated in the 1973 Social Account¬ 
ing insert to the Annual Report that: "The net results was to rein- 
27 
force our belief that we were moving in a useful direction." 
The results of the company’s surveys were publicly announced by 
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the company in their news releases. Again, the company received 
favorable responses from the public. 
In response to the favorable results of Eastern's 1972 social 
audit and Mr. Goldston’s commitment to it, the company in 1973 took 
steps to make social accounting reporting a continuing part of its 
operations and Annual Report. The following institutionalizing ac¬ 
tions and steps were taken by Mr. Goldston: 
1. Announcement to company through memoranda and other means that: 
a. the audit was not a one-shot deal 
b. the four areas presently being reported on will continually 
be monitored 
c. managers will be evaluated on the basis of performance in 
these four areas 
d. goals and targets in the various areas will be established 
and used to evaluate performance 
2. Formally announced to the Operations Committee (in writing) that 
the audit concept will be continued 
a. He formally appointed Bill Helm, Vice President Financial 
Planning, to investigate the first six month figures for 
the 1973 audit and to explore new areas for possible in¬ 
clusion in future reports 
b. Formally announced that others, at the corporate staff 
level, would be working with Mr. Helm 
c. Formally asked for support from members of the operating 
committee and their colleagues in assisting corporate staff 
in compiling the social accounting data ^8 
In summary, Phase II highlighted the movement of Eastern’s social 
accounting program from an informal experiment to a planned, organized 
and formally announced program. The 1973 audit was conducted with 
fewer problems (although attitudinal, organizational and technical 
problems still existed) and greater effort was taken to make it an 
on-going program (i.e., formal announcement of program, responsibility 
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control and evaluation of managers). 
Although much of Eastern’s early attempts at social accounting 
were "more talk than action" according to Mr. Ingram, later attempts 
were not. 
Institutionalizing - Phase III 
Phase III marked Eastern’s continuing effort to report on social 
accounting in their annual report and to improve its performance and 
measure of performance in social accounting. With the passing of 
Eli Goldston, Eastern’s new President, Mr. John N. Philips, continued 
the company’s effort to institutionalize a social accounting program 
at Eastern. 
Eastern’s commitment to social accounting is permanently in¬ 
stilled in the company through its Annual Report. As part of a contin¬ 
uing feature of the company’s annual report, a social accounting in 
the original four areas (industrial safety, minority employment, pen¬ 
sions, charitable giving) along with others (ethics, environmental 
matters) is made. 
Many of the reporting requirements have been made more formal 
and stringent through new government requirements, and have replaced 
many of Eastern’s earlier and less formal attempts. The social report¬ 
ing aspect of Eastern’s program is still voluntary and considered 
economically and socially important by Eastern’s top management. Ac¬ 
cording to Mr. Ingram, top management has used the results of the social 
report at monthly executive meetings to help pinpoint trouble areas and 
to make necessary adjustments. Operating managers have been told by 
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top executives, to take corrective action in certain areas based on 
their performance as measured by the social accounting report. Thus, 
the social report has been used by members of top management as an 
additional control mechanism in matters which were formerly considered 
optional or informally handled. 
Thus, while earlier attempts were more concerned with the pro- 
gram's "public recognition," these latter attempts, according to 
Mr. Ingram, were more concerned with the program*s actual usefulness 
to Eastern's internal operations. 
Present Status of Eastern's Social Accounting Program 
Eastern's social accounting program is presently housed in 
Corporate Public Relations. The company does not employ a specialist 
or have one person in charge of handling the social reporting program. 
As with earlier attempts, persons with functional responsibility in 
areas included in the social accounting report are responsible for 
collecting and submitting data to public relations. 
Public Relations is responsible for getting the data ready for 
incorporation in the annual report. Before any data is incorporated 
in the Annual Report, the Operations Committee must approve it. 
The company does not employ one specialist to manage the social 
accounting program because according to Mr. Ingram this would be im¬ 
possible because of the complexity of each of the individual areas 
reported on in the social report. As such, each area (i.e., contribu¬ 
tions, pensions safety) employs its own personnel to handle the report 
ing requirements of Eastern’s social accounting program. 
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Top management has not had to use threats or force to get 
operating managers to comply with requests from corporate staff to 
obtain data for the social accounting program. Nor has the social 
accounting information been used as a formal means for evaluation of 
operating managers. 
Summary of the Institutionalization of Eastern’s Social Accounting 
Eastern's first attempts at social accounting were viewed as 
experimental and as a way to gain additional new insights in this area. 
A survey of stockholders and college students provided impetus to 
Mr. Goldston to continue his social accounting efforts at Eastern. 
Unlike the first two attempts. Eastern's third attempt was 
formally announced to the company and top staff executives were made 
responsible for compiling the data. With each new social audit, the 
company learned from its prior experiences — "Some of the imperfec¬ 
tions - such as variations in reporting (among divisions) and the 
difficulty of generalizing among diverse operations - still remain; 
but with a year's experience, we believe the information to be more 
„29 
precise. 
The social accounting report has become a formal part of Eastern's 
annual report. While results are discussed and used at top executive 
meetings, the social accounting report per se is not a formal, built-in 
evaluation tool of managers. 
In its present form, corporate public relations is responsible 
for getting the social accounting report ready for publication in the 
annual report. Functional staff personnel (i.e., Eastern Associated 
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Foundation, Personnel, Industrial Health and Safety Manager) are re¬ 
sponsible for assembling the information in each of their own areas. 
Eastern’s present form and manner of reporting of social ac¬ 
counting information was adopted in 1974. Prior to that time (1972 
and 1973), social accounting information was included as a separate 
insert to Eastern’s annual report. The 1971 audit was not successful 
and as such was never published. 
Conclusions 
Several observations can be made relative to the initiation and 
institutionalization of Eastern's social accounting program: 
1. The initial decision to engage in social accounting was focused 
at the top of the organization in the President’s office 
2. The final on-going decision to engage in the social accounting 
program was made after information was brought in through surveys 
of the public and feedback from managers at all levels in the 
organization (learning phase) 
3. The social accounting decision was not similar to Eastern’s ap¬ 
proach to economic decisions in that no other alternatives were 
analyzed nor was all vital information researched before making 
the initial decision to engage in the program 
4. The social accounting program became routinized to the extent that 
it is reported annually in the company's annual report 
5. While the compiling of information was centralized at the corporate 
staff level, each operating division was given general rather than 
specific guidelines as to how staff requests should be handled 
6. Social accounting was viewed by top executives, especially 
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CHAPTER IX 
ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
It was asserted in Chapter. I that much rhetoric and misunder¬ 
standing surround corporate social involvement. In an attempt to add 
greater undertanding of corporate process and behavior relative to 
corporate social involvement this study focused on describing the 
initiation and institutionalization of voluntary social programs in 
five separate companies in four different industries. 
The approach and emphasis in this study are positive. Along with 
Paine and Naumes it is asserted that, '’Prescribing what we should do is 
meaningful only when it is grounded in valid description."^ The pre¬ 
vious five chapters give descriptive profiles of five voluntary social 
programs. This chapter will provide analysis, interpretation and 
discussion of the information contained in the profiles relative to 




Framework of Analysis 
In Chapter III, one theoretical/methodological and five sub¬ 
stantive propositions were presented (Table 27). From a theoretical 
perspective, Proposition 6 holds that the open systems logic can be 
used to view or explain corporate social involvement. Substantively, 
Propositions 1 through 5 postulate several descriptive actions relative 
to corporate social actions and processes. 
Specifically, this present chapter will present analysis, discus¬ 
sion and interpretations of the five substantive propositions in terms 
of the five voluntary social involvement profiles, open systems theo¬ 
retical reference points and supporting empirical data from existing 
studies. 
Following discussion of the five substantive propositions a 
methodological proposition will be presented to discuss its use as a 
tool for explaining and viewing corporate social actions and processes. 
For a summary review of the data contained in the five voluntary 





PI The initial decision to engage in social programs is originally 
focused at the top of the organization, usually with the chief 
executive officer. 
P2 The final program decision with respect to a social program can 
be the end result of information brought into the organization 
at any level of the organization. 
P3 Decisions associated with a particular social program or invest¬ 
ment become routinized as the organization becomes accustomed to 
(learns or adapts) handling social programs in less than an 
uncertain environment. 
P4 As decisions associated with social programs become routinized, 
they are pushed down in the organization (the decision making 
responsibility becomes decentralized). 
P5 Social programs or investments eventually become an explicit 
management undertaking, that is, recognition of corporate social 
involvement is incorporated in the policy formulation process. 
Theoretical/Methodological Proposition 
P6 The open or natural systems logic holds explanatory power 
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Chapter III noted several studies on corporate social involvement 
that pointed to the top of the organization, usually to the Chief Execu¬ 
tive Officer or other senior executives, when it came to social program 
initiation. Based on an overview of these studies, proposition one was 
presented: 
The initial decision to engage in social programs 
is originally focused at the top of the organization, 
usually with the chief executive officer. 
Profile Data - Proposition 1 
Data contained in the five initiation profiles generally seems 
consistent with the findings as advanced by others relative to the role 
of top managers in social program initiation decisions and as postulated 
in Proposition 1. 
In three of the five case studies (Cabot, Eastern and Hancock), 
top management was the original source of the program's initiation 
decision. While in the two remaining cases (General Electric and Ray¬ 
theon) top management, although not the original source of the social 
idea, was instrumentally involved with the initiation decision. Thus, 
in all five case studies the initial decision to engage in the social 
program was focused at the top of the organization (Table 28). 
Discussion and Interpretations 
Viewed from the modern organizational theory with its open system 
logic, it is not unusual or out of the ordinary to find top managers 
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as the key or pivotal figures when it cones to voluntary social program 
initiation. 
All new programs, social or otherwise, represent organizational 
change. Roeber in his study on organizations in changing environments 
noted four interdependent pressures for change inside corporations: 
sources of change that are felt from outside the company (i.e., popular 
pressure, governmental pressure) and forces for change that manifest 
themselves inside the company (downward pressure, upward pressure). He 
notes after viewing change in several organizations that regardless of 
the source only senior managers are equipped by their training and by 
2 
their position in the company to bring about change. He asserts that 
senior managers have the knowledge — they see the company as a whole 
and in context with the environment; they have a wider range of possible 
models for change; they have the power — they can marshall resources 
and apply them to what they see (in agreement with others) as the 
benefits of the company; and lastly, it is their role to make decisions 
3 
that will secure the well-being of the company. 
In terms of open systems theory, senior level managers operate in 
that part of the organization that faces the greatest uncertainty with 
its environment (managers must mediate between the organization’s 
4 
institutional level and its technical level); they are strategic 
participants who are in a position where their values, beliefs and 
attitudes can dominate organizational decisions;^ and they are in a 
position to experiment, use discretionary or slack resources, and/or 
power and influence in making decisions.^ Also, as cosmopolites or 
boundary spanners, top managers are in a position to gather information 
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about changes in the environment that could have impact on the perform¬ 
ance of the core technologies. 
When viewing the level of initiation and catalyst for the voluntary 
social programs (Table 28),the following comparisons with open systems 
logic seem appropriate. General Electric’s PIMEG program was specifi¬ 
cally designed to reduce governmental and popular pressure on the com¬ 
pany relative to equal employment demands. These pressures can directly 
interfere with core technologies. According to Thompson: under norms 
of rationality, organizations will seek to seal off their core technol¬ 
ogies from environmental influences, constraints, and contingencies.^ 
In addition to PIMEG, notice the number of actions G.E. undertook 
(EO/MR components. Increased recruiting) in an effort to ’’protect" its 
core technologies — i.e., the operation of its business. In a similar 
nature to General Electric, John Hancock viewed its participation in 
civic involvement as a way to "protect" its welfare in the community, 
Hancock top officials noted that because of its size and visibility in 
the community, any potential community crisis could directly affect 
their operations. In line with this, top executives, both at General 
Electric and Hancock, because of their position, role and authority, 
were in a position to engage their organizations in social programs 
that could conceivably protect their core functions from outside in¬ 
fluences or pressures. 
A major reason for Eastern’s social audit, according to company 
representatives, was that it provided a way for the President (Eli 
Goldston) to gain recognition for himself and his company. Similar 
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rationale was offered for Cabot’s strong and long history of charitable 
contributions. Thus, both in Eastern’s and Cabot’s voluntary social 
programs, the primary catalyst for these activities were the values, 
attitudes and interest of their chief executives. According to Dye and 
Zeigler, the policy formulation process for public policy which they 
view as synonymous with decision making, does not reflect the demands 
of the governed ("masses in society”) as much as the personal interest 
and values of the governing elite. They assert, "Public policy may also 
g 
be viewed as the preferences and values of a governing elite." Elite 
theory seems appropriate in explaining the action taken by the CEO’s 
(governing elite) at Cabot and Eastern. 
In addition to being consistent with selected postulates of open 
systems theory, there seems to be strong empirical evidence to support 
the initial finding that top managers are pivotal when it comes to 
social program initiation decisions. Rogers defines an idea, practice, 
or object perceived as new by the individual as an innovation. Since 
social programs represent new ideas or practices, what direction does 
the literature on innovation in organizations lead us about social 
program decisions? Rogers reported in his extensive review on innovative 
research that the innovative process can be viewed in two main stages: 
(1) initiation stage during which an organization becomes aware of an 
innovation and adopts it, and (2) implementation stage during which an 
organization puts the innovation into practice, and eventually institu¬ 
tionalizes it. These main stages are consistent with our thesis rela¬ 
tive to actions and processes relative to voluntary social programs. 
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Additionally, Rogers noted that tvo broad classes of independent vari¬ 
ables have been used to predict organizational innovativeness: (1) in¬ 
dividual characteristics of the organizational leader or leaders, and 
(2) organizational characteristics such as size, centralization, and 
system openness. Again, as vith the innovative process, the independent 
variables associated with organizational innovativeness seen appropriate 
9 
in explaining the initiation or voluntary social programs. 
Baldridge and Burham, in a statistical study, sought to determine 
what class of independent variables, as reported by Rogers (individual 
characteristics versus organizational characteristics) influence innova¬ 
tion. Their findings for innovative programs in organizations revealed 
among other things that: administrative positions and roles - chairman 
and administrators were nominated more often than teachers as (1) in¬ 
itiators of change and (2) evaluators of the quality of work in the 
change process (see Table 29 - seem to have an impact on the involve¬ 
ment of an individual in the innovation process. They observed that 
administrators were extremely important as boundary role people; that 
is, they served as a link between demands and ideas from the outside 
and the innovations being adopted within the schools.^ 
Finally, Cohen and Gadon derived several propositions from their 
intervention activities in a school system. As consultants, these 
writers were called on by the school system's new Superintendent to 
create a new management structure for the public school system. They 
postulated, based on their intervention that:^ "if overall change is to 
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ization must openly support the change." They observed that overall 
change encompassing several units in a hierarchical organization hardly 
seems possible without the support of the heads of the organization.^ 
This observation seems consistent with the evidence in the social pro¬ 
gram profiles that indicate that social program support must come from 
the top of the organization. 
Thus, in the final analysis, the literature on organizational 
change, innovation and intervention which is also grounded in the 
open systems logic lend further support to our proposition that volun¬ 
tary social program initiation decisions are originally focused at the 
top of the organization. 
Proposition 2 
Overview 
While Proposition 1 focused on the role of the chief executive 
officer or other top executives in social program initiation decisions, 
Proposition 2 looks at what level the information pertaining to the 
social program enters into the organization. In an overview of the 
social involvement literature it was postulated that social challenges, 
possible programs, threats and opportunities can come into the organiza¬ 
tion at any level of the organization. Based on an overview of these 
social involvement studies and several open systems theoretical refer¬ 
ence points, Proposition 2 was presented: 
The final program decision with respect to a 
social program can be the end result of informa¬ 
tion brought into the organization at any level 
of the organization. 
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Profile Data - Proposition 2 
Data contained in the five social program initiation profiles lend 
support to Proposition 2 that information pertaining to final program 
decisions can enter the organization at any level in the organization, 
although for the sample cases, the social program initiation decisions 
were focused at or above the middle management level. 
In one case (Raytheon) a marketing manager for a division com¬ 
ponent introduced the social program idea to the organization based on 
his perceptions, which were later supported by top management, that the 
company was not doing enough in helping to solve a social problem (high 
unemployment for blacks). In a second instance (General Electric), the 
social program materialized out of the investigative work of several 
staff components charged with the responsibility of devising a_ solution 
to a_ problem (inability to adjust to governmental pressure stemming from 
affirmative action guidelines). 
In only one case (General Electric) was an investigation under¬ 
taken of rival alternative programs. In all four of the other cases, 
the program idea was accepted, and adjustments made to the program 
during its implementation phase (Table 28). 
Discussion and Interpretations 
As with Proposition 1, findings arrived at for Proposition 2 do 
not seem unusual or inconsistent when viewed from open systems logic 
and supported by empirical evidence in a broad number of other areas. 
As mentioned above, Roeber noted that pressures for change can 
come from outside the company (governmental pressure, popular pressure) 
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and from inside Che company (downward, upward), but regardless of the 
source of pressure, top management had to support the change for it to 
12 
be adopted. In a similar fashion Schon asserted that initiatives for 
change may come from below in the organization or from outside but in 
order for change to be effective it must eventually engage the top of 
13 
the organization. March and Simon assert that the type of innovation 
or program activity at the top of the organization will fall outside 
14 
the scope of activities of any of the operational units. These 
statements are consistent with the research findings. Information 
pertaining to the social program initiation decision flowed both upward 
(Raytheon, General Electric) and downward (Cabot, Eastern, Hancock). 
In other words, the level of entry of the social programs in this study 
ranged from top managers (Cabot, Eastern, Hancock) to staff components 
(General Electric) to a middle level line manager (Raytheon). But 
regardless of the original entry of the social program it was observed 
that top management commitment to the program was necessary both in 
the program’s initiation and institutionalization (Table 28). 
What insights does open system logic provide us relative to the 
entry level of new programs or innovations? March and Simon postulate 
that at any point in the organization we would expect sensitivity to 
innovations to be a function of relevance of the innovation to the needs 
of the specific unit involved. Also, their notion of uncertainty 
absorption is also particularly relevant. They claim that uncertainty 
absorption will take place "when inferences are drawn from a body of 
evidence and the inferences instead of the evidence itself, are then 
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communicated." By defining reality through inferences they assert that: 
...A great deal of the discretion and influence 
is exercised by those persons who are in direct 
contact with some part of the "reality" that is 
of concern to the organization. Both the amount 
and the locus of uncertainty absorption affect 
the influence structure of the organization.^ 
General Electric's PIMEG program decision was located in several 
staff components (Corporate Education Services, Corporate Employee 
Relations and Corporate Public Relations). Each of these staff units 
by design were sensitive to any program which would facilitate their 
assigned responsibilities relative to meeting equal employment/affirma- 
tive action goals. These staff units were in direct contact with the 
"reality" (meeting governmental equal employment pressure) that was of 
major concern to the company. 
Also the influence of the marketing manager at Raytheon relative 
to the company's adoption of the minority vendor program coincided with 
the company's overall sensitivity to an organizational reality (failure 
of past social programs; governmental pressure for equal employment). 
Top managers at Raytheon, because of their top level position, were 
aware of the pressures, both governmental and popular, facing the 
company (Chapter VII - Fig. 18). 
Callaghan in his empirical study on corporate donative activity 
observed: 
Since community fund raising often entails the 
personal involvement of top level executives and 
directors and since these corporate officials are 
constantly exposed to appeals for contributions, 
they are in contact with (and often define) the 
contributions-related social environment in which 
the company operates. Therefore, uncertainty 
absorption (an open system phenomenon) often 
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occurs at the highest organizational levels, 
thus the influence structure is introduced 
at those levels. 
The top executives at both Cabot and Hancock were, because of 
their position in the company and status in the community, exposed to 
appeals from the community. Explained in terms of uncertainty absorp¬ 
tion, and empirically observed by Callaghan, one would expect the 
majority of social programs to enter the organization at or relatively 
close to the top of the organization. 
It was also observed (see Table 28) that in only one instance 
(General Electric) did the company undertake a thorough and detailed 
investigation of the social program decision. Galbraith postulates 
that "the greater the task uncertainty, the greater the amount of 
information that must be processed among decision makers during task 
execution in order to achieve a given level of performance."^ Schon 
postulated that the amount of time devoted to investigating an innova¬ 
tion is a function of the cost of the innovation and the perceived risk 
18 
involved. General Electric took several years in investigating its 
PIMEG program while the other voluntary program decisions were processed 
in a relatively short period of time. The distinguishing factor between 
GEfs program and the others is that GE’s program was in response to a 
direct threat facing the company, while the other programs were not a 
result of an immediate perceived crisis for the company. 
In addition to Callaghan’s empirical support of program location, 
several others have supplied supporting empirical data. Beer and Huse 
found, based on their field study on organizational development that: 
Change can and does begin at lower levels in the organization. They 
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noted that while a clear-cut commitment at the top of the organization 
is not necessary, what is needed is that someone in a strategic posi- 
19 
tion feel the need for change and improvement. Both General Electric’s 
PIMEG project and Raytheon’s Minority Vendor Program did begin at lower 
levels in the organization. In both cases, top managers in strategic 
positions did feel that the change (program) was necessary and impor¬ 
tant . 
In the Baldridge and Burham study, while administrators and chair¬ 
men were nominated more often than teachers as initiators of change, 
teachers were still a potential source of change (Table 29) . 
In conclusion, there seems to be both strong theoretical support 
and empirical evidence that the final program decision with respect to 
a social program can be the end result of information brought into the 
organization at any level of the organization, although one would expect 
social program decisions to enter at or above the middle management 
level of the organization. The middle level of the organization is 
singled out because it seems inconsistent for lower level employees, 
because of their influence in the organization and their low level of 
interaction with institutional phenomenon, to get involved with social 
program initiation decisions. 
Proposition 3 
Overview 
Proposition 3 seeks to determine what happens to social programs 
once they enter the organization and the uncertainties or ramifications 
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of the program have been better understood due to time, familiarity or 
greater information gained from working with the social program. In 
other words, what routines (e.g., policies, procedures, methods) were 
adopted in order to institutionalize the program — make it on-going? 
By design, all the programs investigated in this study were on-going, 
that is, a long-term commitment was made to the program from the 
individual organizations. 
A review of several social involvement studies revealed that 
organizations are making permanent policy and structural changes rela¬ 
tive to the adoption and institutionalization of social concerns. 
Based on an overview of these social involvement studies and several 
open systems theoretical reference points, Proposition 3 was presented: 
Decisions associated with a particular social 
program or investment become routinized as the 
organization becomes accustomed to (learns or 
adapts) handling them in less than an uncertain 
environment. 
Uncertainty was simply defined as a lack of certain knowledge 
about certain contingencies, constraints and/or conditions. 
Profile Data - Proposition 3 
All of the programs investigated in this study were on-going and 
hence institutionalized. Evidence in the five social program institu¬ 
tionalization profiles revealed that social programs do become routin¬ 
ized - activities relating to the program become structured, orderly 
and predictable - after an initial "trying out" or "experimental" 
period. It was observed that this "implementation” period was used to 
gather greater information relative to existing and arising uncertain- 
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ties inherent in the program. 
Eastern’s social audit program was described as ’’experimental" 
during its initial adoption. Once this experimental phase was passed — 
during which an assessment of the program was made — corporate decisions 
and actions associated with the operation of the program became in¬ 
creasingly standardized. In a similar way Hancock’s Tri-Lateral Partner¬ 
ship Program went through a "trying out" period its initial year. Fol¬ 
lowing this initial period in which the company mainly "reacted" to 
request, formal methods and actions were taken to control program con¬ 
tent and actions. Raytheon’s minority vendor program during its initial 
adoption went through a "learning period." The director of procurement 
for the company observed that the company did not know what goals or 
actions to establish for the program during its initial adoption period 
and decided to establish goals and routines based on experience. 
Although Cabot’s contribution program was not described as passing 
through a learning or experimental phase, contribution activities did 
become increasingly formalized as requests for contributions came into 
the company at an increasing rate and total dollar amount of contribu¬ 
tions increased substantially. Thus, it was observed that as this 
activity became increasingly important to the company - relative to 
time and dollars commited to it - the company undertook several steps 
to structure and control the program — make it more orderly. 
In a similar fashion. General Electric’s PIMEG program became 
more orderly and structured as the company "learned what others were 
doing in this area" and its own PIMEG related activities increased in 
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importance. Through the use of seminars, workshops, surveys, meetings 
and other devices, information about PIMEG — its activities and effect 
on the company — was gathered and used to further develop and monitor 
the program. 
Viewed in terms of time, Raytheon’s minority vendor program took 
the longest time (six years) to institutionalize. It was observed that 
Raytheon’s program encountered the strongest employee resistance to it, 
stemming from the fact that the program required mandatory employee 
(buyer) participation, and employees viewed the program as a "threat" 
to their job security. Eastern’s social audit also faced employee re¬ 
sistance in its early stages and was the only other program in this 
study that required mandatory employee involvement. Commitment to 
Eastern’s audit waned after the death of its strongest supporter, Eli 
Goldston, although the audit was kept on-going. Also, increased 
governmental reporting requirements replaced many of the company’s 
informal and less stringent auditing procedures. 
Discussion and Interpretations 
Several observations, both empirical and theoretical, advanced 
by writers in the areas of open systems and innovation lend qualitative 
support to the findings relative to the routinization of social pro¬ 
grams . 
In terms of Thompson's natural systems theory, organizations as 
open systems are subject to environmental constraints, conditions, or 
contingencies (influences) to which the organization must adapt in 
order to protect its core technologies. According to Thompson: organ- 
229 
izations under norms of rationality, seek to place boundaries around 
those activities which if left to the task environment would be crucial 
contingencies. Thompson asserts that organization structure: 
...is a fundamental vehicle by which organiza¬ 
tions achieve bounded rationality. By delimiting 
responsibilities, control over resources, and 
other matters, organizations provide their par¬ 
ticipating members with boundaries within which 
efficiency may be reasonably expected.^ 
Cyert and March postulate that organizations learn or adopt 
standard responses to a particular set of constraints or stimuli. Cyert 
and March assert that: 
The secondary bargaining involved in mutual 
control systems serves to elaborate and revise 
the coalition agreements made on entry...Re¬ 
ports from individuals who have lived through 
such early stages emphasize the lack of struc¬ 
ture that typifies settings for day-to-day 
decisions. 
...Through all the well known mechanisms, the 
coalition agreements of today are institution¬ 
alized into semipermanent arrangements.^ 
Roeber noted that organizations establish offices in the names of 
Community Relations, Social Affairs and so on with their function being 
to mediate fluctuations in the environment and minimize their influence 
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on the internal stability of the organization. 
These statements and propositions seem to be a good description 
of the actions and processes associated with the routinization of the 
five social programs. The routinization of the social programs could 
possibly be explained by the organizations attempt to achieve bounded 
rationality. 
All five companies in the institutionalization of their social 
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programs, adopted and revised several methods and actions (appointed 
staff specialists, wrote policy statements, established procedures and 
rules, assigned key people, strong publicity, other) to guide, monitor, 
evaluate, revise and generally make the program happen (Table 28). 
Thus, regardless of the main catalyst for the program — e.g., to re¬ 
duce environmental uncertainty as in the cases of General Electric and 
Hancock or as a result of top management’s interest or values as in 
cases of Cabot, Eastern and Raytheon — under "norms of rationality" 
it is not inconsistent for organizations to seek order and control over 
activities it has adopted by placing boundaries around its activities. 
In the case of Cabot, the company placed boundaries over its charitable 
gift-giving through its foundation. Raytheon established a minority 
vendor organizational component. General Electric established a PIMEG 
committee and so on. 
An alternative explanation for the time required to institution¬ 
alize a social program is given by Lindblom. Lindblom views decision 
making in terms of increments or "successive limited comparisons." 
According to Lindblom organizations undertake relatively small, incre¬ 
mental changes to past policies because of the cognitively difficult 
task of defining all objectives or viable courses of action at the out- 
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set. This is similar to Simon’s notion that organizations satisfice 
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because they do not have the "wits" to maximize. Additionally, this 
"experimental phase" is similar to McCaskey’s suggestion that decision 
makers in organizations employ "directional planning or planning from 
thrust." That is, when the environment is unstable or uncertain — 
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which is the case in the early phases of new programs or activities — 
it is too early to adopt or set firm goals, instead the activity or pro¬ 
gram is undertaken and serves as an aid to discover and formulate goals, 
plans and actions decision makers make "incremented changes in their 
25 
plans as situations changed over the years." 
It is interesting to note that in three of the social program 
institutionalizations the organizations were described as passing through 
a trial or experimental phase. This same observation was made by Acker¬ 
man and Murray (see Chapter X) in their empirical investigation of the 
social response process. Post also noted that life insurance companies, 
in his empirical study, went through an "organizational learning" 
period in their responses relative to the adoption of programs geared 
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to buffer "social uncertainty." 
Our findings relative to the routinization of social programs is 
also consistent with findings advanced in the area of innovation. As 
cited above, Rogers, based on an extensive review of the innovation 
literature, noted two main phases (each divided into several subphases) 
relative to the innovation process: initiation and implementation. 
Hage and Aiken noted the following steps in the process of innovation: 
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evaluation, initiation, implementation and routinization. Zaltman, 
Duncan and Holbek observed the following stages and substages: (1) in¬ 
itiation stage - a.) knowledge-awareness, b.) formation of attitudes 
toward the innovation, c.) decision; (2) implementation stage - a.) in- 
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itial implementation, b.) continued-sustained implementation. 
Zaltman, et. al. noted that after deciding to engage in a parti- 
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cular innovation, the innovation is often implemented on a "trial" 
basis to determine if it is practical before a full-time commitment is 
made. They assert: 
In reality, however, the process of innovation 
is probably "circular" in that each solution or 
outcome of the process "feeds back" into the 
adoption unit in the form of new problems (per¬ 
ceptions) which require attention. For example, 
as the organization moves to the implementation 
stages and actually begins to integrate the in¬ 
novation into its on-going operation, it increases 
its knowledge and awareness of the innovation. It 
may be that not until the organization actually 
tries to use the innovation does it truly become 
9Q J 
aware of all of its ramifications. 
This "circular approach" to the process of innovation was strongly 
in evidence in the institutionalization of three of the five social pro¬ 
grams. Eastern, Hancock and Raytheon all described their initial im¬ 
plementation stage as either a trial, experimental or learning phase. 
These findings are all also consistent with open systems phenomenon 
(Incrementalism, Satisficing). 
Schon in his research on innovation describes the conditions for 
change within the organizations as: leverage or commitment at the top 
of the organization (see Propositions 1 and 2 above), perception of a 
crisis, conflict and, most importantly, for our present discussion - 
sufficient time. Schon notes, "A company’s cycle of change toward in¬ 
novation seldom requires less than a year and usually more than two or 
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three. As observed in our study, no program was considered institu¬ 
tionalized until at least its second year (Hancock). Schon also ob¬ 
served that for change to occur within an organization it "requires 
active and vigorous promotion." In four of the five voluntary social 
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programs in particular (Eastern, General Electric, John Hancock and 
Raytheon - see Table 28), it was observed that during the program’s 
institutionalization, strong and continuous promotion and publicity 
of the program took place not only to inform the organization about 
the program, but more importantly, to demonstrate top managements 
commitment to the program. 
In their statistical study on innovation in school systems, 
Baldridge and Burnham noted, based on their empirical research that, 
"It also seems reasonable that organizations adopting innovations will 
sustain those innovations to the extent that a complex organizational 
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system is built to support them." Again, as described in our insti¬ 
tutionalization profiles each of the five organizations established, 
adopted and revised numerous mechanisms to sustain their voluntary 
social programs. 
The institutionalization of Raytheon’s Minority Vendor Program 
was held up by buyer resistance to change. Several theorists have re- 
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searched resistance to change in organizations. Schon, in commenting 
on ambivalence toward innovation in corporate society, holds that in¬ 
novations pose "threats” to the corporation by forcing individuals to 
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confront uncertainty. The buyers at Raytheon viewed the minority 
vendor program as a threat to formerly acceptable patterns of behavior. 
Buyers were now being asked to place orders with vendors that under 
former criteria would not be eligible for orders. In a similar manner. 
Eastern’s division managers were being asked, as a result of the social 
audit, to report information in areas that were not formerly evaluated. 
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As a result these division managers faced uncertainty relative to how 
this new information would be used in their overall job evaluations. 
Since the three remaining programs (Cabot, Hancock, and General Electric) 
required only voluntary participation, participation in these programs 
did not represent a threat to members. Whereas, Raytheon and Eastern 
encountered attitudinal and behavioral problems during their implementa¬ 
tion, the remaining three programs encountered no problems in these 
areas. 
In conclusion, there seems to be both strong theoretical and 
4 
empirical evidence in support of Proposition 3 that social program de¬ 
cisions become routinized as the organization becomes accustomed to 
handling them in less than an uncertain environment. 
Proposition 4 
Overview 
Several studies referred to in Chapter II and III observed that 
organizations are delegating social involvement activities, either on 
a full-time or part-time basis, to specific departments, committees 
and/or individuals. Based on an overview of these social involvement 
studies, it was postulated that: 
As decisions associated with social programs 
become routinized, they are pushed down in the 
organization (the decision making responsibili¬ 
ties become decentralized). 
Profile Data - Proposition 4 
An overview of the five institutionalization profiles indicates 
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that while activities associated with voluntary social programs are 
pushed down in the organization final program responsibility remains 
at or relatively close to the top of the organization. In two cases 
(Raytheon, Cabot) a program specialist was appointed to manage the pro¬ 
gram. These specialists reported to the Chairman of the board in the 
case of Cabot and to the President's immediate subordinate (Director of 
Procurement) in the case of Raytheon. General Electric's PIMEG program 
was made the responsibility of a committee whose chairman reported di¬ 
rectly to General Electric’s Senior Vice President for Corporate Ad¬ 
ministrative Staff. John Hancock’s partnership program was assigned 
to a second vice president who reported annually to the company’s exec¬ 
utive committee and who regularly reported to the chairman of the board 
relative to the status of the program. Eastern’s social audit remained, 
prior to his death, under the direction of the company’s president, who 
assigned various high level individuals to help him implement the pro¬ 
gram. 
Discussion and Interpretations 
According to Thompson, "We would expect the outcome preferences, 
or ’goals of the organization,’ to be specified by...the institutional 
level of the organization (and which we would define as composed of 
the inner circle...). But we would expect specification of cause/ 
effect relations to be provided by the middle or managerial level of 
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the hierarchy.” In similar fashion March and Simon assert, "The 
programs at higher levels (of the organization) have as their main out¬ 
put the modification or initiation of programs at lower levels of the 
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organization.” Also according to Simon, uncertainty absorption (see 
Proposition 2) occurs at the highest organizational level, thus the in¬ 
fluence structure is introduced at this level. Tying lower level deci¬ 
sion making to this influence level would seem to follow rationally. 
Thompson asserts, "...administration is not something done by an ad¬ 
ministrator except in the simple organization, but instead is a process 
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flowing through the actions of various members." 
It would be expected logically from these open systems statements 
that social program decisions would be delegated down in the organiza¬ 
tion. With varying degrees social program decisions were delegated down 
in the organization for the five social programs. Raytheon did make 
buyers responsible for meeting procedures and regulations relative to 
minority vendor purchasing decisions. Cabot involved lower level em¬ 
ployees in the contributions function with the establishment of a 
matching grants program. Both General Electric and John Hancock sought 
increasing lower level management involvement in their programs. But 
while each of the programs bv design required lower level involvement 
in their program, the final decision making activity remained close to 
the top of the organization. This finding is supported by several other 
empirical studies. As noted by Coult, 61.6 percent of the 250 execu¬ 
tives polled on their obligations to society reported that they direct¬ 
ly determine corporate social programs for their companies and monitor 
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them. McGuire and Parrish reported that a majority of the 250 execu¬ 
tives they polled stated that while social programs were decentralized 
among line and staff personnel, they are co-ordinated at the top of the 
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organization by the president or more often, a vice president. 
What accounts for this close co-ordination of social programs at 
the top or relatively close to the top of the organization? Several 
possible explanations are advanced all stemming from open systems phe¬ 
nomenon. According to Simon, the right to initiate a social program 
is a source of power for executives in the organization. Thompson 
states that organizations facing dynamic task environments seek to 
score favorably in relation to comparable organizations. By scoring 
favorably, compared to other organizations, an organization can acquire 
power or status. If social programs can demonstrate an executive's 
"power" both within and outside the organization then it would follow 
rationally that executives at the top of the organization would want to 
maintain close ties to the program — source of power/status. 
Elite preference theory was cited as one possible explanation for 
social program initiation. It can also be used as a possible explana¬ 
tion for executives continued interest in the social program after the 
initiation decision has been made. It seems rational for executives 
to maintain close proximity to social programs that they have a person¬ 
al interest or commitment to. 
Lastly, it has been observed that social programs are hard to 
quantify and measure. As one moves down in the organization, program 
activities become increasingly structured and routinized. Thus, while 
one would expect "core functions" to be structured, activities that 
are focused at the institutional level, that do not lend themselves to 
detailed program decision arrangements, would in all likelihood re- 
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main at or relatively close to their initial source of entry. All 
programs in this study entered the organization at or above the middle 
management level. 
In the final analysis, the program data does generally support 
Proposition 4, and the findings do seem to be consistent with several 
open systems phenomenon and findings as advanced in several field 
studies on corporate social involvement. Thus, while social program 
decisions are delegated down, their locus of control or co-ordination 




In earlier studies cited, Lipson reported that an increasing 
number of firms are incorporating social goals into their annual plan¬ 
ning processes, while Newgren reported that nearly half of the 183 
firms responding to his study reported that they undertake a formal 
identification and analysis of social trends. 
Murray viewed social programs and actions not simply just a 
function of good citizenship, but as a rational response by the organ- 
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ization to insure overall corporate survival. 
Paine and Naumes, in describing social programs and social re¬ 
sponsibility as an organizational output stemming from various environ¬ 
mental forces in interaction with organizational structure (roles, pro¬ 
grams, self-interest or values, political forces), concluded: 
In the final analysis, the policy maker is left 
with the question of judgement, influenced by his 
role perception and self-interest, and constrained 
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by various forces, all of which he must take into 
consideration in adapting the organziation to 
social responsibility.^1 
The Paine and Naumes descriptive input-output model of the policy 
formulation process is similar to Murray’s findings that the initial 
phase of the social response process is characterized by the chief exec¬ 
utive officer developing a concern for a social issue by acting as a 
boundary spanner by "internalizing externally imposed demands and inter¬ 
nalized personal values. 
Based on a review of these and other social involvement studies 
there seems to be strong empirical evidence that corporate social in¬ 
volvement is gaining increasing attention and importance within the 
corporate hierarchy. In light of these findings Proposition 5 was 
presented: 
Social programs or investments eventually 
become an explicit management undertaking, 
that is, recognition of corporate social 
involvement is incorporated in the policy 
formulation process. 
The policy formulation process was defined as the process of 
determining organizational goals and the actions and plans to reach 
these goals in light of the organization’s environment, resources and 
values. 
Profile Data - Proposition 5 
Based on the actions undertaken by the companies in this study 
relative to corporate social programs and in light of the discussion 
and interpretation of Propositions 1 through 4 in this present chapter, 
there seems to be sufficient initial support for Proposition 5 that 
240 
social involvement decisions are increasingly becoming an explicit top 
management undertaking. Viewed in terms of their locus of initiation 
and influence in the organization there seems to be general support that 
social decisions are becoming incorporated in the policy formulation 
process of organizations. 
General Electric. The processes and actions of the initiation of 
General Electric's PIMEG program provides the strongest support of 
Proposition 5. PIMEG was a social program strategically tailored to 
facilitate the company in meeting its social goals for equal employment 
minority hiring. The equal employment/affirmative action goals were 
established and clarified through the company's interaction with several 
coalitions (i.e., federal and state governments, interest groups, em¬ 
ployees) . While the company was facing this uncertainty or indetermi¬ 
nateness in the sense that it was having difficulty internalizing these 
influences, it sought rationality (closure) by treating the situation 
as a policy problem. The organization systematically conducted an 
investigation to define what obstacles were preventing it from reaching 
social goals and what was the best strategy to adopt to reach these 
goals. Major steps taken by the company were the adoption of EO/MR 
components, increased recruiting and formal incorporation of EO/MR goals 
within each manager's strategic unit business plan. PIMEG, while volun¬ 
tary, can be viewed as a strategic part of the company's overall effort 
to meet these goals. 
Further, PIMEG became more obvious as an explicit part of the 
policy process by the attention given to it by top management, including 
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members of the board of directors (Public Issues Committee), and the 
various actions and routines adopted to keep the program on-going. 
Eastern. Eastern’s social audit can also be considered, similar 
to General Electric’s program, as a strategic element or part of the 
company’s policy, adopted by Mr. Goldston, of being defined in business, 
academic and civic circles as a "socially responsible” firm. Mr. Gold¬ 
ston viewed social involvement and the many programs which this en¬ 
tailed at Eastern as his organization’s attempt (among other reasons) to 
tailor and adapt his company to what he perceived to be inevitable en¬ 
vironmental influences. 
Also, the audit grew out of Mr. Goldston’s recognition that some 
of Eastern’s prior actions and operations (in both social and economic 
areas) were not managed properly. As such, the social audit was used 
by corporate executives, including the president and his operations 
committee, (the main decision-making body of the company), to help ap¬ 
praise and monitor performance in particular social areas (contributions, 
pensions, equal employment, health and safety). 
Cabot Corporation. The social involvement literature and studies 
on charitable contributions in particular have long described charitable 
contributions as an explicit management undertaking. As described at 
Cabot, contributions grew out of both environmental forces (increase 
requests) and organizational philosophy (top executive’s values or 
beliefs). Also noted was the increased formalization of the total 
commitment to contribution activity (part-time responsibility of com¬ 
pany executive to full-time director and organization unit for contribu- 
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tion activity-foundation/policy). 
The classification of contributions into specific categories 
(Foundation, Division, Research, Personnel) with specific responsibili¬ 
ties integrated the charitable contribution activity into the total 
on-going appraisal, formulation and implementation of organizational 
strategy. Although clearly explicit and considered a part of total 
strategy, the direct effects of charitable activities, like other social 
programs in this study, are difficult to clearly define and measure 
(under the tenets of the positive model, this is to be expected). 
John Hancock. Top management (Mr. G. Bleichen) clearly committed 
John Hancock to assisting the city in implementing a potentially 
volatile program. The social program pursued, like others studied here, 
was included under the company’s social responsibility philosophy. 
While not always verbalized or clarified, the company adopted a general 
social strategy. While the direct benefits of these programs can not 
always be clearly defined or measured, top executives considered these 
actions as, "being both worthwhile in their own right and of great 
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longterm value to John Hancock and its policyholders." 
The commitment of top people to the partnership program (Chair¬ 
men of the Board, President, Vice Presidents, Executive Committee) and 
other social programs at Hancock lends strong support to proposition 
five that social decisions do eventually become an explicit management 
undertaking. 
Raytheon. Raytheon’s top executives made a strong and explicit 
commitment to the minority vendor program. The placement of the pro- 
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gram under a top executive (Director of Procurement) and the establish¬ 
ment of a formal Minority Vendor Unit at Raytheon (Figure 17 - Chapter 
VII) further ensures the program as an institutionalized aspect of 
total company strategy. Top management (Mr. Phillips), like other top 
executives in this study, viewed the program not only desirable in its 
own right, but of long-term value to the company. 
Discussion and Interpretations 
Viewed from a purely rational model perspective, it would be 
difficult to accept social programs as part of the policy formulation 
process. In all cases, the decisions were not made in a clearly de¬ 
fined and certain environment as the rational model would dictate. No 
goals or strategies were clearly established nor was a formal and 
systematic investigation of alternative or rival courses of action 
weighed against explicit criteria in arriving at the decision to en¬ 
gage in a particular social program. Even at General Electric, PIMEG 
grew out of an investigation of one alternative (co-operative education) 
and was introduced to the company only after feedback for the proposed 
solution was contrary to what the company had expected. 
If the rational model seems inappropriate as an explanation of 
social decisions as an explicit management undertaking, what direction 
does open systems logic provide us? Viewed from the alternative per¬ 
spective, social decisions can be explained as a natural outgrowth of 
complex organizations due to their size, top management’s role of 
boundary spanner and his/her personal values or beliefs. 
According to Thompson, organizational core technologies are em- 
244 
bedded in a closed system, but are invariably embedded in a larger 
organization rationality which pins the technology to a time and place 
and links it with the larger environment through input-output activities. 
Thompson asserts: 
But if the organization is not simply the product 
of its environment, neither is it independent. The 
configuration necessary for survival comes neither 
from yielding to any and all pressures nor from 
manipulating all variables, but from finding the 
strategic variables - those which are available 
to the organization and can be manipulated in 
such a way that interaction with other elements 
will result in a viable co-alignment.4 
Viewed as input-output models, organizations invariably interact 
with several coalition members. Owing to the size of organizations 
and changing public expectations of organizations, organizations are 
increasingly encountering social demands and pressures. Whether social 
programs are a result of a crisis situation or an attempt by an organ¬ 
ization to score favorably in comparison to other organizations; social 
demands, threats, challenges, and actions do become an explicit manage¬ 
ment undertaking. 
A final open system explanation of corporate social involvement 
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as an explicit management undertaking is given to us by Cyert and March 
and their use of "side payments." According to these writers, side 
payments (monetary and nonmonetary inducements) are made to coalition 
members to ensure their participation in the coalition. It is easy to 
see the use of side payments made to most coalition members (i.e., em¬ 
ployees would expect to receive a fair wage for their services rendered). 
Side payments, according to Cyert and March, can take many forms such 
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as: money, personal treatment, authority, policy commitments. Corporate 
social involvement can be viewed as a form of side payments. Since the 
demands of various coalition members, while varying in importance (active/ 
passive) ultimately determine and clarify overall organizational goals 
and activities, the use of corporate social involvement as a side pay¬ 
ment becomes part of the goal determination and clarification process. 
Corporate social involvement viewed as a side payment can be made in the 
form of policy commitments, personal interest or values of top managers 
or as Roeber asserts, direct payments to the radicals case. For in¬ 
stance, the PIMEG program at G.E. could be viewed as a policy commitment 
by the company to the federal government signifying the company*s efforts 
in affirmative action. Eastern’s social audit and Cabot’s charitable 
contributions program were viewed as strongly initiated by top manage¬ 
ment and their personal interest; values. Both in terms of "side pay¬ 
ments and elite preference theory" corporate social involvement becomes 
a side payment to top executives. 
Several studies have confirmed the increasing attention organiza¬ 
tions are paying to social decisions in their policy formulation process. 
Roeber in his study on social change in organizations observed that 
organizations are facing pressures that are unpredictable, unmanageable 
and are becoming a rich source of uncertainty. He mentions that com¬ 
panies have reacted to minimize these pressures in three interdependent 
ways: accepting the radicals case (i.e., voluntarily undertaking a 
social program to, according to Roeber, "be on the side of angels"); 
public relations ("companies wish to change their status as targets 
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and stress in publicity their most socially aware, conservationist 
face"); boundary control (establish offices or programs to mediate 
fluctuations in the environment and minimize their influence on the in- 
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ternal stability of the organization. I't should be noted that Roeber’s 
three strategies relative to social concerns can all be explained in 
terms of open systems phenomenon. 
Relative to organization size, complexity and environmental in¬ 
fluences on the incorporation of social involvement in the policy formu¬ 
lation process, the Baldridge and Burham study provide us with several 
open s3/stems explanations. These investigators in their statistical 
study on innovation concluded that: (1) structural characteristics of 
the organization, such as size and complexity, strongly affect the or¬ 
ganization’s innovative behavior and (2) environmental input from the 
community and other organizations is a major determinant of an organiza¬ 
tion’s innovative behavior.^ Earlier we noted that social programs 
being new ideas, practices, or methods can be considered innovations. 
V 
Several social involvement writers (see Chapter II - Buehler and Shetty; 
Eilbirt and Parket) have indicated that organizational size is an impor¬ 
tant variable relative to corporate social involvement. 
Relative to Finding 1, Baldridge and Burham postulated that "in¬ 
creased size expands the possibility for interacting with the environ¬ 
ment, since additional clients multiply the number of interested out¬ 
siders making their demands.” Their empirical data clearly supported 
their size/coraplexity hypothesis. Their data revealed a perfect rank 
order between increasing district size and increased adoption of innova- 
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tions for organizations contained within their study. 
Relative to Finding 2, these investigators argued that hetero¬ 
geneous, changing environments pose unique problems for organizations, 
causing them to adopt innovations. Their empirical data showed that 
all six variables used to define environmental variability and hetero¬ 
geneity (population density, urbanization, and percentage of non-whites 
in the district, the amount of home ownership, and the number of other 
governmental agencies competing for resources) had the predicted rela¬ 
tionship (innovative activity is a function of environmental variability). 
If voluntary social programs are defined as innovative activities 
then for large complex organizations, as our sample of firms represents, 
it may not be unusual or out of the ordinary to find top managers 
actively engaging in social decision making and incorporating it into 
their policy formulation process. 
Two other studies indicate increased awareness on the part of 
executives relative to corporate social involvement in their organiza¬ 
tions. Ewing reported that over 61% of 3,453 HBR subscribers (32.5% 
top level managers, 42.6% second level, 18.9% lower level, 6.0% non¬ 
business) indicated that the interests of owners must be served in 
competition with the interests of three other groups - i.e., employees, 
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customers, and the public. If one views organizations as a coalition 
of members (an open system phenomenon) then this finding is not surpris¬ 
ing and lends additional support to Proposition 5. 
Holmes, in a study cited earlier, polled executives relative to 
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their opinions and their firm's philosophy about social responsibility. 
In response to a three part question relative to a firm engaging in 
solving social problems in addition to making profits, (whether or 
not business helped to create these problems), Holmes noted increased 
executive support relative to engaging in social programs over three 
separate time frames (Table 30 ). Holmes study further indicated that 
4 
executives are increasingly taking social concerns into consideration. 
Thus, in the final analysis, when viewed in terms of open systems 
phenomenon and partially supported by empirical evidence, there seems 
to be general support to the proposition that corporate social involve¬ 
ment eventually becomes an explicit part of the policy process. 
Proposition 6 
Overview 
From a purely theoretical/methodological perspective it was post¬ 
ulated that: 
The open or natural system logic holds explanatory 
power relative to the initiation and institutional¬ 
ization of social program decisions. 
This proposition was based on a fundamental assumption of this 
study that the theoretical propositions underlying the open systems 
logic provide us with a methodology for viewing and explaining organ¬ 
izational processes — and in particular organizational processes 
relative to corporate social decision making. 
Kast and Rosenzweig noted: 
Traditional organization theory used a highly 
structured, closed system approach. Modern theory 
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Roeber in his study on environmental change made the following 
methodological assumption: 
...organizations are not closed systems, 
obedient to their own laws, but are open 
systems, sensitive and responsive to change 
in their environment. We call them systems 
because they have boundaries (although these 
are not easy to define) and they have the 
capacity for self-perpetuation and growth. 
They are open because they exist by inter¬ 
change of matter, energy, and information 
with the environment and its transformation 
within the boundaries.^^ 
Johnson noted after a review of several alternative theories of 
the firm that, ’’The organization-theory model is a way of analyzing 
52 
ethical or responsible behavior. 
Discussion and Interpretations 
Based on discussion and interpretation of the five substantive 
propositions in terms of profile data, empirical support and open sys¬ 
tems phenomenon, there seems to be strong support to our theoretical/ 
methodological proposition that open systems logic can be used to ex¬ 
plain corporate social involvement. 
In terms of Proposition 1, it was held that corporate social 
decisions are focused at the top of the organization usually x^ith a 
chief executive officer because of the following open systems phenomenon: 
(1) top managers operate at that part of the organization that faces 
the greatest uncertainty with its environment (managers must mediate 
between the organization’s institutional level and technical level; 
(2) top managers are strategic participants who are in a position to 
allow their values to influence decisions (elite preference theory); 
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(3) they are in a position to experiment or use discretionary resources 
on social programs; and (4) as boundary spanners they are in a position 
to be more sensitive to social issues and demands. 
Relative to Proposition 2, it was held that social decisions may 
enter the organization at that point in the organization that is most 
sensitive to a ’’reality of concern to the organization.” Two open 
system phenomenon used to explain social program entry into organiza¬ 
tions were: (1) uncertainty absorption and (2) sensitivity to innova¬ 
tions. 
Proposition 3 asserted that organization’s routinize social de¬ 
cisions over time. Using such open system phenomenon as: incremental¬ 
ism, satisficing, and organizational learning, it was concluded that 
it is not inconsistent to see social program routinization to progress 
r ■ 
through a trial or experimental phase. 
Proposition 4 was partly revised to hold that social program 
activities may be pushed down but social program responsibility remains 
at or close to the top of the organization. This finding seems con¬ 
sistent with the open system phenomenon that: (1) individuals like to 
remain close to a perceived power source; (2) executives want to remain 
close to programs they have a personal interest in (elite preference 
theory) and (3) since social program decisions are difficult to struc¬ 
ture and routinize, they are difficult to push down to the technical 
core of the organization. 
Additional insights relative to the use of open systems phenomen¬ 
on to explain social decision making was found in discussion and inter¬ 
pretation of Proposition 5. It was held that it is not inconsistent to 
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find corporate social involvement an explicit management undertaking, 
for: top managers must mediate between several coalitions including 
those supporting public or civic demands; social involvement can be 
explained as a side payment to any number of coalition members includ¬ 
ing top managers; that organization’s size and complexity increase the 
number of interactions and demands a firm encounters; environmental 
variability influence the programs an organization will adopt and 
implement. Thus, viewed in terms of open systems logic it is not 
inconsistent to see corporate social involvement become an explicit 
management undertaking. 
In the final analysis, there is strong evidence to support 
Proposition 6, that open systems logic can be used as a way to explain 
and view corporate social decision processes. 
Summary 
In this present chapter, we focused on the analysis of voluntary 
social decision profiles to determine to what extent one theoretical/ 
methodological proposition and five substantive propositions presented 
by this writer were prevalent. Based on analysis, discussion and inter¬ 
pretations of the five substantive propositions, it was concluded that 
open systems logic provided a way of viewing and explaining corporate 
social processes. Thus, while much rhetoric and misunderstanding has 
surrounded corporate assumption of social involvement, viewed and ex¬ 
plained in terms of open systems, corporate social activity can be 
expected and explained in most cases rationally. 
Relative to analysis, discussion and interpretation of the five 
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substantive propositions, the following observations are advanced: 
Proposition 1 
There seems to be strong evidence that social program decisions 
are focused at the top of the organization, usually with a chief 
executive officer. 
Proposition 2 
Relative to proposition 2, there seems to be evidence that social 
threats, challenges or demands can enter the organization at any 
level, although it was found for companies in this study social 
programs entered at or above the middle management level. 
Proposition 3 
In line with proposition 3} the profile data indicated that social 
program decisions do become structured and routinized after an 
initial trial or experimental phase. 
Proposition 4 
The profile data indicated that while social program activities 
may be pushed down, social program responsibility remains at or 
close to the top of the organization. 
Proposition 5 
In line with proposition 5, the profile data indicated that social 
program decisions do become an explicit management undertaking. 
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CHAPTER X 
THE CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSE PROCESS 
Introduction 
To xtfhat extent do the voluntary social response patterns described 
in the five social program profiles compare to the social response pat¬ 
tern presented by Robert W. Ackerman and Edwin A. Murray (Table 31). 
In their empirical studies both Ackerman and Murray traced and described 
the processes and actions that organizations undertake in responding to 
social activities that directly affect corporate operations. Both these 
investigators reported a social response process that encompassed three 
separate and distinct, although overlapping, phases: Phase I - Policy 
Consideration; Phase II - Learning; and Phase III - Institutionalization. 
In this chapter we will examine the Ackerman and Murray findings 
reported on in Table 31 to determine to what extent they were repeated 
in this present study. 
Social Activity 
According to Ackerman and Murray social decisions/policy can be 
distinguished according to their operational impact (whether or not the 
decision/policy has a significant affect on operations) and level of 
implementation (Corporate, Staff, Division). The Ackerman and Murray 
social activity matrixes were reproduced in Chapter II (see Tables 4 
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main line operations and that were ultimately integrated into manage¬ 
ment practices at operating levels. Ackerman studied ecological (pol¬ 
lution) and equal employment demands while Murray studied minority 
lending programs. Ackerman concentrated on large divisionalized 
manufacturers while Murray concentrated on large centralized banks. 
In this study we focused on social activities that were voluntary 
and made no distinction as to whether or not the social program had a 
significant affect on main line operations. Of the five voluntary social 
programs described in this study only two (minority vendor program and 
social audit) required mandatory participation from operating managers. 
The other three programs (PIMEG, Tri-Lateral Council and Corporate 
Contributions) were based on voluntary participation from main line 
operating managers. All of the five programs, at one time or another 
were participated in, whether on a mandatory or nonmandatory basis, at 
all levels of the organization (Top Management, Corporate Staff Managers). 
Three of the five programs (Minority Vendor program, PIMEG and 
Social Audit) can be viewed as having a potential significant affect 
on main line operating decisions. Figure 22 depicts a social activity 
matrix for the voluntary social programs in this study. 
Social Response Process 
Phase I - Policy Phase 
Phase I of the social response process is characterized by recogni¬ 
tion by the chief executive, either based on his personal values or 
internalized external demands or both, that the social concern is 
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Figure 22 







































Social Audit (Mandatory 
Participation) 
These three programs were viewed as having a potential significant 
affect on operations in that: (1) programs like the social audit and 
minority vendor program were viewed by operating or staff personnel as 
interfering with their daily operating routines; and (2) a program like 
PIMEG was aimed at assisting operating or staff personnel in meeting 
established affirmative action goals that if not met could negatively 
affect daily operating routines. 
^These social programs were classified as having no direct affect 
on operations in that they do not directly interfer with daily operating 
routines. These two programs were participated in by managers and staff 
personnel at the three levels depicted (corporate general, corporate 
staff, division/line managers). 
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important and deserving of his and his organizations time and resources. 
While the program in this phase receives strong top level support, com¬ 
mitment to the program from operating and line executives was minimal 
or nonexistant. 
Discussion and analysis of Proposition 1 in Chapter IX revealed 
that the chief executive officer or other top managers were the pivotal 
figures in recognizing the social program's importance and communicating 
this to the organization. This observation is consistent with both 
Ackerman’s and Murray’s finding relative to the role of the chief execu¬ 
tive officer. Ackerman noted that Phase I was initiated by the Chief 
Executive Officer's recognition that the social program was important. 
Murray noted that Phase I was initiated by the chief executive’s concern 
for a social issue based on his own internally imposed values or external¬ 
ly imposed demands. In all five voluntary social programs, the chief 
executive recognized the program’s importance (either as a result of his 
own values or externally imposed demands) and committed his organization 
to the program. 
Both Ackerman and Murray noted that despite the efforts of top 
managers, the programs failed to gain the desired organizational commit¬ 
ment during Phase I. This same observation was found in the initial 
stages of Raytheon’s minority vendor program and Eastern's social audit. 
Additionally, GE’s initial attempts at affirmative action (not PIMEG) 
met with limited success despite top management commitment to the pro¬ 
gram. In each of these cases the social program required a change in the 
daily operating procedures of managers. This change met with resistance. 
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The two programs that were classified in Figure 22 as having no 
significant affect on operations (Cabot, John Hancock), other than re¬ 
ceiving strong top management support in their initiation, exhibited 
few similarities to the remaining aspects of Ackerman’s and Murray’s 
Phase I. 
It seems appropriate to observe dissimilarities for Cabot's and 
Hancock’s programs relative to these latter stages of Phase I. In 
both these instances, the programs did not require operating managers 
to make changes in their daily operating procedures; were not perceived 
as potential threats or with uncertainty; and could, in fact, provide 
positive benefits to managers for their participation. This also is 
the case for PIMEG. While earlier attempts at affirmative action failed, 
PIMEG was a voluntary program that could benefit participating operating 
managers. 
Phase II - Learning Phase 
Ackerman and Murray described Phase II as a learning phase in which 
a staff specialist is assigned the responsibility by top management to 
coordinate the program and "generally make it happen." 
It is during this phase, according to Ackerman and Murray, that 
the technical details of the program itself are defined and clarified 
by the staff specialists. In addition to learning the technical require¬ 
ments of the program itself, according to Murray, administrative learn¬ 
ing takes place by which the organizational and behavioral problems 
which the program presents to line managers are exposed and clarified. 
With the social program still under the auspice of a staff specialist, 
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the social program remains of limited concern to operating managers or 
in Murray’s terms "a small show of good faith.” 
Discussion and analysis of Propositions 3 and 4 in Chapter IX 
revealed that each organization went through a learning or experimental 
phase which resulted in increased bureaucratification of the program. 
All programs, regardless of classification in Figure 22, xvere assigned 
to a staff specialist (s) with either part-time (Hancock, General Electric, 
Eastern) or full-time (Cabot, Raytheon) responsibility for the program. 
In all cases the technical aspects of the program were defined and 
clarified by the specialist(s). 
In these aspects (learning phase and assignment of staff special¬ 
ists) the response for voluntary social programs is consistent with 
Phase II. 
As just noted, for two of the programs (Raytheon and Eastern) 
operating management participation and cooperation was necessary and 
mandatory for the program’s success. It was during Phase II that top 
managers in these companies began to recognize the potential risks 
that these programs presented to line managers. In that these two 
programs exhibited a "small show of good faith," they present the 
greatest similarities with Phase II. 
Minority Vendor. Following top management commitment to a social 
concern, a staff specialist was hired to implement a minority vendor 
program. Working with top management the specialist "conceptualized" 
the program and began formulating procedures and policies for the pro¬ 
gram implementation. The bulk of his time was spent "getting the pro- 
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gram going." Despite the eventual establishment of goals and procedures 
for the program, the specialist had difficulty implementing the program 
at the buyer level and eventually left the company. Reasons given for 
his failure to gain operating commitment were: buyers’ perception that 
the program was social and not economic and hence not important; and 
specialist’s failure to perceive the risks the program presented to 
buyers (minority vendors were considered by buyers as poor and unreliable 
businessmen). 
A second specialist was hired whose main job was to "educate" both 
buyers and vendors about the program and to break stereotype thinking on 
both sides (buyer and minority vendor). Whereas the first specialist 
concentrated on conceptualizing the program and its technical aspects, 
the second specialist concentrated on administrative problems of the 
program. 
According to a top manager, the first specialist was great for 
conceptualizing and organizing, but poor on implementing — "he did not 
understand the buyers’ problems." The second specialist concentrated 
on exposing and clarifying organizational and behavioral problems pre¬ 
venting the program implementation. 
Social Audit. After recognizing the importance of social account¬ 
ing, Eastern's President assigned the task of conducting a social audit 
to a Vice President. The Vice President, who was temporarily in Eastern's 
employ while on leave from Harvard, together with a part-time employee 
(MBA student from Harvard) began the task of collecting information for 
the audit. Their efforts in collecting data for incorporation in the 
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audit failed because autonomous operating division managers were reluc¬ 
tant to give information in areas where they were not formally evaluated 
and where traditional methods of scorekeeping (e.g., net income, rate of 
return on investment) were not applicable. 
Thus, x^hile some technical learning may have taken place relative 
to the social audit concept, the program was not accepted at the operat¬ 
ing levels because of several behavioral and organizational obstacles. 
A second attempt at the social audit was undertaken by a team of 
top managers assigned to the program by the President. Using informa¬ 
tion gathered in the first audit and organizing a list of questions 
pertaining to the type of information sought, information was gathered 
from the appropriate staff and operating divisions. Following the com¬ 
piling and dissemination of this second audit, several surveys were 
conducted by which information was obtained from stockholders, managers 
and others pertaining to the continuation of Eastern’s social audit. 
The company viewed these early attempts as a learning or experi¬ 
mental base upon which future audits could be conducted. Thus, the 
experimental phase in Eastern’s social audit was used to screen several 
technical and administrative problems associated with the program 
implementation. In this respect, Eastern’s early attempts at the 
social audit were similar to Murray’s Phase II. 
Phase III - Institutionalization 
Ackerman and Murray both describe Phase III as an increased aware¬ 
ness on the part of the chief executive that in order to get the pro¬ 
gram implemented, he must institutionalize the program ("that is, work- 
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ing it into the process through which resources were allocated and 
ultimately careers decided.”)^ 
Ackerman noted a creative use of trauma (test case(s) where a 
manager or managers are reprimanded by the President for failing to 
implement the program) in addition to a modification of existing standard 
operating procedure. Murray did not observe the use of trauma but did 
note an increased consulting role on the part of the staff unit to as¬ 
sist operating managers and a modification of existing operating proce¬ 
dures and performance expectations based on an increased understanding 
of the technical and administrative aspects of the program. 
As noted in Chapter IX, voluntary social programs are routinized 
as the organization becomes accustomed to (learns or adapts) handling 
them in less than an uncertain environment (see Proposition 4). After 
an initial trial or experimental phase in which increased understanding 
of the technical and administrative details of the program took place, 
several modifications and adjustments were made in organization struc¬ 
ture (i.e., new units, positions), procedures and policies, responsibil¬ 
ities and operating methods. In all of the voluntary social programs, 
top management provided the programs with authenticity by highly pub¬ 
licizing and taking part in the program themselves. No use of trauma 
was observed for programs that did not require mandatory participation 
(PIMEG, Contributions, Civic Involvement). The greatest use of trauma, 
although not substantial, was noted in the implementation of Raytheon’s 
minority vendor program. Eastern’s social audit requirements for the 
reporting of social data, for the most part, were replaced by increased 
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governmental reporting reauirements. As such, the social audit became 
merely a public reporting, in three of the four audited areas (industrial 
safety, minority employment, pensions) of information that had to be 
gathered and used to meet regulatory requirements. Since this study 
focused on voluntary programs, no attempt was made to observe organiza¬ 
tional response patterns at Eastern relative to these now required pro¬ 
grams . 
Of the five voluntary social programs described in this study, 
Raytheon’s minority vendor program offers the greatest similarity to 
Ackerman’s and Murray’s Phase III. 
Raytheon. In addition to the actions taken by staff specialists 
described above, Raytheon’s top management on a number of occasions 
intervened in the program implementation to let it be known in the 
organization that the program emanated from the corporate executive 
offices and that the power and status of that office was behind the 
program. According to Mr. Hill, Director of Procurement, top management 
made effective use of the administrative chain of command to serve notice 
that top management expected the goals of the program to be reached. In 
addition to building minority purchasing goals into a manager's manage¬ 
ment bv objectives (MBO) program, top executives would use constant per¬ 
suasion and pressure at meetings of general managers to gain compliance 
— the president would single out those nonperforming division general 
managers - "call them on the carpet" - and made it known to all present 
that he as president expected their performance to improve. 
With the renewed and increased initiatives of top management, along 
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with the modification of operating procedures and increased assistance 
from the minority vendor specialist, the minority vendor program (after 
six years) became a formal and continuing part of overall planning for 
division managers, purchasing managers and buyers. 
Time 
A six to eight year cycle from Phase T to Phase III was observed 
by both Ackerman and Murray. A six year cycle was also observed at 
Raytheon relative to their organizational response to the minority vendor 
program. 
The remaining four companies all exhibited varying time periods 
relative to their organizational response to their voluntary social 
programs. John Hancock's program, according to its program director, 
was fully institutionalized within two years of its inception. General 
Electric's PIMEG program is still undergoing changes pursuant to new 
information and data collected from operating managers. Contributions 
at Cabot were always a continuous and on-going process. Although, it 
is only of recent times (1975) that the company is attempting to gain 
greater involvement relative to contributions at the division level. 
The reporting aspects of Eastern's social audit have remained relatively 
the same since the death of Eastern's President and program initiator. 
Obstacles to Program Acceptance 
Ackerman and Murray observed both technical and administrative 
obstacles to the implementation of social demands. Ackerman listed 
organizational structure (centralized - decentralized) and inadequate 
272 
reporting and managerial appraisal svstems for social demands as 
critical aspects in managing the social response process (major obstacles). 
Murray observed attitudinal problems (i.e., branch managers felt threat¬ 
ened by program) as the biggest obstacle preventing program acceptance. 
Social programs requiring voluntary participation from operating 
managers (PIMEO, Contributions, Civic Involvement) experience no 
administrative problems relative to organizational resistance. Problems, 
if any, centered on the technical aspects of the program (i.e., is a 
contribution made through the foundation a legal contribution?). This 
is expected since the program does not in any way Jeopardize an operat¬ 
ing manager’s overall job evaluation or performance. In fact, voluntary 
involvement in social programs by operating managers could enhance their 
overall standing in the organization (allows operating managers the 
opportunity to work with top managers without having to be formally 
evaluated or reviewed). 
On the other hand, besides experiencing technical problems, pro¬ 
grams requiring mandatory operating management participation (minority 
vendor program, social audit) also experience administrative problems. 
The problems as defined by Ackerman and Murray were observed at both 
Eastern and Raytheon. 
Eastern's President listed these problems as: (1) resistance to 
anything new, (2) realization by division managers that in the absence 
of top management monitoring, reasonable good results have not been 
obtained in the audited areas and (3) uneasiness as to how the perform¬ 
ance in the audited areas will be weighted by top management in judging 
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executive performance. Also, as Ackerman noted, division managers 
viewed the social program as a threat against their normally autonomous 
operating responsibility. As long as net income and rate of return on 
investment (or other formally accepted measures of performance) were 
maintained, they felt that they were free to manage their divisions as 
2 
autonomous entities. 
Raytheon’s biggest obstacle, in addition to technical problems, 
was resistance at the buyer level to the program. Buyers were being 
asked to make, as perceived by them, purchases from vendors that they 
normally, according to stated operating procedure, would not deal with. 
Among the reasons given for buyer resistance were: program represented 
a threat to buyer security, normal resistance to anything new, stereo¬ 
typing and racial. It was noted that since buyers are formally evaluat¬ 
ed in job performance, it was easier and safer for buyers to maintain 
relations with established vendors than to chance possible poor results 
with minority owned vendors. In this respect, Raytheon’s buyers faced 
the same problems as branch loan officers in Murray's study. 
Observations and Conclusions 
Both Ackerman and Murray observed that (1) the response to social 
issues changes drastically in the corporation over time, (2) as the 
organization struggles to adapt, learning takes place, (3) corporate 
responsiveness is evolutionary and not ad hoc, and (4) within this 
process of organizational learning, the chief executive officer is the 
key agent of change. Both the role of organizational learning and the 
chief executive officer in bringing about the initiation and institu- 
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tionalization of voluntary social programs was also evident in our 
study. As we observed in Chapter IX, these findings are not surprising 
when viewed in terms of the natural systems model. Accordingly, in 
that many of our findings are consistent with Ackerman’s and Murray’s 
social response process, their findings are consistent with our method¬ 
ological proposition (P6). 
Murray noted the chief executive officer as the primary figure not 
only in the program initiation, but in managing the program over time. 
Besides publicly supporting programs in all five companies, the chief 
executive officers in this study were of prime importance in managing 
the program implementation specifically at Raytheon and Eastern. These 
two programs required mandatory participation from operating managers 
and throughout their implementation top management actively got in¬ 
volved . 
Murray, like Ackerman, noted that organizational learning plays 
a key part in the responsiveness of any firm. The "false starts" in 
decentralizing the program represent the appearance of a two part 
learning phase - technical and administrative. As noted, we concur 
with this organizational learning hypothesis. In four of the five 
programs (PIMEG, MVP, Civic Involvement, Audit) it was obvious that 
the organization engaged in a "trial" or "experimental" phase from 
which organizational learning transpired. John Hancock's program co¬ 
ordinator noted the tri-lateral program went through a "trying out" 
period before the company stopped re-acting and took steps to formally 
control the program. Eastern described its early attempts at the social 
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audit as "experimental." Raytheon noted that instead of evoking pro¬ 
gram goals immediately, they waited and set them based on experience. 
Murray also concluded that his findings underscore the feasibility 
of methodically tracing and analyzing corporate responsiveness as an 
organizational process that can be both understood and managed. We have 
in this study demonstrated that organizational responsiveness to voluntary 
social programs can also be methodically analyzed and traced and thus 
better understood and managed. 
Summary 
This chapter compared the actions and processes in the initiation 
and institutionalization of voluntary social programs specifically to the 
social response process as described by Ackerman and Murray. Ackerman 
and Murray both selected for their study social actions (demands/programs) 
that had a direct main line affect on operations and were required to be 
implemented at the operating levels of the organization. Figure22 plotted 
the social programs in this study according to the Ackerman and Murray 
social activity matrix. Raytheon’s Minority Vendor Program provides the 
greatest similarity to programs studied by Ackerman and Murray. 
In comparing all five voluntary social programs to the social re¬ 
sponse process, the minority vendor program provided the greatest similar¬ 
ity to the social response process as described by Murray. The social 
audit at Eastern was also found to compare, although not in all respects, 
closely with the social response process. It is important to note that 
of the five social programs only those two required mandatory participa¬ 
tion for program implementation at the operating level. 
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Aside from observing a close approximation to the social response 
process at both Raytheon and Eastern, the following general conclusions 
as advanced by Ackerman and Murray seem to hold true for our study: 
1. Organizational learning plays a key part in the responsiveness of 
any firm to a voluntary social program 
2. The chief executive officer is a key figure not only in the program’s 
initiation but in its implementation, especially at companies where 
the program requires participation at the operating level for its 
implementation 
3. Organizations modify their operating procedures or establish routines 
to guide decision making for voluntary social programs 
A. Methodologically the social response to voluntary social programs can 
be traced and analyzed and thus social actions can be better under¬ 
stood and managed 
FOOTNOTES 
^■Robert W. Ackerman, "Hew Companies Respond to Social Demands, 
Harvard Business Review 51 (July-August 1973): 92. 
2 
Ackerman, "How Companies Respond": 91-93. 
CHAPTER XI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
As advanced in Chapter I, the overall objective of this explora¬ 
tory study is to add empirical credence to our understanding and knowl¬ 
edge of corporate processes and actions relative to corporate social 
involvement. More specifically, two major purposes of this study were 
to (1) trace and describe in detail all those actions and/or steps that 
lead a firm to undertake a voluntary social program and (2) once a 
program gets inside an organization what actions were taken to institu¬ 
tionalize the social program? 
As an important preliminary step toward fulfillment of these 
objectives an indepth library review of several models and structure 
of social activities was undertaken and presented in Chapter II. In 
order to trace and describe initiating and institutionalizing processes 
and actions associated with voluntary social programs an indepth case 
study of five voluntary social programs in several differing industries 
was undertaken and presented in Chapters IV through VIII. Data ob¬ 
tained in the field interviews was supplemented with corporate docu¬ 
ments and library documents pertaining to the companies and programs 
investigated. 
Based on a fundamental theoretical assumption that social in¬ 
volvement flows from an organization’s open systems interface with its 
environment, no restrictions other than size of sample firms (all firms 
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studied are Fortune 500 or its equivalent) was imposed. The size 
limitation was established based on the findings advanced by researchers 
in social involvement that indicate that size is important relative to 
the frequency and magnitude of a firm’s social involvement activities. 
This size limitation is also consistent with open systems logic which 
postulates that increased size increases the number of interactions a 
firm will encounter in an increasingly dynamic and changing environment. 
Further, while no restriction was made relative to one particular 
type of program (i.e., corporate contributions) only voluntary programs 
were studied. It was assumed that in order for a program to be purely 
social, an organization should be in a position to withdraw its support 
from the program without fear of reprisal. 
The data presented in the five voluntary social program profiles 
was qualitatively analyzed to indicate the relevancy of (1) the proposi¬ 
tions advanced by this investigator and (2) open systems theory as a way 
of viewing and explaining corporate social activities. This task was 
undertaken in the form of discussion and interpretations and was present¬ 
ed in Chapter IX. Additionally, the data contained in the five profiles 
was qualitatively analyzed to determine if findings advanced by Acker¬ 
man and Murray relative to the social response process were replicated 
in this study. This task, again in the form of discussion and inter¬ 
pretations was presented in Chapter X. 
Conclusions 
Based on this exploratory case study into the actions and pro¬ 
cesses associated with voluntary social involvement several conclusions 
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can be advanced. These conclusions can be divided into two categories: 
general and specific. 
General 
To the extent that we were able to add to the limited empirical 
base of corporate social activity studies, our overall objective has 
been met. It was asserted in Chapter I that discussion of corporate 
social involvement is clouded by much rhetoric and misunderstanding. 
In that we were able to (1) present five indepth case profiles on 
voluntary social programs, (2) map findings advanced in the profiles 
according to five substantive propositions derived from other social 
involvement, studies, (3) use open systems logic in the form of a method¬ 
ological proposition from which to view and explain corporate social 
phenomenon and (4) replicate findings advanced by others relative to 
the ’’corporate social response process,” a major step has been made to 
add empirical credence to our knowledge and understanding of corporate 
social processes and actions. Hopefully, information advanced in this 
study will help to reduce the ’’so-what” attitude which some writers 
have accorded to this positive and relatively important aspect of 
organizational actions. 
In this exploratory study we intentionally stayed away from the 
propriety of corporate social endeavors. It was asserted and concluded 
that it is more important to understand corporate social involvement 
as a positive managerial action than it is to assess it from some value 
laden normative perspective. 
A second major offering of this investigation is its unique ap- 
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proach to studying corporate social activities. While others studying 
corporate social involvement found it necessary to design their studies 
around specific factors, such as: one particular type of social activity 
(corporate contributions); in one particular industry (i.e., banking), 
in organizations with particular structures (i.e., centralized/decentral¬ 
ized), we found those limitations to be unnecessary and too confining. 
Five different social programs were looked at in differing industries 
with differing organizational structures. It was asserted that what 
is more important is how one views or explains this positive phenomenon 
from a theoretical/methodological perspective. Thus, we have hopefully 
added to the important contributions made by others relative to corporate 
social involvement activities. We consistently applied findings and 
propositions advanced by others in various disciplines and areas (organ¬ 
izational development, organizational innovation, organizational theory) 
when viewing and explaining voluntary social programs. The common fea¬ 
ture of findings and conclusions advanced by modern organizational 
theorists is their use of open systems as a theoretical and methodologi¬ 
cal base for studying organizational actions. Thus, this crossover of 
findings and propositions from several disciplines and areas as a way 
to view and explain corporate social involvement is an important initial 
step in helping one understand corporate social involvement as a normal 
and expected corporate action. 
Specific 
Specific conclusions offered for the one methodological proposi¬ 
tion and five substantive propositions were summarized in Chapter IX. 
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Conclusions relative to the social response process were summarized in 
Chapter X. 
The methodological proposition proved to be a valuable aid in 
viewing and explaining corporate social involvement. Viewed in terras 
of selected aspects of several theoretical reference points of open 
systems logic we concluded that voluntary social programs are to be 
expected and can be considered rational behavior. 
Generally, our five substantive propositions were supported, al¬ 
though several revisions were noted. There seemed to be strong support 
to Proposition 1 which stated that corporate, social involvement is 
focused at the top of the organization, usually with the chief executive 
officer. Not only was it demonstrated that top managers are important 
in a program's initiation, it was also noted that without top manage¬ 
ment involvement during the program’s implementation, its institutional¬ 
ization would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
Proposition 2 was partially revised to reflect the importance of 
middle and top level managers for the entry of voluntary social programs 
in organizations. In all five case studies, the program entered at or 
above the middle management level. It was concluded, that viewed in 
terms of open systems logic, this finding should not be surprising, since 
open systems theory predicts the greatest openness in organizations at 
these levels. Furthermore, it is unlikely that lower level employees, 
because of their position in the organization and scope of their activity 
(i.e., technical core activity) would get involved with social program 
initiation activities. Possibly, it is for this reason that Collins and 
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Ganotis observed the undermining of corporate social responsibility by 
the rank and file in large organizations.^- 
Proposition 3 was also partially revised to reflect the type of 
routinization social programs undergo. It appears that social programs 
that require mandatory rank and file participation take longer to in¬ 
stitutionalize and need greater formalization than programs that require 
nonmandatory participation. In all cases a key aspect of the program’s 
institutionalization was the continuous support of the program by top 
level managers. This involvement of top managers was well publicized, 
both within and outside the organization. 
Proposition 4 was also partially supported although the degree to 
which social program responsibility is decentralized is limited. While 
social program co-ordination is delegated to full or part-time people, 
the co-ordination of the program remains at or close to the top of the 
organization. According to the particular content of the social pro¬ 
gram, varying degrees of organizational involvement at lower levels in 
the organization was observed. It was concluded that social program 
responsibility remains at or relatively close to the top of the organ¬ 
ization for any number of interdependent reasons, including: top 
management's personal interest in the program, certain benefits that 
are derived from social programs — power, goodwill, public relations, 
and the difficulty to structure programs according to the detail 
routinization that lower level employees are accustomed to and expect. 
Finally, it was concluded that Proposition 5 was also supported. 
This conclusion was partially arrived at by observing the amount of time, 
effort, and interest that top level managers do actually place in social 
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involvement activities. In all five cases, top management was instru¬ 
mental in the program's initiation and institutionalization. Also, it 
was concluded that organization size and environmental variability play 
an important role in management's explicit assumption of social programs. 
It was observed that as both organizational size and environmental vari¬ 
ability increase, there is an increased probability of social programs 
entering the organization and becoming institutionalized. 
Relative to the similarity of these findings to the social re¬ 
sponse process in organizations several conclusions were reached. First, 
it was found that organizational learning (an open systems phenomenon) 
plays a key role in the implementation and eventual institutionalization 
of voluntary social programs. This finding is consistent with both 
Ackerman’s and Murray's Phase II, which they describe as a learning 
phase. The role of organizational learning was noted to be an important 
aspect of the process of innovation in organizations. Thus, Murray and 
Ackerman’s observations, along with those of this study, are consistent 
with the process of innovation and open systems logic. 
Second, the importance of top managers during Ackerman's and 
Murray's Phase I (Policy Phase) and Phase III (Institutionalization 
Phase) was also noted for voluntary programs. These findings are again 
similar to observations made about the adoption and implementation of 
new programs, regardless of whether these programs are social or not. 
Top managers are key individuals when it comes to organizational innova¬ 
tion and change, as described by open system theorists. 
Finally, the greatest similarity of a company in this study and 
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those observed in the Ackerman and Murray social response process was 
for programs that (1) require mandatory lower level participation and 
(2) were perceived by lower level employees as threats. When both these 
conditions existed, the time to institutionalize the program and the 
number of attitudinal problems increased significantly. This finding 
is very similar to observations made relative to organizational change 
and resistance to change. 
Conclusion. In the final analysis, what this exploratory case 
study does demonstrate is the need and importance for a systematic ap¬ 
proach for viewing and explaining organizational actions in general. 
The importance of this for the formulation and implementation of policy 
considerations (programs, actions, plans) can not be underestimated. 
It is only after understanding how organizations act and behave can 
normative approaches to organizational development be prescribed. It 
was shown that actions taken to initiate and institutionalize voluntary 
social programs were in many ways similar to actions taken for new 
programs, in general, regardless of whether or not the program was 
social in nature. Thus, the crossover of observations made in many 
disciplines and areas (organizational theory, organizational develop¬ 
ment, innovation and change) can be used to increase our knowledge and 
understanding of the corporate social decision process. Understanding 
and accepting this will help to lessen the rhetoric and misunderstanding 




Where does this exploratory journey into the social decision pro¬ 
cess in organizations lead us? To begin with, a need exists to expand 
this present study in terms of the number of programs and companies 
investigated. To replicate this study in a larger number of organiza¬ 
tions will help to further confirm or deny the observations made here¬ 
tofore. 
In the process of undertaking this study, it was noted that many 
of the companies joined forces for one particular program. For instance, 
PIMEG represented a national program participated in by governmental, 
civic, educational, professional as well as business organizations. If 
the theoretical/methodological proposition of this study is valid, then 
many of the actions observed for firms in this study should hold true 
for other business and nonbusiness organizations. An important dimen¬ 
sion of this avenue of research is the control added to the study by 
limiting the observations to one particular type of program. 
Additionally, in order to help overcome some of the weaknesses 
associated with ex post facto studies, a longitudinal study can be 
undertaken focusing on the actual institutionalization of a voluntary 
social program in one company. The amount of detail and structure one 
can obtain in a longitudinal study will help to reduce the potential 
personal biases in ex post facto studies and further substantiate or 
deny observations made here. 
In conjunction with the above longitudinal study for a voluntary 
social program, a longitudinal study investigating the institutionaliza- 
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tion of a new project, not of a social involvement nature, can be under¬ 
taken. The study can be designed to control observations on the in¬ 
stitutionalization of new programs, both social and economic, on a 
number of key variables, not limited to but including the following: 
one company, dollar commitment to program, level of entry, employee 
participation requirement, degree to which the new program affects 
present job descriptions and relationshiDS. 
Also select facets of several alternative theories of the firm, 
organizational development, change, and/or organizational innovation 
can be used to map findings advanced for longitudinal studies for social 
and economic programs. 
In addition to a cross-sectional study of one program in several 
organizations, and a longitudinal study of one economic and one social 
program for an organization, data generated in this exploratory study 
can be used, along with data generated in other case studies on the 
social response process, to create a survey instrument so that a large 
number of firms can be reached and investigated. A survey will help 
to add external validity to the observations made in this study for a 
small number of firms. 
Finally, a substantial data source on new program initiation and 
institutionalization presently exists. A library study can be under¬ 
taken from which existing findings on program initiations and institu¬ 
tionalizations can be compared to findings and propositions advanced in 
voluntary social programs. 
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FOOTNOTES 
John W. Collins and Chris G. Ganotis, "Is Corporate Responsi¬ 
bility Sabotaged by the Rank and File," Business and Society/Innova- 






Division of:  _ 
Address 
Telephone No._ 
Line of Business: 
Financial Data 
SIC Code:_ Net Income:_ 
ales:_ Rate of Return on Investment: 
Market Share %:_Income as % of Sales:_ 
Rank in Industry:_ Income as % of Total Assets:_ 
Major Competitors: (Industry Ranking) Key Financial Ratios: 
Current Assets: 
_ No. of Employees:_ 
Brief Description of Company’s involvement in social endeavors: 
Brief Description of Social Program under study: 
Key Social Program Data: 
Date Started: Present Budget:_ 
As % of Sales 
As % of Income: 
Is a specialist involved either with the formulation or the implementa¬ 
tion of the social program? Yes No Which One? 
Present Status of Program:*___ 
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Appendix A (cont) 
Company:.  Date: 
Interviewee:. ... 
Social Program:  
DESCRIPTION OF PRE-SOCIAL PROGRAM 
OR 
INVESTMENT DECISION ACTIVITY 
This set of questions is designed to reconstruct all those in¬ 
itiating actions and/or steps associated with the decision to engage 
in the program or investment activity under study. 
1. What/who provoked initial consideration of this social activity as 
a matter of concern for your company, be specific (e.g., corporate 
management, civic organizations, crisis in plant, threatened 
litigation, activism, competitors, other)? 
When was this? 
How was it communicated to the company? 
2. Specifically, what role did top management (e.g., chief executive 
officer, directors, president, vice presidents, other) play in 
the decision to engage in the program under study? 
3. Were rival courses of action, both social and economic, considered 
over the present program under study? Yes No 
If yes, what were these courses of action? 
If no, why were they not considered? 
4. What information was gathered for evaluating the decision to engage 
in present program over other alternatives (e.g., cost of each 
alternative, effect on goals and objectives of company, effect on 
profits, effect on company's constituents, other)? 
Who/what was the source of this information (e.g., top management, 
division management, outside agencies, source documents, techniques 
used)? 
How was this information communicated to organizational members 
involved in the decision process? 
5. Do you feel that all vital information was obtained before the 
final decision to engage in this program was made? 
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If no, what other information would have been preferred? 
Why was this information not obtained (e.g., cost to gather, time, 
other)? 
6. In your opinion was the approach taken in arriving at this social 
decision similar to the approach taken in arriving at an economic 
decision of equal importance to the company? Yes No 
If yes, how are they similar? 
If no, how do the approaches differ? 
7. What problems were encountered in arriving at the decision to en¬ 
gage in this social program (e.g., lack of verifiable objectives, 
power plays, organizational resistance, difficulty communicating 
with individuals involved, constituent interference, other)? 
Specifically, what steps were taken to overcome the problems 
encountered in arriving at the social decision? 
8. How long did it take to decide to engage in the program under 
study from its initial consideration to its final selection? 
DESCRIPTION OF POST SOCIAL PROGRAM 
OR 
INVESTMENT DECISION ACTIVITY 
The last set of questions reconstructed the decision to engage 
in the social program under study. This set of questions is designed 
to describe all those actions and/or steps associated with the institu¬ 
tionalizing (e.g., make program on-going) the decision (program) ini¬ 
tiated. 
9. Briefly describe the steps taken to institutionalize this social 
program (e.g., set objectives and goals, communicated goals, 
established policy statements, budgets, procedure manuals, meet¬ 
ings, employee and program performance evaluations, routines, 
other)? 
10. What problems were encountered in the institutionalization of this 
social program (e.g., organizational resistance, no definable or 
verifiable objectives, no control mechanisms or standards, in¬ 
ability to communicate importance or rationale for program, other)? 
What steps were taken to overcome the problems encountered in the 
institutionalizing of this program (e.g., hired outside consultant. 
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appointed staff specialists, tied employee bonus and salary to 
success of program, other)? 
11. In your opinion was the approach taken in institutionalizing this 
social program similar to the approach taken in institutionalizing 
economic decisions of equal importance to the company? Yes No 
If yes, how are they similar? 
If no, do the approaches differ? 
12. What changes would you make in the institutionalization of the 
program? 
Why? 
Do you feel that both changes in the program itself and its in¬ 
stitutionalization can only come about on a gradual basis when 
the organization has learned how to deal with this type of 
activity? Yes No 
Why? 
13. What individuals were originally involved with the institutionaliza¬ 
tion of this program? 
What individuals are presently involved with the administering of 
this program? 
If the individuals involved with the institutionalizing and 
administering of this social program are different, why was this 
change made? 
14. What role did top management (e.g., chief executive officer, presi¬ 
dent, other) play in the institutionalizing of this program (e.g., 
threaten managers with loss of bonuses, wrote policy statements, 
other)? 
15. How long did it take to institutionalize this social program? 
CORPORATE SOCIAL INVOLVEMENT 
AS A 
POLICY CONCERN 
This set of questions is designed to determine to what extent 
corporate social involvement is associated with the policy formulation 
process of the firm. 
16. In the present strategic decision process within the firms, are 
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social criteria considered (e.g., effect decision has on environ¬ 
ment, employees, community, other constituents)? Yes No 
If yes, why are they considered? 
If no, why are they not considered? 
List specifically any on-going social criteria used in the 
strategic decision process. 
17. Have social criteria always been considered in the policy formula¬ 
tion process? Yes No 
If yes, why? 
If no, why? 
18. In the present strategic decision process within the firm, are 
social programs considered part of the business strategy process? 
Yes No 
If yes, why are they considered (e.g., enlightened self interest, 
executive satisfaction, good public relations, profits, other)? 
If no, why are they not considered (e.g., too costly, none of 
our business, no management expertise, not quantifiable, other)? 
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CORPORATE DOCUMENT CHECKLIST 
Company:. .. Date _ 
Program Investigated:_' _' ' ' 
This investigator is interested in obtaining any corporate docu¬ 
ments pertaining to the social program under study. The following is 











Organization Chart _ 
Planning Statements  
Procedure Manuals  
Program Evaluation Forms _ 
Promotional Documents  
Social Policy Statements-General  
Social Policy Statements-Specific _ 
Standard Operating Procedures _ 
Other: 
Please indicate the confidentiality or availability of document: 
Data is publishable (P) Data can not be published (NP) - by this inves¬ 
tigator. Data must be coded before publication (C) Data not available 
or applicable (NA). 
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DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS USED IN THIS STUDY 
Closed System Logic: in the study of organizations assumes that 
organizations function in a deterministic environment in which 
complete uncertainty can be eliminated. Furthermore, all 
variables and their effect are known or can be predicted which 
will allow the decision maker to reach a desired goal with 
maximum efficiency and effectiveness. 
Decision: a final resolve; to come to a conclusion. 
Decision making: refers to all those steps, actions or processes that 
lead to a final resolve to engage (or not to engage) in a par¬ 
ticular course of action. 
Economic decision: refers to a final resolve to take action (or lack 
of action) by the firm in those areas pertaining to the core 
primary function (revenue generating activities) of the firm. 
For example, the decisions to produce a new product or enter 
into a new market would be considered economic decisions. 
Environment: when we refer to the organization’s environment in this 
study we will utilize Thompson’s notions of domain and task 
environment. According to these notions a firm’s domain con¬ 
sists of those claims or activities that it stakes out for it¬ 
self (i.e., the products it will market, the market it will 
direct its products to, the strategies it employs in achieving 
organizational purpose). A firm’s task environment refers to 
those relevant or potentially relevant aspects of its environ¬ 
ment that affect goal setting and goal achievement. 
Explicit management undertaking: refers to any action, program or 
investment that was pursued by management on a purely voluntary 
and cognizant basis and not on impulse or coercion. 
Final program or investment decision: if the organization considered 
more than one alternative then the final program or investment 
decision refers to the program or investment that was selected 
over other contemplated courses of action. 
Information: refers to all data collected both quantitative and 
qualitative that was used as criteria in the interpreting, 
analyzing and selection of contemplated courses of action. 
Initial decision: refers to the original final resolve to commit the 
organization to particular course of action. 
Institutionalize: a sustained organizational commitment to a specific 
action, program or activity that results in the program, action 
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or activity taking on a distinct charter or character or func¬ 
tion within the organization. 
Learn: refers to the process of acquiring or gaining skill or knowl¬ 
edge. In regards to a social program or investment an organiza¬ 
tion learns how to handle the program or investment to the 
extent that it has acquired enough skill or knowledge to handle 
a formerly unfamiliar or unusual activity to the organization. 
Unusual to the extent that it is not normally considered with¬ 
in the traditional functions of the firm. 
Normative Statement or Model: refers to a statement or a model that 
prescribes or professes a behavior or action that is the ideal 
or claimed to be the ideal and thus should be or ought to be 
accepted as the behavior or action to be adopted. 
Open System Logic: in the study of organizations assumes that a 
system contains more variables than one can comprehend at one 
time, or that some variables are subject to influences that 
cannot be controlled or predicted with certainty and thus leads 
the decision maker to make decisions that could be less than 
optimum. 
Organization: when we refer to organization in this study we will 
utilize Cyert and March’s notion of organization (see Cyert and 
March, Chapter III). Accordingly, we are concerned with business 
entities whose major functions are performed by various divisions 
components or departments and are more or less coordinated by a 
set of formal or informal mechanisms (i.e., goals, strategies, 
policies, plans, procedures, rules). 
Policy: principles guiding action; a common purpose for the organiza¬ 
tion components or the company as a whole in matters where, in 
the interest of achieving both component and overall company 
objectives, it is desirable that those responsible for implements 
tion exercise good judgement and discretion in appraising and 
deciding courses of action. 
Policy Formulation Process: the process of determining organizational 
goals and the actions and plans to reach these goals in light of 
the organization’s environment, resources and values. 
Policy Structure: refers to the major, secondary, functional and 
minor policies and procedures, standard operating plans and rules 
that provide guidance about how a particular problem or program 
shall be solved or handled. 
Positive Statement or Model: refers to a statement or model that de¬ 
scribes a particular behavior, action or phenomenon that may or 
may not be the ideal behavior or action but is a description of 
what is perceived to be actually occuring. 
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Propositions: three types of propositions have been distinguished in 
the literature as follows: 1) propositions stating the indepen¬ 
dence of one variable on one or more other (independent) vari¬ 
ables; 2) propositions embodying qualitative descriptive general¬ 
izations about a person, group, organization, behavior or phen¬ 
omenon and 3) propositions asserting that a particular organiza¬ 
tional structure or process performs a particular function. In 
this dissertation the focus of analysis is on the second type 
of proposition. 
Pushed Down: refers to the decentralization of decision making. In 
this study it refers to the delegation of responsibility and 
authority in the administering of a particular social program 
or investment once the problem solving phase of the program or 
investment has been completed. 
Routinize: activities, programs or investments are routinized to the 
extent that choice has been simplified by the development of a 
fixed response to defined stimuli. In regards to the policy 
structure routinized activities correspond to the policies, 
procedures, standard operating plans and rules that provide 
guidance about how a particular program or investment should 
be handled. Activities, programs or investments are unroutinized 
to the extent that they have to be preceded by program develop¬ 
ing activities of a problem solving (what should be done) kind. 
Social Decision: a final resolve to take action (or lack of action) 
by a firm in an activity, program or investment that is purely 
voluntary and is primarily aimed at the community’s interest 
with any benefits accruing to the firm being purely secondary. 
Social Program or Investment: refers to those activities, programs 
or investments that are a result of a social decision. 
System: two or more components or parts that interact with each other 
and that are separated from their larger environment by separate 
boundary. 
Uncertain Environment: an environment where the effects of an action 
or lack of action are not known or can not be predicted - a lack 




AGREEMENT OF ASSOCIATION 
FOR THE 
CABOT FOUNDATION 
The purposes for which the corporation is formed are as follows: 
To aid by contribution or otherwise any corporation, foundation, 
fund, or trust which is a charitable organization, but in the case of 
contributions or gifts to a corporation, trust, or community chest, 
fund or foundation only if such contributions or gifts are to a corpo¬ 
ration, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation, created or 
organized in the United States or in any possession thereof or under 
the law of the United States, or of any State or Territory, or of the 
District of Columbia, or of any possession of the United States, organ¬ 
ized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, 
veteran rehabilitation service, literary, or educational purposes or 
for the prevention of cruelty to children (but only if such contribu¬ 
tions or gifts are to be used within the United States or any of its 
possessions exclusively for such purposes). 
To expend income or principal for any other religious, charitable, 
scientific, literary or educational purposes. 
To receive, hold and administer in accordance with the directions 
of respective donors, funds given in trust for the promotion of any of 
the corporation's objects or objects cognate thereto: 
To acquire, own, invest, and deal in all kinds of property, both 
real and personal, which the directors of the corporation may deem 
suitable to carry out the purposes of the corporation; to perform, 
establish, carry on and maintain all or any of the different things 
which may be carried on in connection with the purposes herein set 
forth or calculated either directly or indirectly to further the same; 
and in connection with these purposes in general to exercise any and 
all powers which a corporation organized under General Laws (Ter Ed), 
Chapter 180, may legally do; but no part of the net earnings of this 
corporation, or any corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or 
foundation, to which payments are made shall inure to the benefit of 
any private shareholder or individual, and neither this corporation nor 
any corporation, trust fund, or foundation to which payments are made 
shall engage in carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempt to influence 
legislation. 
This corporation may at any time dissolve by vote of at least 
two-thirds (2/3) of the members, provided that its assets, if any, shall 
be transferred: 
299 
To another similar corporation, trust, fund, or foundation, 
created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof 
or under the law of the United States, or of any State or Territory, 
or of the District of Columbia, or of any possession of the United 
States, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, veteran rehabilitation service, literary or educational 
purposes or for the prevention of cruelty to children (but only if 
such contributions or gifts are to be used within the United States or 
any of its possessions exclusively for such purposes); but no part of 
the net earnings of such corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, 
or foundation shall inure to the benefit of any private shareholder 
or individual, and such corporation, trust fund, or foundation shall 
not engage in carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempt to influence 
legislation. 
In the event of dissolution of this corporation, no part of the 
corporation’s assets shall be distributed to any member or private 
individual but the same shall be applied to religious, charitable, 
scientific, veteran rehabilitation service, literary, or educational 
purposes or for the prevention of cruelty to children in accordance 
with the doctrine of cy_ pres. 
APPENDIX D 
CABOT CORPORATION I2S HIGH STREET. 303TQN. MASSACHUSETTS G2UO 
POSEST A CHAPPIE July 17, 1975 
MEMO TO: All U.S. and Canadian Employees 
SU3JECT: Corporate Charitable Giving'Policy 
Cabot Corporation strongly supports private solutions 
to community, personal and national problems. To these 
ends, over the years, i't has dedicated from the domestic 
profits., of.,.tha,.Company, .about double, the average annual 
amount of charitable giving of companies Cabot's sice. 
Cabot consistently administers a program of strong support 
for education both through specific grants to colleges and 
universities and through the Matching Grants Program of the 
Cabot Foundation, Inc. Cabot provides scholarships for 
children of employees and educational assistance to employees. 
We donate to organized local programs trying to solve commu¬ 
nity problems, and to selected civic,, scientific, cultural and 
health projects. We also support those trade associations 
which we believe can serve the public as well as industry. 
So that we adequately coordinate our corporate giving 
from our various locations and .assure that qualifying, chari¬ 
ties are all administered through the Cabot Foundation, Inc., 
which was established for that purpose, I enclose with this 










POLICY: The Company encourages and supports local and national 
charities, health programs, civic, cultural and scien¬ 
tific organizations, and aid to education. 
The Cabot Foundation, Inc., administers all corporate 
domestic contributions' add membership fees to organi¬ 
zations qualifying for charitable deductions. Small, 
unscheduled donations, normally under 5100.00, at 
specific plant locations are excepted from this policy 
so long as the plant or' location manager specifically 
approves them. 
PROCEDURE: Division managers shall establish an annual charitable 
giving budget or schedule with the Director of the Cabot 
Foundation, Inc., covering the intended gifts from the 
Foundation for each division. The Director will then 
make the specific expenditures in conformance with the 
agreed budget. Interim special requests can be pro¬ 
cessed on an individual basis directly with the Director 
Cabot Foundation, Inc., is prohibited by law, however, 
from making gifts to non-qualifying recipients. Gifts, 
fees, or donations to such groups should be budgeted for 
in the regular divisional budgets. Where there is need 
for determination of charitable qualifications, a re¬ 
quest should be made to the Director of Cabot Foundation. 
Inc., for a ruling on eligibility. 
RESPONSIBILITY: Division managers shall see that this policy is 
carried out and that material gifts, donations and 
memberships to qualifying recipients are administered 
through Cabot Foundation, Inc. Division managers shall 
be responsible for clearing all questions of conflict 
of interest and legality of donations with the Legal 
Department. The Director of the Foundation is responsi¬ 
ble for supplying all necessary information to divisions 
and for managing the budget preparation for Cabot Foun¬ 
dation, Inc. Payments to non-qualifying charities, 
groups and associations shall be handled divisionally 
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An Annual Corporation Contributions Report will be 
prepared by the Assistant Controller for approval 
by the President's Office which will contain by 
category total gifts to classes of charities and 
other recipients of contributions, both through Cabot 
Foundation, Inc., and directly from the divisions. 
Specific classes of contributions and memberships are: 
Qualifying Charities 
Administered through Cabot Foundation, Inc., by 
its Director. Costs are to be included in the 
Corporate Contributions Report. 
Scholarships for Children of Employees 
Administered by Corporate Personnel Department 
and charged to fringe benefits distribution. 
Costs to be included in Corporate Contributions 
Report. 
Matching Grants 
Administered by Cabot Foundation, Inc., using 
forms furnished by the Corporate Personnel 
Department. Costs to be included in Corporate 
Contributions Report. 
Educational Assistance 
Administered by individual divisions and charged 
to divisional budgets. Costs to be included in 
Corporate Contributions Reports. 
Research Grants to Universities 
Administered by Director of Technology. Paid by 
Cabot Corporation from RSJD budget. Costs to be 
included in Corporate Contributions Report. 
Memberships m Non-Chanties 
a) Chambers of Commerce and other civic groups. 
b) Trade and professional associations. 
Administered divisionally. Costs to be included 
in Corporate Contributions Report. 
All U.S. and Canadian locations. 
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APPENDIX E 
PIMEG LETTER TO GE MANAGERS 
GENERAL ELECTRIC 
NEW YORK 
April 12, 1974 
TO: Group Executives 
Division General Managers 
Department General Managers 
Gentlemen: 
The purpose of this letter is to urge those of you who have not yet 
done so to establish sound local scholarship plans for minority engineering 
students. 
Here is the reasoning: 
As you know, General Electric is playing a major role in the 
national program to increase minority engineering graduates (PIMEG) ten¬ 
fold during the next decade. Our commitment to the PIMEG effort is 
illustrated by Reg Jones' recent statement to the OIC Convocation in 
Minneapolis: 
# 
'There is one more outstanding example of the marriage of 
OIC and Industry that I would like to tell you about. Leon 
(Sullivan) has agreed to serve on the National Advisory Council 
on Minorities in Engineering to provide counsel to the National 
Academy of Engineering in leading a national drive to achieve 
a ten-fold increase in the number of minority persons entering 
the engineering profession. Progress toward integrating our 
technical management structure depends upon increasing the 
supply of minority engineers. Yet, in 1973, of the more than 
44,000 graduates who received BS degrees in engineering, 
only 574 were Black. I’ve agreed to chair the council which 
includes the heads of some of the nation's leading corporations, 
universities, minority organizations and governmental officials. " 
Our corporate-level minority engineering effort is directed at program 
activities supporting guidance, motivation, and student recruiting; education; 
financial needs and resources; employment; and national leadership. Financial 
aid for minority engineering students is and ’will continue to be a critical need 
for assuring the success of the national effort. The Company's program totals 
about $1 million; in addition there is a $1 million G. E. Foundation support 
including $280 thousand for about 250 scholarships. 
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Many operating components have already initiated local PEMEG 
activities and have committed to co-op, summer, or part-time jobs for 
minority engineering students. Such employment can be a powerful factor 
in successfully recruiting minority engineering graduates in what surely 
will be an increasingly competitive market. To complement minority en¬ 
gineering student employment, we would hope your collective efforts could 
match the 250 scholarships funded by the G. E. Foundation. 
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Schenectady, and San Jose are among the 
locations already embarked on scholarship-type programs. The amount 
can vary depending upon individual circumstances and will generally be in 
the $700-$1500 range. One component pays $1,000 while another pays one- 
half the total cost for'the freshman year and tuition and books the following 
years. 
As I’m sure you appreciate, the G. E. Foundation scholarships cannot 
be used to support G. E. employees nor can they be administered for the direct 
benefit of the Company. 
Attached is a brief form which may be useful in summarizing your local 
scholarship plan. I hope you will return it at the earliest feasible time to: 
Mr. William A. Orme, Manager 
Corporate Support Operation 
1285 Boston Avenue 
Bridgeport, Connecticut 06602 
Clearly this is a highly important project for us all, and one obviously 
in our own interest. We will deeply appreciate your giving it your full 
support. 
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TRI-LATERAL COUNCIL FOR QUALITY EDUCATION, INC. 










Request of school ( ) 
Company initiated ( ) 
(please check) 
Participants in program planning (Name and Affiliation): 
Time allocation: a) Program preparation time _ 
b) Actual program length: 
Date of program start-up  
Date of program completion _ 
Type of program: ( ) New Program 
(please check) ( ) Revision/Refinement of previously implemented 
program 
( ) Expansion of previously implemented program 
Grade levels involved 
Number of students involved _ 
^Number of teachers involved  
^Company personnel involved  
(^Specify titles or responsibilities if applicable, 
i.e.. Guidance Counselors, Personnel Officer, etc.) 
Program Description 
(Be as specific as possible and attach worksheets, outline, booklets 
or any other supplemental material available/produced on or for the 
program.) 
Estimated Program Cost 
(Include in — kind contribution of staff time, material, transporta 
tion, etc.) 
Goal/Objectives of the Program 
10) Evaluation of Program 
(i.e., student reaction if solicited, cooperation of people in¬ 
volved, suggested modifications/additions/deletions for program 
if you were to run it again.) 
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RAYTHEON COMPANY: MINORITY VENDOR INTRODUCTORY PROGRAM COMPANY PROFILE 
Company Name:_ Person to Contact:_ 
Mailing Address:_ Title:_ 
_ Telephone No.:_ 
Firm in Business Since_Average No. of Employees/Last F.Y._ 
Union Shop: Yes_No_ 
Products or Services Offered: 
Quality System per: MIL-Q-21549_MIL-Q-9858A_MIL-I-45208_ 
Other System Complied With:_ 
Has Q.C. System been approved by any Gov't. Agency/Raytheon? When? 
Present Customers— 
Facilities List Attached:_ 
Corporate Mgr. Minority Vendor Relations Tentative Evaluation of Above: 
TO BE FILLED IN BY PROCUREMENT PERSONNEL: Date _ 
Reviewed by_ Facility_ 
Cognizant Dep't. Mgr. 
ASSIGNED TO: 
Buyer/Subcontract Administrator  Ext. 
EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS RELATIVE TO THE CURRENT/FUTURE USE OF THE ABOVE 
SUGGESTED SOURCE OF SUPPLY: _ 
APPENDIX I 
TO OUR SHAREHOLDERS: 
There has been much talk in recent years of corporate social respon¬ 
sibility and of the need to develop some sort of social accounting to 
gauge how well a given firm is performing — not just as an economic 
unit but as a auzea Indeed, some have suggested that these measures 
of corporate performance beyond net protit should be subjected to an 
independent social audit. 
This insert for the 1972 Annual Report of Eastern Gas and Fuel 
.Associates has been designed as an expenmen tal exploration of two 
aspects of social accounting for "seif-auditing” purposes: 
(1) What are some internal topics on which management can pre¬ 
sently assemble and organize reasonably accurate and coherent 
data? 
(21 Which issues of social accountability are of external interest, and 
to what extent are shareholders in particular interested, if at all? 
To explore the It ret of these aspects we have gathered statistical 
information that covers four topics from among the many that are 
currently of concern to those studying-corporate social responsibility: 
• Industrial safety 
• Minority employment 
• Charitable giving 
• Pensions 
To explore the second aspect we have included, at the end of this 
insea a short questionnaire which, if you will mail it back. wiU serve 
as a useful measure of shareholder concern with corporate social respon¬ 
sibility ind the reporting of il No generally accepted standards or 
methods of presentation have been developed for shareholder reporting 
on such top.oi nor i» there clear evidence is to shareholder interest. 
The topics for this first report were not chosen because they are 
necessarily the most important ones, or the ones that might make us 
look good, but because they are the most readily measurable, because 
our goals with respect to them are comparatively simple and dear, and 
because they lie in areas where management can rather directiv 
influence results. In addition, managerial decisions on these topics can 
have a significant impact on earnings per share. 
in the process of making this first consolidation of social data from 
our various operations, we found that our records were less complete 
and less certain than we had believed. We also found that even inade¬ 
quate dtsdosure begins to exert a useful pressure on management to 
comply with new public expectations as to tne conduct of large corpora¬ 
tions. It may also be some of the best evidence that management is 
sincerely concerned and making an effort to meet proper expectations. 
Four major recurring principles for the quantification of social re¬ 
sponsibility have been suggested: 
The first is that our priorities have been changing with some 
rapidity. Many of our political economic and commercial measures 
of progress have become obsolescent. We need a new kind of social 
accounting that goes beyond GNP for the nation and goes beyond 
net profit for the firm. 
Second, while we think of our current economic ar.d accounting 
measures of GNP and net profit as very precise, when vou reailv Z'-t 
into the nitty gritty of how they are put together, their certainiv is 
delusive. 
Third, many proposed imprecise measures of social accounting car. 
be sufficiently accurate to be instructive. They are not hooelesslv less 
accurate than GNP or net profit, and so the;.' can be quia useful 
even though they lack precision, for many purposes for which we 
cannot use GNP and net profit. 
And finally, while our efforts to calibrate our concerns by social 
accounting will re flea this new sense of priorities, without persona! 
observation m the field and a weighing of the figures that we create 
with moral concerns, social accounting itself becomes only a new 
numbers game. 
As we proceed with these early attempts to develop some form of 
internal social accounting, we should acquire additional useful insights 
into this new art. 
Eli Goldston. PnzsiJer.: 
|T| INDUSTRIAL SAFETY 
Recent legislation has demonstrated that a major current public 
concern, especially in the heavy industries in which Eastern is involved, 
is the health and safety of employees. 
Our industrial accident record in recent years has not been very good. 
One standard measurement is the accident frequency rate (number of 
accidents versus hours worked), and our rate has almost doubled in the 
last three years, going up most dramatically in gas operations. It is clear 
that our safety performance has been slippmg. Ln addition it seems that 
our record is poorer than that of a number of firms with whom we hav e 
compared specific records. Just where we stand in our various industries 
is difficult to gauge because meaningful comparative figures are not 
available. 
ACCIDENT FREQUENCY RATE 
(lost tune accidents per million employee hou 
1970 1971 1972 
Coal <& Coke 43 61 78 
Gas 14 26 30 
Marine 34 41 43 
EG F.A Avg. 36 JO 64 
.Another measure of safety performance is the severity rate, which 
takes into account time lost as a result of accidents. Here Eastern's record 
has been steadier, and apparently more in Line with other firms for our 
industries. But much room for improvement remains. 
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ACCIDENT SEVERITY RATE 
(Employee days lost per million employee hours)' 
1970 1971 1972 
Coal &. Coke 22948 3,427 4209 
Gas 222 191 303 
Marine 1.707 1015 1.423 
EGFA Avg. 2225 2.516 3.033 
•Excluding days charged for fatalities. 
Frequency and sev erity rates, either for a single firm or for an industry, 
are rather elusive statistics. They may appear worse sun ply from im¬ 
proved reporting, or may appear better if excessive pressure to improve 
the record results tn variable reporting practices. Comparisons are 
complicated by numerous variables. Our river towboat crews, for in¬ 
stance, live aboard the boats and so are at their workplace even when 
not actually working. A greater awareness by both employees and 
management of the importance of safety may increase the number of 
reported accidents. Improved benefits could encourage accident report¬ 
ing. Comparisons are also difficult because of different bases of report¬ 
ing. We are trying for 1973 to improve bow our performance and our 
abtlity to supply managers with comparable industry statistics. 
Job related fatalities, of course, are the most salient and tragic acci¬ 
dents. We require full reports to top management on all serious injuries 
and fatalities along with proposals to prevent recurrence. At Eastern sve 
are constantly trying to develop more effective ways to impress on all 
our people the need to guard against the ever present hazards in their 
particular line of work. Here is our recent record of fatalities: 
FATALITIES 
fT] MINORITY EMPLOYMENT 
An important thrust of Eastern's soaai concerns effort is to respond 
positively to the apparently clear national desire to bring an end to 
discrimination in employment and promotion because of race, religion 
or other difference from that elusive notion of “the majority.’’ 
It is difficult to generalize fairly and judiciously about Eastern’s 
minority employment statistics. Numerically, minority employment in 
the company has increased in recent years, but has not quite maintained 
its percentage proportion. This has been particularly noticeable in coal 
operations, but in this instance, the increased employment has come 
in areas where there has been a smaller minority proportion in the local 
population. And it may be that the improving employment prospecs 
for minority members either with our competitors or in fields previously 
dosed to them have reduced the relative attractiveness of jobs with us. 
Boston Gas has had an excellent record of integrating its work force, 
but the addition of new territory with a different population mix has 




1 & Coke 
1970 1971 1972 
Total 5.703 6.050 6.448 
Minority 526 544 517 
% Mtnoncy 9.2% 9.0% 8.0% 
Total 1.466 1.500 1.611 
Minority 66 96 115 
% Minority 4.5% 6.4% 7.1% 
Total Employees 1.077 1.332 1.358 
1970 1971 1972 Minority 64 84 79 
Coal & Coke 8 3 4 % Minority 59% 6.3% 5.3% 
Gas 0 0 0 EGFA* 
Marine 1 1 2 Total Employees 3.349 8.995 9-526 
EGFA Total 9 4 6 
Minority 659 727 716 
% Minontv 7.9% 8.3% 7.5% 
Critics of industry often assume that management has more ability 
to reduce accident frequency and severity and to eliminate fatalities than 
may be the case. We do not accept at all the rationalization that 
“aeddentsjust happen” and we would be the last to suggest that a victim 
aione is at fault. But it is obvious that we need to be better persuaders 
and to improve training, motivation and enforcement when it is consid¬ 
ered that in at least five of the six 1972 fatalities, the victim was an 
experienced employee who was clearly violating a standard safety work 
rule of the com pans at the time of his death. The need for and difficulty 
of broad safety indoctrination is evidenced by the fact that 11 employees 
were fatailv injured in 1972 in accidents off the job 
The economics of safety reinforces our sodal/humanitanan concerns. 
Compensation of employees injured on the job cost Eastern at least 
S3.600.000 last year, or about 20c tn earnings per share. 
We are continuing to increase our commitment of men and money 
to ongoing safety programs in all operations. One of our headquarters 
officers has been assigned to regular field checks of safety practices and 
the compilation and analysis of accident statistics. Eastern .Associated 
Coal Corp has further strengthened its existing safety program by 
engaging the highly respected safety department of a firm in another 
industry to help us improve our safety performance in coal operations. 
In Boston Gas Company, a safety campaign has commenced that 
focuses not only on sale work habits but also on continuing “defensive’’ 
use of equipment and procedures to avoid dangerous situanons. 
•Includes Boston Office 
Measuring progress in integration is further complicated by the fact 
that companies were forbidden to record the race of employees unci 
quite recently. Many of our operations are so geographically scattered 
that it is difficult to determine in many cases tf our percentages of 
minority employment are in line with the minority population in reason¬ 
ably relevant areas, although this does seem to be true. 
MINORITY EMPLOYMENT LEVELS 




Officers & Managers 15 12 1229 1% 
Professional <& Technical 19 34 648 4.9% 
Clerical 58 56 895 6.1% 
Skilled 364 393 5.091 7.8% 
Unskilled 271 216 1.663 1.3% 
727 716 9,526 
Passing over complicated matters of definition, the figures seem to 
indicate that Eastern has done a reasonable job but soil has some 
distance to go in reaching a fair proportion of minorities in the work 
force and in levels of employment Our effort in recruitment and 
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advancement is to give due recognition to merit and performance while 
still showing concern for the need to achieve appropriate representation 
of minorities. There are local instances in our operations which will 
require continuing attention and prodding if this is to be accomplished. 
[~3~] CHARITABLE GIVING 
The figures we present below on our charitable giving through The 
Eastern .Associated Foundation are far from complete. Although most 
charitable guts of S500 and over have been made by all operations 
through the Foundation, a good many smaller gifts are made direclv 
from operating funds. In addition, there are expenditures that get 
classified as personnel expense or sales expense in Eastern that could 
properly be considered charitable giving. For example, we provide 
recreation directors for several of our mining communities and we 
subsidize a summer camp for the children of mine employees. Particu¬ 
larly in the mining areas, equipment is donated or the use of it given 
to various causes. In addition, company employees are sometimes 
loaned or assigned to assist in charitable campaign drives or social 
service projects. 
CHARITABLE GIVING BY THE 
EASTERN ASSOCIATED FOUNDATION 
1970 1971 
Total Contributions . SI85.442 5210320 
1% of Pre-Tax Income 336.450 240.750 
S per Employee 23.77 23.11 






The Federal Income Tax law permits contributions to the extent of 
5% of taxable income; many studies, however, have shown that the 
majority oflarge public corporations make charitable gifts of about 1% 
of pre-tax income. We nave been using this 1% figure as a guide so 
far as Foundation gifts are concerned. 
We have employed outside professional consultants to help us decide 
how la) to respond thoughtfully to the charitable concerns of the 
comm era ties with which we are related and (b) to balance the interest 
of numerous applicants. On. the basis of their suggestions we have 
considered it appropriate to channel Foundation giving about one-half 
to health and welfare, one-fourth to higher education, and one-fourth 
to civic and cultural causes. Casts of educational assistance to active 
employees is in addition to this giving. 
PER CENT OF FOUNDATION GIVING BY CATEGORY OF INTEREST 
1970 1971 1972 
Health and Welfare 56.3% 57.1% 53.8% 
Higher Educauon 26.4 20.7 223 
Civic and Cultural 173 22.2 23.4 
Total 100.0% 1000% 1C0.C% 
Charitable giving budgets are established annually by each of the 
operations and are reviewed along with our other business plans to be 
sure they are adequate and balanced. Through a matching gifts pro¬ 
gram. where the company matches an employee's gift to an educational 
institution. employees can themselves help determine the scale and 
direction of company assistance to higher education. 
PENSIONS 
Where at one time company retirement plans had been an accepted, 
almost competitive, way to attract and keep employees, current thanking 
turns more to their adequacy of coverage and fiscal soundness. In both 
of these areas it is virtually impossible to generalize about the pension 
arrangements for Eastern's employees. 
In the matter of coverage, all of our employees are. of course, covered 
by Social Security, with the employee and the employer paying their 
equal shares. In 1972 each paid 52% of the first 39,000 of an employee's 
earnings but this has since increased to 5.85% of the first S10.800. In 
addition, substantially all of Eastern's employees participate in one of 
the 23 separate formal retirement plans to w hich the company and its 
subsidiaries are a party. 
Eastern's pension arrangements involve very substantial amounts of 
money. Total Social Security payments by the company in 1972 
amounted to about S4.300.CXX). The expense for the various rvpes of 
pension and welfare plans supplemental to Social Security has climbed 
to more than S 12.5CO.OOO annually in recent years. Social Securty, health 
and retirement costs thus add an average of almost 32.000 per employee 
to the av erage of S 10.000 a year paid to an Eastern employee. 
.ANNU AL COST OF PENSION A WELFARE PLANS 
(3000) 
1970 1971 1972 
Union Welfare A Pension Plans 35,314 SJ.724 S 3.904 
Other Formal & Informal Plans 2.693 1967 3.649 
S3.507 58.691 311553 
(Costs charged to income in the fiscal year of the company) 
Eighteen of the formal retirement plans are maintained by negotia¬ 
tions in collective bargaining with various labor unions. In most of these 
we have no control over management of the funds or the amount of 
the benefits. We participate in the control of others to varying degrees. 
So far as we know, none of these funds has been challenged as to 
the competence of its management except die Health and Welfare Fund 
of the United Mine Workers. Contributions to this fund, based on a 
per tonnage contribution made by all unionized operators, including 
our Eastern Assoc.aied Coal Corp.. have been brought under Federal 
court jurisdiction because of alleged mismanagement 
So far as fiscal soundness is concerned, we annually charge as an 
expense against income an amount which reflects the actuarial obliga¬ 
tions of the current year. In addition, the past service obligations that 
existed when various funds were established or resulted from amend¬ 
ments. are being charged to the current year on the basis of 30-year 
amortization periods. 
We have been funding each negotiated plan in accordance with the 
relevant collective bargaining agreement. In the case of Eastern's Retire¬ 
ment Plan for Salaned Employees, which is non-negouated and non¬ 
contributory. funding has recently been brought up to the level for which 
concurrent tax deductibility is permitted. This plan is fairly well funded 
compared to the plans of most companies. 
.An accrued total liability of almost 335.000.000 is funded by assets 
in trust with a market value of about S27.COO.OOO. The additional 
S8.000.000 must be paid to the Trustees or earned through fund invest¬ 
ment income m excess of annual expenditures in order for the plan to 
be considered fully funded 
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STATUS OF EGFA SALARIED PLAN FUNDING 
Fiscal Year Ending June 30. 1972 
(S000) 
Liability for Retired Employees S18.S72 
Liability for Active & Terminated Employees 15,323 
S34.697 
Accrued Liabilitv $34,697 
Plan Assets at Market Value 26,671 
Unfunded Liability @ Market S 8.026 
It is difficult to determine how adequately funded the various nego¬ 
tiated plans are since many cover other companies in addition to our 
own companies and. with continuing changes in benefits, actuarial 
assumption, and market value of assets, there will be variations which 
defy simple explanation. 
We are regularly reviewing both our negotiated pension arrange¬ 
ments and our salaried plan, using an independent insurance firm as 
consultants when appropriate. We believe that the expense, the benefits 
and vesting provisions of our numerous retirement plans are reasonably 
in ur.c with those of the different industries in which we operate. Since 
the Health and Welfare Fund of the coal industry is portable within 
that industry, some of the issues as to portability do not appiv to our 
single iargest employee group. There may be continuing pressure to 
require us and other employers to liberalize vesting and portability. 
These are. no doubt, desirable pension changes, but they must be 
recognized as being increases in actual pension cost. 
The compilation of this report has helped to clarify- Eastern's goals 
in these areas of social concern. 
Our goal in industrial safety is to reverse an unfavorable trend and 
to significantly reduce the frequency and seventy of industnal accidents. 
Our goal in minority employment is to achieve full equality of 
opportunity for all and to adequately rerlect in our work force the 
minority proportion in the population of the areas of our operations 
without sacrificing performance standards. 
Our goal in charitable contributions is to maintain, possibly to in¬ 
crease, a level of about [% of pre-tax income as an appropriate amount 
of support for various social causes. 
Our goal in our retirement programs is to make certain that company 
benefits are adequate and that promises to employees are secured 
through proper funding. 
The attached questionnaire has a number of specific questions and 
also an opportunity for general comments. We will greatly appreciate 
yotir detaching it. filling it in and mailing it to us. We hope to be able 
to make a preliminary report at the shareholders’ meeting on April 26, 
1973 as to any significant shareholder opinion. 
SHAREHOLDER COMMENTS 
-x.iJ 
Please fid out, detach arul mail 
*--vr ***** 
i .ih'^aialR 
U VTU 1 r r: 






Should this sort of social accounting report be: 
Q enlarged 
continued in about same manner 
‘33 condensed 
□ ommed 
Should such reports cover 
□ Industnal Safety 
fj Minority Employment 
□ Charttabie Giving 
0 Pensions 
0 Environment 
(3 Female Employment 
0 Consumer Rights 
0 Other <piease list) 
How does our record on industrial accidents 
seem to you? 




Should the company conunue to move ahead 
of legal enforcement pressures in the following 
areas: 
Employment and promotion of minorities 
Q Yes 0 Moderately Q No 
Preferential hiring of minonues 
Q Yes 0 Moderately 0 No 
Special counselling, training for minonues 
0 Yes 0 Moderately 0 No 
5. In charitable contributions, should die com¬ 
pany give: 
0 Present level of about 1^ as is common 
practice 
0 Up to permitted tax deducuble level of 
of taxable income 
0 Above 5% even though not deductible 
0 Nothing, letting individuals choose their 
own charities 
6. Should company charitable contributions be: 
Limited to programs likely to serve our own 
emplovees and families 0 Yes 0 No 
Limited to sociai welfare programs such as 
hospitals or United Funds 0 Yes 0 No 
Include urban or minority programs 







Should the company continue its “Matching 
Gifts’’ program as a way of bringing employees 7 
inio chanuole giving decisions 
0 Ves 0 No 
(continued on other side) 
Please add your own comments below: 
» tfn-kM ri 'I P rm i m . >•»- 
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